NEXT STEPS ON ARTICLE 98

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000373

SIPDIS

FOR AF/S DIR -MOZENA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/25/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LT UN
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON ARTICLE 98

REF: MASERU 365

CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: JUNE CARTER PERRY, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Ambassador met July 19, 21 and 25 with Foreign Minister
Moleleki concerning Article 98. We learned from a United
Kingdom (UK) source that arguments against Article 98 had been
developed by the European Union (EU) at an informal Cabinet
meeting chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) during the
Prime Minister's absence the week of July 11. According to
Moleleki, FOMIN expressed strong opposition to the EU's position
and advised that his colleagues in the Cabinet support Lesotho's
becoming a signatory to an Article 98 Agreement with the U.S.
During July 15 and subsequent conversations, Moleleki told
Ambassador that he had observed a moderation in the position of
the DPM who had previously been strongly opposed. The DPM
currently, according to Minister of Foreign Affairs, has
observed that it is in "Lesotho's national interest" to sign
this agreement which obviously is a key concern for the U.S., a
major ally of this nation.


2. (C) In discussing how best to make progress on this issue on
July 25, Foreign Minister Moleleki said that all members of the
Cabinet, he felt, were fully on board and recognized the
necessity of signing; the only person who has not been convinced
remained the Prime Minister, in his opinion. Moleleki is aware,
as are several members of the Cabinet, of the 2004 Nethercut
Amendment which restricts some ESF funding to non-signatory
countries. He said he could fully understand the position of
the U.S. legislature and any future other restrictions,
particularly in light of the fact that so many African countries
have become signatories in the past few years, including many of
the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) countries. Ambassador
stated that we recognized the continued presence and pressure
that Lesotho felt from South Africa, a phenomenum Moleleki
refers to as the "short man" scenario, i.e. Lesotho always feels
as though it is being badgered by its taller and larger big
brother next door. However, FOMIN believes that it would be
helpful for the PM to hear not only from us, but also from
signatories in the region; that it would be especially useful
for the PM to hear from Botswana's President Mogae. He also
suggested that Lesotho's own Ambassador to Washington call the
PM and discuss the importance of this matter. Moleleki felt
that he himself was not the right person at this time to put
pressure on the PM. As we have reported previously, the PM can
be a very prickly and difficult character with whom to deal.
Moleleki has told us that he was spoken to dismissively by the
Prime Minister when the FOMIN had come with a message the PM did
not want to hear; he was told to "sit down and be quiet, young
man." Therefore, having a variety of messengers approach
Mosisili at the right time seems to be key to swaying his
opinion which we will continue to pursue. Ambassador told
Moleleki that we continue to raise this issue at high levels,
with their perceived threatening neighbor, South Africa, and
that there had been significant support from most African
countries. Moleleki thought a high level bilateral discussion
on the edges of the UNGA could be helpful in persuading the
Prime Minister on the Article 98 issue.


3. (C) Comment: The Foreign Minister expressed his own very
deep frustration in working with the Prime Minister. We have
heard rumors that he is beginning to consider resigning from the
MFA post. For the moment, it appears Moleleki will remain in
place, but we should understand that the FOMIN is an extremely
popular, charismatic individual who is also an elected official,
which the PM is not, and it is easy to understand that the PM
would see him as an internal rival within the ruling party. A
recent article characterized Minister Moleleki as one of the
most powerful political leaders in the ruling party, and
recalled that "he has his people everywhere, in every ministry."
It is now believed that the PM, who at one point observers
believed would step down, will compete to hold on to his
position and that he wishes to remain the incumbent following

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the 2007 national elections. It is clear that although many
Basotho view Moleleki as the natural heir to the government's
top job, Mosisili has his own ideas about succession. This
internal political drama may help to explain, to some degree,
the PM's adamant stance against the Article 98 Agreement. His
is not the type of personality who likes to be "bested" in any
competition. His Cabinet, on the other hand, views the world
through realpolitick lenses and wishes to move forward.
Moleleki (according to sources in and out of government) has
become the most vocal of those pressing a more realistic and,
ultimately, beneficial approach to foreign policy, particularly
in regard to the U.S.


4. (C) Against this backdrop, it becomes a bit clearer why
rational, legal arguments do not work with PM Mosisili; this is
not a question of logic, it is a question of personality,
external forces (particularly South Africa and to some degree
the EU) and internal political infighting. That said, post
agrees that the GOL Ambassador's call to the Prime Minister
would re-emphasize the importance of this matter and that post
continue to dialogue with PM, FOMIN and with other key
ministers, e.g. Finance and Trade. If progress is not obvious
by mid-September, we suggest considering a bilateral at some
point during the UNGA. End Comment




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