Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MUSCAT1027
2005-06-29 12:52:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

CSI TARGETS PORT SALALAH FOR EXPANSION

Tags:  EWWT PARM PHSA PREL MU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 001027 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI (TROBERTS),NP/ECC (TGROEN),DS/IP/NEA
ABU DHABI FOR W. WALLRAPP
USCBP FOR T. HORTON
AMMAN FOR J. IRVINE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EWWT PARM PHSA PREL MU
SUBJECT: CSI TARGETS PORT SALALAH FOR EXPANSION

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 001027

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI (TROBERTS),NP/ECC (TGROEN),DS/IP/NEA
ABU DHABI FOR W. WALLRAPP
USCBP FOR T. HORTON
AMMAN FOR J. IRVINE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EWWT PARM PHSA PREL MU
SUBJECT: CSI TARGETS PORT SALALAH FOR EXPANSION

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) On June 17, at the request of Omani Minister of
Commerce and Industry Maqbool bin Ali Sultan, an assessment
team for the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program
arrived in Oman to meet with government contacts and
officials from Salalah Port Services (SPS) to discuss Oman's
potential participation in the expanding CSI program.


2. (SBU) The CBP delegates were warmly received, having gone
to great lengths to reassure SPS management of the commercial
benefits of the CSI program and allaying SPS fears that
scanning high-risk containers at the transshipment hub will
harm productivity. To begin moving forward, however, the CBP
team will need to negotiate the use and modification of
identified workspace at SPS, while the government will need
to commit to procuring new inspection equipment for Port
Salalah.


3. (U) The CSI team visit also helped lay the foundation for
an upcoming visit by the Department of Energy's Megaports
assessment team. Working in close coordination with the CSI
program, Megaports aims to outfit strategic ports with free
radiation portal monitoring equipment. End Summary.

-------------- --
CSI TEAM ARRIVES AT REQUEST OF OMANI GOVERNMENT
-------------- --


4. (U) Following successful discussions in Washington, D.C.
with Omani Minister of Commerce and Industry Maqbool bin Ali
Sultan, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) followed
through on its commitment to send a Container Security
Initiative (CSI) assessment team to Oman. The team members,
including officials from CBP, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE),the Department of Energy, and U.S. Coast
Guard, arrived in Muscat on June 17 to meet with counterparts
at the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MTC),
Royal Oman Police Coast Guard and Customs, and senior
management at Salalah Port Services (SPS) to discuss Oman's
potential participation in the expanding CSI program.


5. (U) Currently operational in 37 international ports, the
purpose of the CSI program is to protect the global trading
system and trade lanes between CSI ports and the United

States. Although CSI partners must procure their own
non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment, CBP deploys its own
team of 5 officers to identified CSI ports to work with
customs counterparts to identify and coordinate exams of
high-risk containers bound for the United States. While the
wait time for screening targeted cargo at U.S. ports may be
up to 10 days or more, screening at the port of transit or
origin can be accomplished during a container's "down" time
and significantly expedites the shipment's processing through
CBP upon arrival to the United States.

--------------
CSI TARGETS PORT SALALAH
--------------


6. (U) Although the government of Oman has been actively
pursuing participation in the CSI program and is eager to
receive a CBP team straightaway, officials at Salalah Port
Services were less impressed by the promised commercial
benefits of CSI and assert that scanning high-risk containers
at the transshipment hub will harm productivity. Senior SPS
management also expressed more pressing operational concerns,
such as who will absorb the additional cargo handling costs
and how will SPS officials liaise with ROP Customs
counterparts with whom they currently have little
interaction.


7. (U) In rather contentious meetings with SPS operators, the
CBP team expounded on the strategic importance of Port
Salalah, highlighting the fact that since the transshipment
hub often represents the last port of lading before reaching
the U.S., it is the first viable opportunity for CPB officers
to analyze and target shipments bound for the U.S. Moreover,
pre-screening targeted shipments has proved successful in
facilitating faster cargo flow into U.S. ports, attracting
the interest and support of the international business
community.


8. (SBU) In highlighting the significance of Salalah's
location and traffic flow, CBP officials reminded SPS
management that Port Salalah currently ranks 35th in
containerized cargo flow to the U.S. Although this
represents less than 1 percent of all traffic into the U.S.,
it is nonetheless significant. To demonstrate how CSI would
impact Salalah's container traffic, CBP officials conducted
an analysis of the 74,234 containers shipped from Salalah to
the U.S. in 2004. Of those 74,234 containers, approximately
2,000 would have been identified as high-risk through the
automated targeting system. While the average scan of
imports at U.S. ports is approximately 6 percent, this would
have represented just 3% of Salalah's U.S.-bound cargo.


9. (U) A CBP team at Port Salalah would significantly
increase the flow of Salalah's U.S.-bound cargo through U.S.
ports. The team in Salalah would identify high-risk
containers through an automated targeting system that filters
information from the bill of lading. Although there are a
minimum of 15 data points required for an accurate analysis,
there are a multitude of rules that are used to immediately
sort and identify high-risk shipments. According to CBP
officials, rules may include anything from first-time
shippers to low-volume exporters. If a container is
identified as a high-risk shipment, through the points-based
targeting system, it would be referred to Omani Customs for
scanning. Should ROP Customs disagree with the team's
findings and choose not to scan an identified high-risk
container, the CBP officials may issue a "do not load"
certificate to the carrier, advising the carrier that the
container will not be unloaded in the U.S. and, moreover, may
affect that carrier's ability to call at a U.S. port.

--------------
MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE OFFERS FREE EQUIPMENT
--------------


10. (U) In a related initiative, a representative from the
Department of Energy's Megaports program accompanied the CSI
team to official ministry meetings and visits at Port
Salalah. The Megaports initiative works in conjunction with
the CSI program by providing radiation portal monitors at
selected ports. Should the Omani government be amenable, an
assessment team from the Department of Energy would travel to
view Port Salalah in late September and determine optimal
locations for radiation scanning equipment. The equipment is
free of charge and is managed by host-nation personnel after
a brief period of training conducted both in the U.S. and
locally.


11. (U) The monitors are passive measurement equipment that
would be placed in normal thru-fares within the port. If
radiation is detected, an alarm would simultaneously alert
ROP Customs and the CSI staff. As part of the agreement,
however, all seizures of radiation material must be reported
to the Embassy; there can be no taxation on associated
services; and there must be a commitment by the Omani
government to maintain the equipment beyond the three-year
warranty and maintenance period.

--------------
NEXT STEPS
--------------


12. (SBU) In a de-brief with Embassy personnel, CBP officials
outlined the next steps, clarifying that before a team will
be deployed to Salalah, Oman must first sign a Declaration of
Principles (DOP) and agree to utilize newly purchased NII
equipment for Salalah. In the interim, CBP officials
confirmed that they can deploy their own equipment in order
to prevent any delays in implementing the program. However,
equipment will only be deployed up to one year and will
require CBP personnel to oversee the use of the equipment at
all times. (Note: According to one official at the MTC, the
government has already budgeted for new NII equipment and
will guarantee procurement within the one year timeframe.
End Note.)


13. (SBU) Moving forward, office space will need to be
negotiated with SPS and then remodeled. However, the MTC
confirmed that, according to its concession agreement with
SPS, it alone is responsible for allocating space and will
make the necessary arrangements directly with SPS. The
Embassy will work in coordination with the ICE Attache in Abu
Dhabi to secure construction of the office space, assess
local housing, and work with the Omani government in
determining the country status of CBP personnel. (Note:
Operating under Chief of Mission authority, the personnel
will seek Administrative and Technical status for purposes of
immunity. End Note.)

BALTIMORE