Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MINSK1495
2005-12-13 13:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

EUR DAS Kramer Discusses Campaign Strategy with

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSK #1495/01 3471358
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131358Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3457
INFO RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3448
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3230
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1475
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3106
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 3025
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0785
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 001495 

SIPDIS

KIEV FOR USAID

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: EUR DAS Kramer Discusses Campaign Strategy with
Opposition

Ref: A) Minsk 1410 B) Minsk 1406 C) Minsk 1437

Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 001495

SIPDIS

KIEV FOR USAID

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: EUR DAS Kramer Discusses Campaign Strategy with
Opposition

Ref: A) Minsk 1410 B) Minsk 1406 C) Minsk 1437

Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: On December 6, EUR DAS David Kramer met
with single opposition candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich's
campaign team. Milinkevich was out in the regions on his
campaign trips. Campaign manager Sergey Kalyakin and his
deputies described the negative effects the government-
supported information blockade has had on their election
campaign, but expressed encouragement with the level of
voter interest in Milinkevich's candidacy. The team
dismissed rumors of early presidential elections but
stressed their campaign activities were limited due to
financial constraints. The team recounted Milinkevich's
recent meetings in Moscow, Vilnius, and Kiev, and described
plans to boost the single candidate's ratings. Kramer
assured the team members that the U.S. will continue to
push for a free and fair electoral process, and will remain
committed to democracy promotion in the long term. End
Summary.


2. (C) On December 6, EUR DAS David Kramer, accompanied by
Ambassador and Embassy note takers, met with the senior
leadership of single opposition candidate Aleksandr
Milinkevich's campaign team, including campaign manager
Sergey Kalyakin, deputy campaign managers Vintsuk Vyachorka
and Victor Korneyenko, and business manager Valery
Ukhnalyov. At the time of the meeting, Milinkevich was in
the eastern part of the country on a campaign trip.

Combating the Information Blockade
--------------


3. (C) Kalyakin explained that in order for Milinkevich to
have a fighting chance heading into the official
presidential campaign period, approximately 60 percent of
voters must at least be aware of his candidacy and 30-35
percent of the electorate must be willing to vote for him.
However, Kalyakin reported that the most serious obstacle
to reaching this goal is the campaign team's lack of access
to mass media. In an effort to mitigate this problem,
Kalyakin said Milinkevich must rely on direct contact with
voters and advertising through independent media.


4. (C) Kalyakin said that the team is working to increase

the number of volunteers from from 3,000 to 10,000 over the
next few months. Kalyakin noted that these foot soldiers
will be responsible for the door-to-door voter outreach
campaign and the collection of signatures in support of
Milinkevich's candidacy. The team has also launched a
website (www.milinkevich.org) and distributed one million
leaflets and 100,000 bulletins on Milinkevich's platform,
the Democratic Congress, and the electoral process. The
team possesses a few low-scale printing machines but the
level and speed of output is much smaller and slower. The
team mainly has relied on publishing houses within Belarus
to print their information, but Kalyakin suspected that
they would not be able to continue printing in Belarus for
much longer. The publishers fear persecution and risk
fines and most likely will begin to refuse future printing
projects. Kalyakin expects that the team will have to
print in Ukraine.


5. (C) Kalyakin added that the campaign team regularly
utilizes independent newspapers and websites to promote
Milinkevich. Some independent newspapers have provided
Milinkevich the opportunity to engage directly with voters.
Belarusians are asked to write or phone in questions to the
paper for Milinkevich and he will respond. Kalyakin
stated, however, that starting in January there will really
only be two remaining independent newspapers left for him
to use (Belarus i Rynok and Belaruskaya Gazeta) and these
newspapers focused more on economics than politics. [Note:
The state-controlled printing and distribution monopolies
refused to renew their contracts with several national and
regional independent newspapers. See ref A and ref B for
details.]


Milinkevich's Travel Within the Country

--------------


6. (C) Kalyakin provided DAS Kramer his assessment of
Milinkevich's domestic campaign trips. The single
candidate conducted five one-day trips to different regions
in the country to experiment with various campaign
techniques. Based on the results of the short trips,
Kalyakin said that many voters are afraid to be seen
interacting with Milinkevich, but those voters who do have
the courage have expressed interest in his candidacy.
Milinkevich has already launched a series of longer
domestic trips lasting seven to eight days, and from
December 5-12 he will visit more than 20 cities in the
country. Kalyakin noted that the local authorities have
not interfered too much during the campaign stops, but
Milinkevich remains under constant surveillance, regardless
of his whereabouts. Kalyakin cited as an example the
tendency for university administrators to approach and
observe (and sometimes publicly chastise) students who are
talking to Milinkevich in an effort to intimidate them.


7. (C) Kalyakin said he recognized that the campaign trips
alone will not boost Milinkevich's popular support ratings
to 30-35 percent. He stressed, however, that given the
information blockade on the opposition, the campaign trips
combined with the planned door-to-door campaign are the
team's most effective tools for winning support from
voters.


Milinkevich Also Keeps a Busy International Travel Schedule
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Kalyakin and the deputy campaign manager responsible
for the campaign's relations with foreign countries Vintsuk
Vyachorka said Milinkevich has made several trips to
neighboring countries to drum up moral and possibly
financial support for his candidacy. They reported on
Milinkevich's recent trips to Moscow, Vilnius, and Kiev.


Milinkevich in Russia
--------------


9. (C) Kalyakin said on November 10 Milinkevich traveled on
a "probing visit" to Russia to meet with a member of the
Duma, business leaders, and the Belarusian diaspora. As
part of the conditions for the meetings posed by the
Russians, the meetings were closed and not publicized until
afterwards. Kalyakin stated that Putin sanctioned these
meetings and that Putin most likely received a formal
report on the meetings. Kalyakin suspected that they were
not that far from actually meeting the Russian president
himself. (Post: Barring unforeseen changes in the
relationship between Minsk and Moscow, Post doubts Putin
would entertain a meeting with Milinkevich.)


10. (C) Kramer inquired about the extent to which
Milinkevich's Russian interlocutors were willing to provide
financial support to his campaign. Kalyakin said that it
is not a problem to find money in Russia; the problem is
obtaining permission from the Russian authorities for
Russian business leaders to give money to opposition
groups. Kalyakin pointed to the predicament of Russian
business magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky as an example. Thus
far, the Kremlin has not authorized Russian government
officials or business leaders to provide material
assistance to Milinkevich.


11. (C) Kalyakin believes the Russians have not made up
their minds about Belarus. Kalyakin viewed this
observation as a positive sign and felt that if Milinkevich
could significantly increase his popularity ratings,
Russian officials and business leaders would support him.
Kramer suggested that based on his meetings in Russia,
there seemed to be a lot of interest in Milinkevich's
candidacy from Russian government officials, political
analysts and local business leaders. He added this
interest appeared to be sanctioned by the Kremlin. He
cited a critical report about the human rights situation in
Belarus that was released while Lukashenko was visiting

Russia as further evidence.


Milinkevich in Lithuania and Ukraine
--------------


12. (C) Kalyakin and Vyachorka said that Milinkevich's
November 25 meetings in Vilnius were productive.
Milinkevich met with Lithuanian President Adamkus and spoke
before the Lithuanian parliament. Vyachorka noted the
Lithuanian president expressed his deep interest in
Belarus, which stems from the shared history between the
two countries, and discussed with Milinkevich possible ways
international organizations could help democratic forces in
Belarus.


13. (C) Vyachorka said Milinkevich and he traveled to Kiev
On November 30 to participate in the Community of
Democracies' conference. He also had the opportunity to
meet briefly with Undersecretary for Democracy and Global
Affairs Paula Dobriansky and several Western ambassadors.
Vyachorka told Kramer it was vital to establish and
maintain contacts in Kiev since it is a neighboring country
with a good economy and an interest in the political
situation in Belarus. However, Vyachorka conceded that
Kiev also remains interested in serving as an intermediary
between the Lukashenko regime and the EU, which could limit
the Yuschenko government's ability to provide direct and
open support to Milinkevich.


No Need to Worry about Early Elections...
--------------


14. (C) DAS Kramer inquired about whether the campaign
team would be ready if the government called the
presidential elections early. [Note: the elections are
currently scheduled for July, but there were rumors they
could occur as early as March. End note.] Kalyakin
admitted that anything is possible in Belarus and said that
such a decision by the government would be a devastating
blow to the campaign. He noted, however, that the team has
already begun to prepare for this possibility. Regardless,
Kalyakin does not believe the elections will be held before
July. Kalyakin stated that the government must give four
months notice before holding elections. [Note: The
Belarusian Constitution only requires 90 days advanced
notice.] Kalyakin stated significant advance preparation
must be done and he would have noticed if the government
had begun the process of organizing the elections.


...But We Do Need to Worry About Money
--------------


15. (C) Deputy campaign manager Korneyenko told DAS Kramer
that the team has a sound strategy and a good campaign plan
but is faced with severe budgetary constraints. The team
would prefer to seek financial support from the local
business community, but Korneyenko pointed out that
practically all business is under the government's control.
Instead, the team has to rely on international aid, and to
the extent possible, individual donations from Belarusian
voters. Korneyenko went on to criticize the Europeans for
not being able to help the opposition. He recognized the
bureaucratic inefficiencies and obstacles inherent in the
EU assistance program, but stated that the EU talks too
much while the U.S. is the one supporting the opposition.
At this point, Korneyenko thanked Kramer and Ambassador for
the help the USG provides through U.S. NGOs.


U.S. Pledges Long-Term Interest in Belarus
--------------


16. (C) DAS Kramer stressed that the political and economic
repression in Belarus is an issue of increasing importance
on the U.S. agenda. Kramer said the U.S. will continue to
promote democracy and a free and fair electoral process,
but he expressed doubt the Lukashenko regime will permit
such an outcome. He added that the GOB-proposed amendments

to the criminal code, which aim to stifle dissent (ref C),
only confirm his assessment. However, Kramer noted that
even if regime change occurred tomorrow, Belarus would not
immediately become a democracy. Therefore, Kramer assured
the team that U.S. is fully prepared to remain engaged with
Belarus over the long run through the Embassy's work and
our assistance programs. Despite what the current
government propagandizes, Kramer assured the guests that
the people of Belarus have a friend in the U.S.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) It was encouraging to hear that the relatively few
voters who have met with Milinkevich on his domestic trips
have responded positively to his campaign. However, the

campaign team does not seem to have made significant
progress since the October 1-2 democratic congress.
Financial constraints, lack of access to the state media
and an increasingly more hostile political environment
continue to cripple the campaign.

Krol