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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05MUSCAT135 2005-01-25 12:26:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 01/25/2005

Tags:   AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS KVPR MU EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  S E C R E T MUSCAT 000135 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/DSS/OSAC,
DS/OPO/FPD, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS KVPR MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 01/25/2005

REF: A. TD-314/03138-05


B. ITA/RSO E-MAILS DTD 01/20/2005

C. MUSCAT 0110

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(c).

-------
Summary
-------



1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Emergency
Action Committee January 25 to review the Embassy's security
posture following the Eid al-Adha holiday. Members of the
EAC noted no substantive changes in the local security
environment since the last meeting. Accordingly, the EAC
agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security posture
and FPCON remain appropriate. End Summary.



--------------------------


Security and Threat Environments


--------------------------





2. (S/NF) On January 25, the Ambassador chaired a meeting
of the Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the
Embassy's security posture following the Eid al-Adha holiday.
The meeting opened with a discussion of the local and
regional security situations; the EAC continued to
characterize the former as stable. RMAS did, however, raise
uncorroborated threat reporting alleging that, as of late
December 2004, a group of extremists, traveling in groups of
pilgrims, were ordered by Usama bin Ladin to travel to Oman
and Dubai, U.A.E., to carry out terrorist attacks against
Westerners (NFI) (reftels A and B). RMAS noted that the
information, of undetermined veracity, and originating from a
source of unknown reliability, was referred to their Omani
security service contacts for investigation. Members of the
EAC noted no additional threat reporting specific to Oman.



3. (SBU) RSO also described a situation that occurred on
January 20, in which an Embassy employee reported his
cellular telephone apparently stolen from his residence by a
group of uncharacteristically rambunctious Omani youths who
were walking door-to-door asking for gifts in conjunction
with Eid al-Adha, which is customary on that holiday. RSO is
in the process of reporting details of the incident to the
Royal Oman Police. Members of the EAC cited no other
security incidents among their staffs or family members over
the weekend, and CONS confirmed that there were no security
incidents or security-related queries from the private
American citizen community.



--------------------------


Continued Vigilance


--------------------------





4. (SBU) Prior to concluding the meeting, RSO reiterated
that, despite the relative calm, members of the EAC must
continue reinforcing to both their staffs and family members
the need for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal
security, including the need to maintain a low profile and to
remain unpredictable. RSO further re-emphasized the
importance of immediately reporting all suspicious activity
or security-related incidents, especially those involving
suspected surveillance, to Post One.



--------------------------


EAC Conclusion


--------------------------





5. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that there have been no
substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the
local security environment since the last meeting held on
January 18 (reftel C), and that the Embassy's FPCON and
already heightened security posture remain appropriate.
Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of the need to
monitor both the regional and local security and threat
environments, and is prepared to take the necessary
countermeasures should changes to either occur. AMB, DCM,
RSO, RMAS, P/E, PAO, CONS, MGT, DAO, MSG, OMC (USDR), and ECA
(USCENTAF) participated in the meeting, which was followed by
a meeting of the Visas Viper Committee.
BALTIMORE