CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS DISCUSS IMPACT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 001284

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS DISCUSS IMPACT OF
MILINKEVICH'S CANDIDACY

Ref: A) Minsk 1205 B) Minsk 1236

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Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Since the October 2 nomination of
Aleksandr Milinkevich by the democratic congress, Emboffs
have conducted a series of meetings with civil society
leaders and political analysts to assess the significance
of the democratic congress and of Milinkevich's
presidential bid. Most observers viewed the congress and
Milinkevich's nomination as a catalyzing event but noted
the significant obstacles that remain in the way of
democratic change in 2006, including continued
fragmentation in the opposition camp, Lukashenko's strong
popular support, and Russia's likely backing of the
Lukashenko regime. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Emboffs have met with various civil society
leaders with opposing views during the past three weeks to
assess the impact of Aleksandr Milinkevich's 10+ coalition
nomination for presidency in the 2006 elections (ref A).
This report will draw mainly from comments made by:

-- Andrey Vardomatsky, Director of Novak Opinion Research
Center
-- Aleksandr Voitovich, former Speaker of Upper Chamber of
Parliament and possible presidential contender in the 2006
elections
-- Anatoly Federov, close advisor to Voitovich
-- Petr Martsev, owner of independent newspaper BDG
-- Vladimir Labkovich, member of human rights NGO Vyasna
-- Valentin Stepanovich, member of Vyasna
-- Oleg Gulak, deputy in human rights NGO Belarus Helskinki
Committee
-- Andrey Sannikov, International Coordinator for human
rights NGO Charter 97
-- Andrey Federov, political analyst
-- Valery Karbalevich, political analyst
-- Andrey Sudaltsev, political analyst and advisor to Chair
of Belarusian Congress of Independent Trade Union Aleksandr
Yaroshuk

Democratic Congress Exceeded Expectations
--------------


3. (C) Civil society leaders generally considered the
October 1-2 democratic congress a success. The event was
highly organized, professional, and represented a
significant achievement in the opposition movement. Andrey
Vardomatsky, who was one of the delegates at the
convention, told Pol/Econ Chief on October 6 most people in
the pro-democracy camp and in the Lukashenko regime
expected the congress to be poorly attended and to be rife
with infighting among party leaders. (Note: Vardomatsky
and others have heard that Lukashenko expected no more than
a hundred delegates and guests to attend the convention,
which is why he allowed it to take place in Minsk.) To
everyone's surprise, high turnout of delegates and domestic
and international VIPs, good press coverage in independent
and foreign media, and a generally democratic election
process marked the democratic convention. Human rights
activist Vladimir Labkovich explained to Pol/Econ Chief in
a separate meeting that although the most recent democratic
congress was the fifth such congress in Belarusian history,
the October 1-2 event stood out because it unified the
greatest number of pro-democracy groups and leaders.


Most Say Milinkevich Is the Best Choice
--------------


4. (C) Most people in the NGO and human rights community
are pleased with Milinkevich's candidacy. Vardomatsky and
others noted it was a difficult choice to decide between
Milinkevich and runner-up candidate Anatoly Lebedko because
the latter is more "energetic" and experienced in politics.
Milinkevich, according to several contacts, seems ill
suited for stirring up the masses to oust Lukashenko (ref
B). However, Vardomatsky ultimately voted for Milinkevich
because Lebedko has too much "political baggage." For all
his personal qualities, Lebedko has remained relatively
unpopular among voters, and Vardomatsky believes this
scenario will not likely change.


5. (C) On October 5, human rights leader Andrey Sannikov
told the Ambassador and Pol/Econ chief he is also satisfied
Milinkevich is the 10+ candidate. In his view, the
opposition needed new blood and a new face. He considers

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the 5+ "experiment" (pre-cursor to the 10+) an utter
failure, mainly because it was built relatively around
hollow and unattractive political parties. Milinkevich's
deep contacts in the NGO community should help the 10+
coalition attract voters. (Note: Sannikov and his Free
Belarus movement have long been competitors of the 5+ and
Lebedko. Sannikov stressed to Econoff that Milinkevich is
the right choice because he will work with groups outside
the traditional political party opposition.)


His Competitors Think Otherwise
--------------


6. (C) Opposition candidate and former Parliamentary
Speaker Aleksandr Voitovich and his advisor Anatoly Federov
recently told the Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief they were
pleased Milinkevich won the 10+ nomination, but only
because Milinkevich seems the most willing to "reach a
compromise" with other opposition presidential contenders.
Voitovich pointed out he and several other non-party
leaders, excluding likely presidential candidate Anatoly
Kozulin, signed an agreement with the 10+ candidates a few
days prior to the democratic convention to unite democratic
forces. However, Voitovich seriously doubted any 10+
candidate other than Milinkevich would honor the agreement.
Voitovich and two other members of the recently formed non-
party democratic coalition, former Agricultural Minister
Vasily Leonov and former MP Valery Frolov, have repeatedly
told Emboffs there will likely be a single opposition
candidate to face Lukashenko but this decision will not be
made until later in the election process. It is clear,
however, that they expect Milinkevich to realize sooner or
later that he is no match for Lukashenko.


7. (C) Voitovich and Federov have determined Milinkevich
is incapable of attracting a large share of voters
primarily because he lacks strong ties to Belarus' economic
elite and to Russia, and because he maintains strong ties
to a nationalistic political party, the Belarusian Popular
Front (BPF). First, Federov explained the importance of
appealing to and representing the nomenclature and economic
elite in any successful strategy to defeat Lukashenko.
According to Federov, the nomenclature is more likely to
support someone like Voitovich, or even Kozulin, than
Milinkevich. Other political analysts refute the notion
that the nomenclature can be drawn away from Lukashenko.
Political analyst Valery Karbalevich told the Ambassador on
October 12 the nomenclature is not fond of Lukashenko and
would probably abandon ship quickly if Lukashenko was on
the verge of losing power, but it would be "pure nonsense"
to think the nomenclature would risk losing their jobs and
privileges for any opposition candidate this early in the
game.


8. (C) Second, Federov believes Milinkevich will be unable
to convince Russia he is a better choice than Lukashenko,
mainly due to the perception Milinkevich would steer
Belarus, including its economy, toward the West. Neither
Federov nor Voitovich were willing to declare that Russia
would look more favorably on a Voitovich candidacy; their
concern was only that Milinkevich was a non-starter for the
Kremlin. Finally, Voitovich believes nationalism does not
play well in Belarusian politics, and the BPF's formal
backing of Milinkevich will surely taint his candidacy.


Election Campaign Must Be Bold
--------------


9. (C) Vardomatsky, Sannikov, human rights activist Oleg
Gulak and others remain concerned that Milinkevich's timid
personality will limit his ability to sway voters away from
Lukashenko. Sannikov stressed Milinkevich must be willing
to take the necessary risks to gain voter support, even if
it means falling prey to GOB repressive tactics. Gulak
emphasized that frequent and massive street rallies,
relentless door-to-door campaigns, and innovative use of
available media outlets are necessary ingredients for an
effective campaign strategy (a report on the 10+ campaign
strategy and platform will be sent septel). Civil society
leaders agreed that Lukashenko's tight restrictions on
information dissemination and public gatherings make it
extremely difficult for Milinkevich to mount a successful
campaign in the next nine months, but they are convinced
the secret lies in Milinkevich surrounding himself with
creative, energetic people to do much of the legwork around
the country.

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10. (C) Sannikov added the campaign message should steer
clear of populism. The human rights leader maintained that
voters do not want to hear promises from Milinkevich that
he will "fix their houses and repair their roads;
Lukashenko has this market cornered." Instead, Milinkevich
should focus on serious issues such as long-term economic
stability, Lukashenko's involvement in the 1999 and 2000
disappearances of prominent Belarusian activists, and a
balanced economic and political policy towards Russia and
the West. Clearly, the substance of Milinkevich's platform
is the subject of much debate among political observers,
and there are many who disagree with Sannikov's viewpoint.


"Russia Will Stick By Lukashenko"
--------------


11. (C) Many political observers and civil society leaders
predict the Kremlin will ultimately back Lukashenko, and
therefore without Kremlin backing, Milinkevich's (or any
other opposition candidate's) prospects in the 2006
elections are significantly reduced. Karbalevich and
political analyst Andrey Sudaltsev agree with other
observers' assessments that in the opposition there is no
viable alternative to Milinkevich, but they seriously doubt
the 10+ nominee will be able to attract the Kremlin's
attention. Milinkevich, according to Karbalevich and
Sudaltsev, is perceived by many in Belarus and Russia as a
"Western project" Q i.e., someone groomed by the U.S. and
EU to wrestle Belarus from the hands of Russia.
Independent newspaper owner Peter Martsev concurs with
Karbalevich and Sudaltsev, adding that Lukashenko's
continuation in power plays an important role in President
Putin's economic, political, and military policy towards
the West. Most civil society leaders conceded Lukashenko
represents an embarrassment to Russia, but the Belarusian
leader's hostility to the West outweighs his faults.


"It's Still Worth a Shot To Engage Russia"
--------------


12. (C) Vardomatsky told Emboffs other analysts overrate
the ties between Lukashenko and President Putin. He
maintains that Lukashenko is enough of an embarrassment to
Putin that the Russian leader could be persuaded to
withdraw Kremlin support for the Lukashenko regime.
Specifically, Vardomatsky recommended a combination of
external and internal (i.e. within Russia) pressures be
applied to Putin. On the external side, the EU and USG
should emphasize to Putin that Lukashenko's reelection in
2006 would be a reflection of Putin's personal image, and
Russia's future in the Group of Eight and WTO could be
thrown into jeopardy. Within Russia, Vardomatsky knows of
a number of intellectuals with close ties to the Kremlin.
These intellectuals could be called upon to deliver a
similar message to Putin. Vardomatsky refused to reveal
the names of the Russian intellectuals, in part because we
were meeting in his office and the Belarusian KGB was
likely listening to the conversation.


"Belarusian Voters, Not Russia, Are The Determining Factor"
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Labkovich, Gulak, and human rights activist
Valentin Stepanovich hold a different opinion on Russia's
influence in the upcoming presidential elections. They
agree that Lukashenko is an asset to the Putin regime, but
they believe others overestimate Russia's role in
Belarusian politics. Labkovich argued that, "events in
Ukraine proved we don't need Russia to win over voters."
He believes the 10+ should focus its efforts on reaching
out to voters with an attractive message. If the
opposition is successful in this endeavor, Stepanovich
argued the Kremlin would likely re-evaluate its
relationship with Lukashenko.


Comment
--------------


14. (C) Most civil society leaders and activists agree
that Aleksandr Milinkevich's nomination as the 10+
presidential candidate was a significant and positive
development in the opposition camp. The opposition has
never before beQ so organized and unified.

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15. (C) However, all of our interlocutors made it clear
that significant Q almost insurmountable Q obstacles remain
in the way of democratic change in 2006. First, the strong
presidential aspirations of Voitovich, Kozulin, and
possibly other non-party opposition leaders clearly
indicate the democratic forces will continue to suffer from
fragmentation. Second, Milinkevich is an unknown quantity
to the electorate, which can be considered one of his
strengths, but he must work extra hard in a repressive
environment to attract voters. Third, Belarus' economy
continues to grow (even if it is unsustainable),and most
voters associate its growth with Lukashenko and his
policies. Fourth, despite what some analysts believe,
Russia's continued support for Lukashenko persuades most
voters to stand by Lukashenko, or at least not stand by the
opposition candidate. Overall, the opposition has a steep
road to climb, but it seems that Milinkevich's nomination
has started the opposition up the hill.

KROL