Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MINSK1328
2005-10-31 13:01:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

MFA Arms Control Raises Old Issues

Tags:  PGOV PARM KNNP MNUC BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSK #1328/01 3041301
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311301Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3256
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0725
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS MINSK 001328 

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SENSITIVE

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E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PARM KNNP MNUC BO
SUBJECT: MFA Arms Control Raises Old Issues


UNCLAS MINSK 001328

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SENSITIVE

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E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PARM KNNP MNUC BO
SUBJECT: MFA Arms Control Raises Old Issues



1. (SBU) Summary: On October 14, Ambassador Krol met with
MFA Arms Control and International Security Director
Alexander Baichorov before Baichorov's trip to the U.S. to
participate in the UN First Committee. Baichorov provided
the Ambassador with information on a proposed First
Committee Resolution on the prohibition of new weapons of
mass destruction, reiterated Belarus's desire to become a
member of the Zangger Committee, and passed documents on
the OSCE project to dismantle conventional weapons in
Belarus. In addition, Baichorov relayed to the Ambassador
an episode about a Belarusian minister who was invited to
the U.S. for a training program, but was immediately
recalled by the GOB for failure to receive prior permission
to travel to the U.S. The minister blames his own
government for this, highlighting the value of continued
outreach. End Summary.


--------------
GOB Wants No New WMD...
--------------


2. (SBU) Baichorov passed the proposed Belarusian
resolution on the "Prohibition of the Development and
Manufacture of Types of WMD and New Systems of Such
Weapons." Belarus has attempted to put this resolution on
the First Committee agenda for several years, but with no
success. Last year the resolution was left off the agenda
completely due to a "technical glitch" which Baichorov
asserted was a deliberate action of the U.S. He surmised
that the U.S. did not want to see the resolution on the
agenda, let alone support it. However, Baichorov relayed
to the Ambassador that he hoped the U.S. would not obstruct
the inclusion of the resolution on this year's agenda.
Baichorov even asked the U.S. to consider supporting the
resolution on its merits and in recognition of Belarus'
sincere interest in combating the development of new WMD
technology. [Note: Post understands this resolution
subsequently passed.]


3. (SBU) Ambassador replied that he had no official
position to convey. He added that after Lukashenko made
Belarus' official position toward the U.S. quite clear at
the opening of UNGA, there is little desire in Washington

to support any Belarusian efforts in the U.N. or anywhere
else. The atmosphere Lukashenko has created by his hostile
statements and actions alone would make it difficult for
the U.S. to cooperate with Belarus. [Comment: Now that the
resolution has passed, Belarus is likely to portray itself
as an ardent proponent of non-proliferation and to accuse
the U.S. of being a threat to world peace and security.
End Comment.]


--------------
...And Zangger Committee Membership
--------------


4. (SBU) Baichorov presented another non-paper on a
different perennial issue - Belarus' desire to join the
Zangger Committee. The paper recounted Belarusian
Ambassador to the U.S. Mikhail Khvostov's recent meeting on
Zangger at the Department, and complained that "US-
Belarusian cooperation in the field of nonproliferation is
being taken hostage by extraneous issues." The non-paper
stressed the GOB supports USG nonproliferation efforts,
including PSI. Baichorov further speculated what the U.S.
position would be if Belarus actually ratified the Missile
Technology Control Regime.


5. (SBU) Ambassador reminded Baichorov that the U.S.
support for Belarusian membership on the Zangger Committee
would probably only come about once Belarus changed its
overall policy approach to international cooperation and
cooperation with the U.S., including respect for human
rights and conducting a responsible arms sales policy. If
Belarus had taken steps to improve its record, the USG
would have a very different attitude to Belarus' membership
on the Zangger Committee and other groups. Baichorov
simply smiled.


-------------- --------------
GOB Seeks Support for OSCE Weapons Destruction Project
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) Finally, Baichorov shared with the Ambassador a
copy of the latest version of the OSCE project to support
the destruction of excess SALW in Belarus. Baichorov
opined the U.S. delegation to Vienna would support the UK's
lead on this project. Ambassador concurred with
Baichorov's assessment and added the USG was considering
supporting this project through the OSCE since it serves
everyone's interest. [Note: Post will report septel on
recent problems with this project.]


--------------
Reaching Out to GOB Officials Still Useful
--------------


7. (SBU) As the Ambassador was leaving, Baichorov related
to him an episode involving Minister for Emergency
Situations Enver Bariyev. Bariyev, who at the time was a
deputy minister, had attempted to participate in a U.S.
Army sponsored training program in 2004. He traveled to
New Hampshire with the rest of his delegation only to
receive an urgent phone call from Minsk informing him that
he did not have permission from on high to travel to the
U.S. With great embarrassment, Bariyev had to turn right
around and fly out that very day. [Comment: Bariyev does
not fault the U.S. When Bariyev greeted a recent U.S.
Department of Energy delegation, he was most cordial. This
episode and Bariyev's reaction demonstrate the usefulness
of reaching out to GOB officials and letting the leadership
take the blame for rejecting engagement. End Comment.]

KROL