OMANI INSIGHTS INTO IRAN AND IRAQ FOR NEA DAS GRAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 001876

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER IR IZ MU
SUBJECT: OMANI INSIGHTS INTO IRAN AND IRAQ FOR NEA DAS GRAY


Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4 (b, d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Calling Iran's political scene and new government a
sea of "shifting sands," royal adviser Abdulaziz al-Rawas
suggested that U.S. threats have only served to shore up
hardliners' support in Iranian society, and that a more
positive approach should be adopted. Separately, MFA Under
Secretary Sayyid Badr called U.S.-Iranian tensions the

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greatest strategic threat to Gulf security, and also urged
more positive U.S. engagement with Tehran. Sayyid Badr
expressed optimism over Iraq, noting that during his recent
visit, Iraqi FM Zebari provided the Omanis with welcome
reassurances. End summary.

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Looking for an Opening with Iran
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2. (SBU) During a December 5 visit to Muscat, NEA DAS Gordon
Gray separately called on the Sultan's Special Advisor for
Cultural Affairs (Oman's chief interlocutor with Iran)
Abdulaziz al-Rawas, and Foreign Ministry Under Secretary
Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi (FM Yusuf bin Alawi was out of the
country). DAS Gray was accompanied by the Ambassador and P/E
Chief (notetaker).


3. (C) Abdulaziz al-Rawas, former longtime Minister of
Information, briefed Gray on his last discussions with the
Iranian government in his long-standing capacity as the
Sultan's designated special envoy to Tehran. Rawas, as later
did Sayyid Badr, began his remarks by asking whether recent
reports that Ambassador Khalilzad was empowered to talk to
the Iranians might signify a new opening in U.S.-Iranian
dialogue. Gray put misleading press characterizations into
context, affirming that Switzerland would remain our
interlocutor with Iran while the EU-3 led the diplomatic
effort on the nuclear issues.

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Divergent Iranian Social Currents
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4. (C) On the issue of whether Iran was itself prepared for
dialogue with the U.S., Rawas described the current political
environment in Tehran as one of "shifting sand." President
Ahmadinejad, he observed, is still new and seeking to build
his reputation as a "man of the people." His standoff with
the Majlis over the Oil Minister portfolio illustrated the
resentment the parliament feels over his tactics. Rawas
called Ahmadinejad's circle of advisers "a bunch of
unknowns," and was uncertain whether any of them had much
international awareness. He noted many dichotomies in
Iranian society. Conservatives remain dogmatically tied to
the concept of "velayat e-faqih," yet there is a strong
reformist opposition and considerable freedom to criticize,
even in the press. The journalistic redlines were unclear,
however, which has led to an "acceptable" but not quite
"vigorous" amount of public debate.


5. (C) He said young Iranians continue to aspire to greater
political and social freedom and more economic opportunity.
They are deeply resentful of the Basij militia. And yet,
under Ahmadinejad, Rawas observed that Iranian women are more
visible in public places (even hotels),ostentatiously
smoking and chatting with people. He saw this as women's
efforts to preserve freedoms previously won. Iranians, he
said, are conflicted by the threat they feel from the U.S.,
while at the same time being frustrated by oppression at
home. He sensed a nation "waiting for the shoe to drop."

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Urging Iran to Respect the International Community
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6. (C) During his late August meeting with Ahmadinejad to
deliver a message from Sultan Qaboos, Rawas said he was
lectured about letting foreign forces tell Oman what to do.
He argued back that nations are interconnected and one cannot
ignore legitimate concerns. Nasser learned that lesson to
Egypt's detriment in his confrontation with the UN, just as
Saddam did over Kuwait. Rawas said he urged Ahmadinejad to
learn from those mistakes rather than follow down the same
disastrous path. "See the world as it is and not as you wish
it to be."


7. (C) On Omani-Iranian relations, Rawas again observed that
Iran is constantly changing and evolving. He never perceived
an Iranian threat to Oman, but noted Iran was also never shy
about asserting its influence. Given Iran's limited economic
allure to the Arab Gulf states, and the fact that it has
nothing on the religious side to teach the Arabs (even Arab
Shia are more drawn to Iraq than Iran, Rawas noted),he said
Tehran tends to focus more on Central Asia, where is has a
better chance to wield influence. A chief adviser to the
Iranian president dined with Rawas one evening during his
visit, and tried to woo Oman with offers of technology.
Rawas bluntly told him that Oman relied on the West for its
trade and alliances.

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No Substitute for Dialogue
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8. (C) Rawas urged the U.S. to seek a more active, direct
dialogue with Tehran. He cautioned Washington to remember
three key factors that would influence any rapprochement.
First, Iran's strong sense of national pride is deeply
offended by such things as having its assets frozen in the
West. Second, it is threatened by the decision to route a
Caspian oil pipeline to Turkey rather than the Persian Gulf.
Third, Iran desires recognition as the major regional power.
Gray replied that the USG desires good relations with the
Iranian people, but deeply opposes such Iranian policies as
its support for terrorists. Rawas agreed that, were Tehran
to cease its financial support of Hezbollah, that
organization "would dry up in six months."


9. (C) Gray described the serious USG concerns about Iran's
nuclear activities. Rawas said the Iranians insisted to him
that they were not pursuing nuclear weapons, to which he
replied, "Then why are you antagonizing the international
community?" The Iranians rejoined that nobody could deny
them their sovereign rights, and rejected the notion of any
confidence building measures since the U.S., they feel, is
bent on humiliating Iran. The Iranians, he said, were
offended that their cooperation in Afghanistan earned them no
favors from Washington. Rawas said he told his hosts that
the "U.S. didn't attack you - that's your reward." But
despite his bluntness with Tehran, Rawas reiterated to Gray
that U.S. threats against Iran have only helped reinforce
public support for hardliners these past 25 years. The U.S.,
he said, must keep pressure on Iran, yet also use fewer
threats. He acknowledged that finding a proper balance would
not be easy.

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U.S.-Iran Tensions: A Threat to Gulf Security
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10. (C) Similar sentiments were expressed by MFA Under
Secretary Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi, who was accompanied in his

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meeting by A/S-equivalent for Europe and North America,
Ambassador Mohammed Tahir Aided. Departing that evening to
address a seminar on Gulf security in London, Sayyid Badr
said he intended to sound an optimistic note. If he had to
pick the single biggest challenge to Gulf security, however,
he said frankly that it was U.S.-Iranian tensions. As long
as that bilateral relationship "lacks a proper footing," it
poses a strategic danger to the region. Sayyid Badr noted
that Iranian-Arab relations have their own share of problems,
but that Iran cannot be simply ignored or marginalized any
longer.


11. (C) Sayyid Badr said he was pleased to hear from Gray
that the U.S. remained open to dialogue with Iran to resolve
deep concerns over Iranian policy, even if Tehran perhaps did
not show a similar willingness. He said Oman shares USG
concern over Iran's nuclear program, support for terrorism,
and human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the Sultanate has
rejected the impulse to either isolate or confront Iran, but
rather pursued the only attractive option: dialogue and
cooperation. Acknowledging that "the stick" has its proper
place, Sayyid Badr said there was still considerable room for
"the carrot." He and Gray discussed the U.S., the EU-3 and
IAEA's approach to Iran's nuclear program, with Gray
emphasizing the need for Iran to understand it was facing
international rather than simply U.S. opposition. Gray
underscored that the USG remained focused on the goal of
reaching a successful conclusion with measurable results on
Tehran's nuclear program.

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Buoyant on Iraq, Engagement with U.S.
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12. (C) Turning to Iraq, Gray provided an overview of
positive trends as the Iraqis approached another historic
election on December 15, as well as remaining challenges.
Sayyid Badr replied that Oman continues to be optimistic
about Iraq's future, citing the country's considerable
natural resources and a confidence that its people are
capable of living in harmony. Iraqi FM Zebari had recently
visited Muscat, he said, and provided a reassuring,
first-hand impression of the situation there. The Omani said
reconstruction cannot be deterred by security problems.


13. (C) Sayyid Badr was appreciative of these bilateral
consultations with the U.S., noting that he was "bullish" on
life in Oman and, more widely, within the GCC - even if the
media did not always portray this in the West. Gray said
Oman's June participation in the Smithsonian Folklife
Festival on the Mall, and plans to dispatch a tall ship to
the U.S. in 2006, combined with an activist Omani Embassy in
Washington, were all key to better portraying the reality.
Sayyid Badr agreed, noting that U.S. engagement in Oman was
equally important.


14. (U) DAS Gray cleared this cable.
BALTIMORE