Presidential Elections To Take Place In March 2006

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SIPDIS


SIPDIS
(CORRECTED COPY E.O. LINE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: Presidential Elections To Take Place In March 2006

Ref: A) Minsk 1495

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Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: On December 16, the Belarusian Parliament in a
suddenly announced extraordinary session unanimously approved
March 19, 2006, as the date for holding presidential elections.
Rumors about holding the elections in March started to circulate
in November, although Belarusian election officials had been
indicating the elections would most likely be held in July. It
is probably not a coincidence that the Parliament's "decision"
came the day after President Lukashenko returned from meeting
with Russian President Putin in Sochi. There Putin reportedly
promised Lukashenko Russia would continue to supply Belarus with
highly subsidized energy deliveries in 2006 Q key support for
Lukashenko that may have sealed his decision on a March date.
What the Russians will get in return is not clear but Gazprom's
gaining full control of Belarus' gas transit network and/or
acceleration toward a union state would fulfill major Russian
objectives that Lukashenko has been withholding. It is also not
entirely out of the question that Russia's support may also
entail an agreement from Lukashenko to find a successor
acceptable to Russia to be announced before the end of the year
when all candidates must legally declare their intention to run.
In any event, the decision to hold the elections in March may be
the last nail in the coffin the regime has been fashioning for
the opposition over the past several months. It clearly
complicates, if not virtually destroys, the small and poorly
supported Belarusian opposition's chances to challenge
Lukashenko or any GOB candidate either before or after the
elections. It is also conveniently timed to prevent Western aid
to the opposition from playing any effective role in the
elections as well as takes advantage of the West's chronic
difficulty in reacting to events in Belarus. For Russia, March
elections may also conveniently remove Belarus as a complication
for the 2006 G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in July since by then
Moscow may hope its G-8 partners will have resigned themselves
to the post election situation in Belarus. End Summary.


Following Lukashenko-Putin Meeting, Parliament Goes Into Action
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Immediately following President Lukashenko's December
15 meeting with Russian President Putin in Sochi, press reports
indicated the Lower House would convene on December 16 in an
extraordinary session to set the date of the elections. (Note:
The press offices of both presidents released statements
confirming the presidents discussed the upcoming elections in
Belarus.) At 10am (local time) on December 16 the Speaker of
Parliament convened a plenary session to review a legislative
decree drafted earlier in the morning by the Committee on State
System Building, Local Self-Governance, and Rules of Procedure.
Independent journalists observing the process in the Parliament
building told Emboffs that Central Electoral Commission Lydia
Yermoshina and Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration
Natalia Petkevich were participants in the committee session.
Once drafted, the decree was immediately sent to the plenary
session and was approved in a unanimous decision. Article 81 of
the Constitution stipulates that the setting of election dates
falls exclusively under the purview of the Lower House. The
Upper House and President Lukashenko do not need to ratify the
decree.


Next Steps in the Election Process
--------------


3. (U) Deputy and Secretary of the CEC Nikolai Lozovik told
Pol/Econ Chief that prospective presidential candidates must
make a formal application to the CEC by December 23. The
application must include names of those citizens who will make
up the "group of support," which have at least 100 members. The
CEC will have up to five days to verify the identity and legal
status of the candidates and their respective support groups.
Once the CEC approves the candidates and their support groups,
the candidates will have 30 days, or until January 27, to
collect 100,000 signatures of support from voters. The CEC will
then take up to 10 days to verify a sample portion of each set
of signatures. Thus, the names of those candidates who will
appear on the election ballot will not be known by February 10.
(Note: Opposition leaders expect the verification of signatures
to be a pivotal point in the campaign, because the CEC will have
complete discretion on determining the validity of signatures.
The CEC in past elections have frequently disqualified
candidates by claiming many of their signatures are false.)


Why In March? Q The Official Reasons
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4. (C) Lozovik told Pol/Econ Chief that the Lower House was
perfectly within their right to set the elections in March.
When Pol/Econ Chief reminded Lozovik that many government
officials, including his boss CEC Chairwoman Lydia Yermoshina,
made statements indicating the elections would likely be held in
July, he maintained that the scheduling of elections is the sole
prerogative of Parliament. Lozovik added that Article 81 of the
Constitution stipulates only that presidential elections have to
held two months prior to the expiration of the current
president's term, or July, and the elections have to be
announced no later than five months prior to the expiration of
the president's term. Thus, Parliament could schedule the
elections anytime up until July 19.


5. (C) Lozovik commented that spring elections would be more
"convenient" for voters and the candidates than summer
elections. According to Lozovik, summer is a time for vacations
and rest, not elections. The CEC official speculated that March
elections would be better for the candidates because a higher
concentration of voters, particularly students, will be in the
cities and therefore more likely to participate in the voting on
Election Day.


Why in March? Q The More Likely Reasons
--------------


6. (C) The opposition greatly feared the elections would be
called in March, as it would give them little time to advance
their cause among the Belarusian electorate, although the regime
has done everything else to prevent contact between the
opposition and the people. The 10+ coalition candidate,
Aleksandr Milinkevich, convened an emergency meeting of the
campaign team on December 16 to discuss strategy in light of the
new election date. When DAS David Kramer met with Milinkevich's
campaign team during his December 5-6 visit Minsk, campaign
manager Sergey Kalyakin admitted that if the elections were held
in March, the campaign would suffer a fatal blow (reftel).
(Note: Kalyakin separately told Econoff that President
Lukashenko would consider elections in March to take advantage
of the public relations campaign surrounding the delivery of the
S-300 missile systems by Russia and to the commissioning of the
last two co-prescor stations on the Yamal-Europa g`s pipeli.e.)


Comment
--------------


7. (C) Lukashenko's decision to hold the elections in March (in
Belarus the parliament is only a rubber stamp for presidential
directives) may be another brilliant move by this master
politician/dictator to seal completely the opposition's fate and
his own sure victory in extending his rule yet again next year.
Belarus' small and weakly supported opposition, already
inhibited by the regime's increasingly draconian measures aimed
at preventing contact with the people and the outside world,
will probably not be able to mount an effective challenge to
Lukashenko by March. It is also hard to believe that `
significand number of Belarusians will be sufficiently
stimulated to go into the streets by March as so many now seem
resigned to their fate. Moreover, any Western aid or radio
projects will probably be too little and, more importantly, too
late to have any effect on the March elections. It may also be
difficult for any real opposition candidate to collect the
required 100,000 signatures needed by January to actually run in
the race. The regime may also have calculated that with Russian
sup0ort locked in, a united Western stand `gainst Lukashenko
will be difficult if not impossible to achieve. Lukashenko may
also have considered that Ukrainian elections in March will
garner greater international attention and international
observer participation.


8. (C) What is not clear is what may have been Russia's price
in return for Putin agreeing to continue supplying Belarus cheap
energy Q the crucial support for the Lukashenko regime that
probably sealed Lukashenko's decision to set the March date.
Gazprom chairman Miller may have the answer in his public
remarks that Gazprom's achieving full control over Belarus'
pipeline network would fulfill a major Russia demand that
Lukashenko has been withholding. Acceleration of the union
state may also be a part of the quid pro quo as the two
presidents reportedly agreed that the Supreme Council would meet
later this month to advance the process Q another key Russian
objective.


9. (C) We also do not rule out that Putin may have achieved
agreement from Lukashenko to name a successor acceptable to
Russia who might be announced by the end of the year, as that is
the deadline under Belarusian law for candidates to make formal

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their intention to contest the elections. Some sources have
indicated this had been a major condition Putin had made to
Lukashenko when they met in Sochi in the summer. If this
scenario were to happen, it could follow the example of
Yeltsin's "elegant," if not abrupt, departure in 1999 when he
announced his resignation in his end of year message and named
Putin to succeed him with elections that followed in March.
Chief of Presidential Administration Viktor Sheiman's recent
visit to Moscow probably was to set up the Sochi meeting and
perhaps iron out the final issues for agreement, including on a
successor. But this is pure speculation on our part.


10. (C) Russia may have also calculated that by agreeing to
support Lukashenko and agreeing to the March elections (no doubt
Lukashenko informed Putin ahead of his decision) Belarus will be
removed as an issue complicating the G-8 summit in Russia in
July. Perhaps Moscow hopes the West will be resigned to the
situation in Belarus by then.


11. (C) In these scenarios Russia and Lukashenko would be
winners although Lukashenko might view a secure retirement
differently if that were part of the deal. The biggest losers
would be Belarusian democrats and possibly Belarus' de facto
independence if Russia secures control over the Belarusian
economy and possibly polity in a union state.

Krol