MILINKEVICH TEAM OUTLINES CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 001342

SIPDIS

KIEV FOR USAID

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH TEAM OUTLINES CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

Ref: A) Minsk 1205 B) Minsk 1227 C) Minsk 1284

Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief recently met
with 10+ presidential nominee Aleksandr Milinkevich and
several leaders of his team to discuss their plans to bring
about democratic change around the time of the 2006
presidential elections. The strategy, though still in its
elementary stage, aims to increase Milinkevich's popularity
rating to 30 percent by March 2006, mobilize 30,000 to
50,000 street demonstrators in the event the 10+ candidate
is disqualified during the candidate registration process
or on election day, and launch a negative PR campaign
against President Lukashenko and his policies. However,
Milinkevich's team thus far has placed more emphasis on
strategy than message. They know what they want to
accomplish (change),and they believe they know how to
accomplish it (street demonstrations),but they have yet to
develop the campaign message that will motivate enough
Belarusians to seek change. End Summary.


2. (C) On October 26, Aleksandr Milinkevich provided a
general overview of his activities since his October 2
presidential nomination at the 10+ coalition democratic
congress (ref A). The focus of his meeting with
Ambassador, however, was on the need for quicker
disbursement of foreign assistance to the coalition.
(Note: A report on Ambassador's meeting with Milinkevich
will be sent septel.) In separate meetings, several senior
members of Milinkevich's team discussed with Ambassador and
Pol/Econ Chief the details of the organizational structure
and strategy of the campaign.


Milinkevich Offers Up The Crown Jewels To Maintain Unity
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Milinkevich told Ambassador he needed to act
quickly following the democratic congress to keep the
coalition from splintering. Apparently, the two main
contenders for the 10+ presidential nomination, pro-
democracy Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC) leader
Sergey Kalyakin and United Civic Party (UCP) leader Anatoly
Lebedko, were seriously disappointed with the results of
the congress and considered walking away from the
coalition. Thus, Milinkevich picked Kalaykin to be his
campaign manager, even though he would have preferred his
close associate Victor Karnyenko for the position.
Milinkevich gave Lebedko, the 10+ leader who was facing the
most pressure from his party to withdraw from the
coalition, any position he wanted (except campaign manager)
to keep him on board. Lebedko chose the position of head
of the national committee, which is the team responsible
for formulating political, economic, social policy for the
campaign. Milinkevich assured Ambassador the coalition is
now a cohesive organization.


Kalyakin's Team
--------------


4. (C) Valery Ukhnalyov, a deputy in the BPC and a ranking
member of the Milinkevich campaign team, confirmed for
Pol/Econ Chief on October 19 the key players in Kalyakin's
campaign staff:

-- Victor Karnyenko Q responsible for forming campaign
teams at the regional and local levels; information
dissemination; Milinkevich's campaign trips around the
country; and the collection of the 100,000 signatures
needed to register Milinkevich as a presidential candidate
(see ref B for an explanation of the electoral process).
Karnyenko was the head of the NGO Civil Initiatives before
joining Milinkevich in the lead up to the democratic
congress.

-- Aleksandr Dobrovolsky Q responsible for developing
campaign strategy; public relations. Dobrovolsky is a
deputy in the UCP.

-- Vintsuk Vyachorka Q responsible for international
relations, including attracting financial support
(Vyachorka de facto shares this responsibility with
Lebedko); Milinkevich's international trips. Vyachorka is
the head of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF).

-- Valery Ukhnyalov Q responsible for the administration of
the team's financial resources, including money received
from abroad.

The National Committee
--------------


5. (C) Milinkevich offered Lebedko, the runner-up in the
congress, the position of head of the "national committee,"
or policy team. On October 20, Lebedko told Ambassador the
national committee would be separate from the daily
operations of the presidential campaign but would provide
the campaign with policies. While the leaders of the
expert groups would not have titles, such as shadow
economic minister, the idea would be to develop the policy
platforms the single candidate can use to engage with the
public. Lebedko stressed he works closely with Milinkevich
and Kalyakin.


6. (C) Comment: Putting Lebedko in charge of policy
guarantees the opposition will adopt a libertarian free
market platform. UCP deputy Yaroslav Romanchuk, who also
heads the Mises Center economic think tank, told Econoff on
October 26 that he has already written several libertarian
economic policy proposals for Milinkevich. Surprisingly,
Kalyakin and his Communist party support these proposals.
However, Vyachorka and his nationalist BNF party have
complained loudly about the papers, and are pushing
Milinkevich to adopt a more socialist economic policy. End
Comment.

Despite Competition, Milinkevich Is Not Bowing Out
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Milinkevich told Ambassador that Kozulin has
already made up his mind that he will run alone. However,
Ales Yanukovich, deputy chairman of the BNF and member of
Milinkevich's national campaign team, told Pol/Econ Chief
on October 20 Kozulin is still in the "wait and see" mode.
Kozulin's supporters have informed several 10+ leaders the
former BGU rector will reexamine his presidential
aspirations in February 2006, after all democratic
presidential contenders have had an opportunity to
determine each other's prospects for attracting the most
amount of money, campaign volunteers, and popular support
to run a successful campaign during the official campaign
season.


8. (C) Despite attempts by Kozulin, former Parliament
Speaker Aleksandr Voitovich, and others to convince
Milinkevich to withdraw his candidacy (ref C),Yanukovich
told Pol/Econ Chief Milinkevich has made it clear to his
team that he intends to stay in the race until the end.
Milinkevich is the only opposition candidate who can claim
he was nominated in an open democratic process and that he
has the backing of an entire network of NGOs and parties.
Yanukovich pointed out the other opposition candidates
nominated themselves and their support extends to a few
dozen volunteers at best.


9. (C) Lebedko told Ambassador he hoped to include several
presidential aspirants in the national committee he heads
as a way of further consolidating democratic forces prior
to the candidate registration process. Specifically, he
planned to reach out to Voitovich on science policy, former
MP Vladimir Parfenovich on sports, and former Agriculture
Minister Vasily Leonov on agriculture. (Note: Milinkevich
apparently has different plans for Leonov. He told
Ambassador he wants Leonov to take charge of the "Eastern
Front," drawing on his contacts in Russia to build support
in Russian public and private sectors for a Milinkevich
presidency.)


QCampaign Strategy Based On Three Pillars
--------------

10. (C) Dobrovolsky and Ukhnalyov acknowledged to Pol/Econ
Chief the campaign's strategy for fomenting democratic
change around the upcoming presidential elections is still
in the elementary stage. However, they were able to
describe the strategy's three basic tenets: significantly
increased voter support for Milinkevich, large-scale street
mobilization, and a negative PR campaign against President
Lukashenko.


Pillar #1: Popular Support For Milinkevich
--------------


11. (C) The 10+ coalition's number one priority is to
increase Milinkevich's popular approval ratings from around
one percent to 25-30 percent by March 2006. Reaching such
a level would put Milinkevich in a close race with
President Lukashenko. (Note: The campaign team is working
off the assumption Lukashenko's true popularity is 35%.)
Ukhnalyov stressed if they failed in significantly boosting
the 10+ nominee's ratings by March, the battle is already
lost.


12. (C) Milinkevich said his target group were those
Belarusians who support democratic change but are either
unfamiliar with or unsure about the 10+ candidate.
Milinkevich firmly believes Belarusians in many different
demographic groups fall into the pro-democracy category,
but he acknowledged Lukashenko enjoys considerable support
and said it would be "pointless" to go after those voters
who strongly back the President. Dobrovolsky told Pol/Econ
Chief the two key ingredients for building voter support in
the target group in a relatively short time period are a
massive informational campaign (flyers and bulletins in
voter's mailboxes) and a door-to-door voter outreach
campaign.


13. (C) Ukhnaylov also noted the Milinkevich team plans to
gather one million signatures during the candidate
registration process (probably in April 2006). The
electoral law requires candidates to gather 100,000
signatures, but the campaign team intends to bombard the
Central Electoral Commission (CEC) with so many signatures
that it would appear ludicrous to deny Milinkevich's
registration application. To achieve that goal, deputy
campaign manager Karnyenko will try to gather 10,000
volunteers who will serve as signature collectors by
February 2006. Ukhnalyov noted that the successful
gathering of one million signatures also means they have
secured a potentially large number of people willing to
participate in street demonstrations in the event the CEC
disqualifies Milinkevich during the registration process.


Pillar #2: Street Demonstrations
--------------


14. (C) The second priority for the Milinkevich campaign
team is to mobilize a critical mass of voters to engage in
street demonstrations in the likely event Lukasenko will
either disqualify Milinkevich during the candidate
registration process or the vote counting. Milinkevich
stressed to Ambassador the street protests would be
peaceful in nature. Dobrovolsky said he aimed to organize
approximately 30,000 to 50,000 volunteers who are so
committed to democratic change they are willing to form
massive street demonstrations on a moment's notice to
defend Milinkevich's candidacy. The same group of people
would also be responsible for disseminating information on
the need for Belarusian citizens to protect their right to
vote. This particular aspect of the information campaign
would not be tied directly to Milinkevich's candidacy; it
is focused on voter awareness. Dobrovolsky recognizes his
goal of attracting 30,000 die-hard volunteers to engage in
such risky activities is lofty, but says he is committed to
making it happen.


Pillar #3: Smear Campaign Against Lukashenko
--------------


15. (C) The goal of the negative PR campaign would be to
juxtapose Belarusian life with Lukashenko remaining in
power ("bad") with Belarusian life with a democratic
candidate like Milinkevich in power ("good"). The anti-
Lukashenko PR team would focus on gathering and
disseminating information on specific cases of human rights
abuse and political repression, the unsustainability of the
economy, the increased isolation of the Lukashenko regime
by the international community, and the corrupt dealings of
Lukashenko and his family. Dobrovolsky noted the team in
charge of the negative PR campaign would maintain no direct
ties to the Milinkevich team, although Dobrovolsky
acknowledged he is responsible for creating the team and
overseeing its general operations.


Comment
--------------


16. (C) The Milinkevich campaign strategy is in its
rudimentary stage, but his team clearly envisions a bold
plan for encouraging democratic change around the time of
the 2006 presidential elections. The 10+ leaders,
including Milinkevich, sense the next elections may be
their last best opportunity to awaken voters from their
political apathy and seek a change. But they also
recognize their main difficulty lies in being able to reach
out to voters and encourage the voters to confront the
regime. The campaign team so far has concentrated its
energy on discussing strategy and not on developing an
attractive message that will motivate enough Belarusians to
seek change. It is also worth noting the 10+ coalition has
yet to launch its campaign almost a month after the
congress. The campaign leaders are quick to point out
their financial constraints, but voter outreach is
fundamentally a labor-intensive Q not a capital-intensive Q
endeavor. Milinkevich and his team still do not seem ready
to take the plunge in commencing outreach in Belarus to
develop a domestic momentum after the Congress. The clock
is ticking.

KROL