KREMLIN AGGRESSIVELY SEEKS TO DISRUPT KASYANOV'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 015735

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: KREMLIN AGGRESSIVELY SEEKS TO DISRUPT KASYANOV'S
PRESIDENTIAL HOPES

REF: A. MOSCOW 8535

B. MOSCOW 7972

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, the
only declared candidate for the 2008 presidential election,
has faced a tough and thus far frustrating slog in his bid to
unite the democratic opposition behind him. During several
recent visits to the country's regions, Kasyanov has been
shouted down by organized protesters, assaulted with eggs,
physically blocked from entering meeting places, and on one
occasion prevented from speaking to supporters because of an
alleged bomb threat. The latest setback occurred last week
when supporters of a rival candidate for the leadership of
the Democratic Party prevented him from attending the party's
congress. Kasyanov's chief advisor acknowledged to us
December 23 that his boss was disheartened by recent events
but remained undeterred and will press ahead with his
political quest. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In recent months, former Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov has sought to position himself as the only viable
democratic presidential candidate (reftels). He has made
limited progress in this regard, gaining support from Nikita
Belykh of the Union of Right Forces (SPS); Irina Khakamada,
leader of Our Choice and a former presidential candidate; and
Ivan Starikov, maverick member of the SPS Political Council
and former campaign manager for Mikhail Khodorkovskiy's
failed bid to run in a State Duma by-election earlier this
month. Kasyanov's prominence at a December 12 Civil Congress
of democratic politicians and civil society activists might
also have boosted his hopes, though many remain suspicious of
Kasyanov and believe he must do more to burnish his
democratic credentials. Among other things, many democrats
view his reputation for corruption and his close ties to
Russian business "oligarchs" as an Achilles heel. As he
worked to establish his credentials, Kasyanov was also hoping
that a take-over of the Democratic Party (DP) would give him
a launching pad for his political ambitions and allow him to
avoid creating his own party. But in that endeavor, too, his
reputation for corruption preceded him, and even some of his
sympathizers acknowledged to us that he had tried to buy his
way into control of the party.
.
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NOT THE WAY TO UNITE THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
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3. (C) Oleg Buklemishev, long-time advisor to the former
Prime Minister, told us December 23 that Kasyanov had fully
expected strong pressure from the Kremlin and other opponents
of his candidacy, but the intensity of the opposition and
level of vitriol associated with recent events in Moscow and
Kursk had come as an unwelcome surprise. Buklemishev said
the fiasco surrounding the December 17 DP congress in Moscow,
in particular, had caught Kasyanov and his supporters
completely offguard. He confirmed media reports that some
delegates had prevented Kasyanov from attending the main
congress, where Kasyanov had hoped to be elected party leader
and, subsequently, to use the DP as the vanguard for a united
democratic opposition for the 2007-08 election cycle.
Instead, the current Chairman of the DP's Central Committee,
Andrey Bogdanov, was elected party leader, while Kasyanov and
company were forced to hold a separate, hastily arranged
meeting elsewhere in the city.


4. (C) Buklemishev contended that the Kremlin had
effectively split the DP by buying off Bogdanov and his block
of delegates. Such a divide-and-conquer approach was a
staple Kremlin political strategy, he offered, but the use of
physical intimidation to lock out a viable challenger was
"childish" and demonstrated a new low even by Russia's
deteriorating democratic standards. In spite of the lockout,
Buklemishev claimed that DP delegates from 32 regions threw
in their lot with Kasyanov at the alternative congress, which
was also attended by Belykh and Khakamada. However,
Buklemishev acknowledged that Kasyanov's failure to take over
the DP had undermined his longer-term political strategy,
which he, along with other members of Kasyanov's advisory
team, would re-evaluate in coming weeks. Among the options
was creation of a totally new political organization. He
asserted, however, that Kasyanov intended to press ahead with
his political quest despite the mounting pressure against him.
.
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IT'S EVEN WORSE IN THE PROVINCES
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5. (C) Buklemishev went on to say that Kasyanov had

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confronted similar opposition the previous week during a
visit to Kursk, which he described as a DP stronghold with
more than 10,000 local members (NOTE: Some media reports
suggested that the number of DP members in Kursk is closer to
13,000, including several members of the local legislature).
Buklemishev reported that local authorities had initially
denied permission to host a party meeting at two venues
before finally settling on a third location. The last-minute
decision did not deter organized protesters from showing up
at the approved location. At the entrance to the building
Buklemishev said several hundred pensioners and members of
the pro-Kremlin Nashi demonstrated against Kasyanov. Local
police stood by as scuffles broke out between Nashi members
and DP supporters; police intervened only when some of the
Nashi members began to damage the property because, as a
senior police official explained to Buklemishev, local
authorities would blame the police for any damage.
Buklemishev said a row of parked cars prevented Kasyanov's
vehicle from entering the street where the building was
located, and Kasyanov was forced to walk the last block on
foot. Much of the crowd had backed off at that point, but at
least one protester threw an egg at Kasyanov (but missed).
Buklemishev added that a subsequent meeting with the public
was canceled because of an alleged bomb threat.


6. (C) Buklemishev noted that Kursk was Kasyanov's third
foray to the regions since he announced his presidential
candidacy. Protesters had greeted Kasyanov elsewhere, but
not with the intensity he encountered in Kursk. (NOTE:
Kasyanov is not the only member of the democratic opposition
to face such difficulties. Garri Kasparov, head of the
United Civic Forum, has experienced similar protests in his
regional travels.) In addition to the continuing
demonstrations, Buklemishev said Kasyanov found it hard to
get positive media attention, and Duma Deputy Aleksandr
Khinshteyn continued to dog him with allegations of
corruption. Khinshteyn's latest charge was that Kasyanov had
attempted to bribe DP members to support his bid for the
party's leadership. Dismissing Khinshteyn as a hack whose
disreputable activities were well known even in Soviet times,
Buklemishev nonetheless admitted that further allegations of
corruption, however false, did not help Kasyanov's cause and
would bolster the Kremlin's relentless campaign to undermine
the candidate's political message. Buklemishev added that
Kremlin pressure even extended to prospective clients of
Kasyanov's private consulting business, MK Analytika. The
firm had virtually no business because potential customers
feared retaliation from authorities for their association
with Kasyanov.
.
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COMMENT
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7. (C) Both Buklemishev in his meeting with us and Kasyanov,
in his public statements, have tried to spin recent setbacks
in a positive light. Kasyanov has cited the DP congress
affair, in particular, as an example of the Kremlin's fear of
the popular will and criticized the extent to which
authorities will employ ruthless "elements of
totalitarianism" to maintain their grasp on power. Kasyanov
also said in an interview with Ekho Moskviy radio December 19
that he did not view his failure to secure the DP leadership
as a defeat and reaffirmed his intention to challenge the
current political establishment. That may be so, but
Buklemishev's comments to us, which might or might not be
disingenuous about Kasyanov's indignation at Kremlin tactics,
make it clear that Kasyanov's campaign is in considerable
disarray before it has had a chance to get off the ground.
Kasyanov's resilience will be tested as he tries to rescue
his effort to unite the democratic opposition, and the odds
against him will remain daunting. In addition to continued
strong opposition from the Kremlin, Kasyanov still needs to
demonstrate to the general public that he is not corrupt and
prove to the liberal opposition that he is a genuine democrat
worthy of support. Nonetheless, the Kremlin's dislike of the
upstart challenger is evident. As Kasyanov underscored in
the Ekho Moskviy interview last week, the "rules of the game
offered by the state are unplayable because the player on one
side can just overturn the chessboard at any time." Recent
events in Moscow and Kursk seem to signify that authorities
are prepared to employ a full array of options against
Kasyanov -- and to ensure that his chessboard remains
unbalanced and unusable.


8. (C) Ironically, Kasyanov appears to share with Putin one
benefit -- the absence of a credible alternative. We have
previously noted that while Putin is genuinely popular, he
also benefits from a broad perception that there is no
alternative to him. To a certain extent, Kasyanov benefits
from the same perception among those at the "democratic" end

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of the political spectrum. One prominent commentator, for
instance, recently complained about Kasyanov's failure to
anticipate the Kremlin's hardball tactics against him and his
"pathetic" Ekho Moskviy interview but still said that
Kasyanov was, faute de mieux, the only plausible democratic
challenger for the presidency.


9. (C) We would also note that from its beginnings, people
close to the Kasyanov effort have spoken of mounting an
electoral challenge for the presidency in 2008 but have, in
fact, appeared more hopeful about the possibility that
Kasyanov might emerge as a near-consensus candidate of the
political and economic elite at an undefined time of national
crisis before 2008 arrives, potentially obtaining the nod
from Putin himself for the succession. That seemed very much
an outside chance even early in 2005, when things were going
badly for Putin, and seems even less likely now.
Nonetheless, many continue to note that despite Khinshteyn's
continuing drumbeat of allegations against Kasyanov, there
has yet to be any legal action taken against him, and others
perceive an obscure Kasyanov link through Roman Abramovich to
Putin's entourage. We continue to see Kasyanov's prospects
as very limited but also regard his "campaign" efforts as
being as much a negotiation offer as an attempt at outreach
to the public.
RUSSELL