Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MAPUTO155
2005-02-02 12:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Maputo
Cable title:  

ISLAM IN MOZAMBIQUE

Tags:  KISL MZ PHUM PTER SCUL KNAR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 MAPUTO 000155 

SIPDIS
FOR AF/S - TREGER
STATE PASS TO MCC FOR GAULL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2010
TAGS: KISL MZ PHUM PTER SCUL KNAR
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN MOZAMBIQUE

REF: A. A) 2004 MAPUTO 0112

B. B) 2004 MAPUTO 1658

C. C) MAPUTO 0002
Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer James Potts for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 MAPUTO 000155

SIPDIS
FOR AF/S - TREGER
STATE PASS TO MCC FOR GAULL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2010
TAGS: KISL MZ PHUM PTER SCUL KNAR
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN MOZAMBIQUE

REF: A. A) 2004 MAPUTO 0112

B. B) 2004 MAPUTO 1658

C. C) MAPUTO 0002
Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer James Potts for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Mozambique large Muslim minority has long
been a bastion of moderate faith, both in the native
African and South Asian immigrant communities. The country
has no tradition of militant, anti-western Islamic thought,
and post sees no substantial evidence of any Islamic
organizations promoting militant action against non-Muslim
countries or peoples. Muslim practice has become somewhat
more orthodox in recent years, however, as more
conservative South Asian immigrants have arrived in
country, and as Mozambicans return to apply the lessons
from study of Islam overseas. Tensions between native
Africans and South Asians have escalated in recent years,
since the latter group dominates both economic activity and
positions of religious authority throughout Mozambique.
Conservative foreign donors such as the African Muslim
Agency are active constructing mosques and religious
schools, as are many prominent Mozambican Muslim
businessmen, generally religious moderates and Frelimo
party supporters. With widespread poverty, loose borders,
and a broad range of wealthy donors trying to shape Islam
in their image, Mozambique finds itself in a struggle to
maintain its tradition of religious moderation. END
SUMMARY

--------------
Demographics and Migration Patterns
--------------

2. (SBU) Only a minority of Mozambicans professes the
Islamic faith; Mozambique National Institute of
Statistics estimates the country to be 24% Catholic, 22%
Protestant, and 20% Muslim, with the rest classified as
animist. Muslim leaders insist that their actual numbers
are much higher, and they are almost certainly right. New
immigrants to Mozambique are heavily Muslim, and new mosque
construction in the rural north suggests that Islam has
penetrated some nominally animist regions in recent years.
The northern provinces - Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa
- are predominantly Muslim, especially along the coast, the
result of centuries of contact with Arab, East African, and

South Asian traders. The central and southern provinces
all feature small but influential Muslim populations, with
South Asians especially prominent. South Asians have
provided religious leadership within the Muslim community
since colonial times, when many Indians served as
administrators for the Portuguese. Nearly all imams are
Mozambican citizens of Indian or Pakistani descent. This
leadership has only recently come under serious pressure by
native African Muslims.


3. (SBU) The vast majority of Mozambicans can be classified
as Sunni, with a small Shi minority, largely of Pakistani
origin. Within the Shi community is a tiny Ismailite
community that owns a wide range of Mozambique most
important businesses. The community estimates its own
numbers as less than 1,000. (Other Mozambican Muslims
claim, however, that Ismailites are a sect, and not really
Muslims). Many, perhaps most, native African Mozambicans
cannot say whether they are Sunni or Shi , and the
distinction has little meaning to them. If anything,
people are more likely to identify whether they and their
mosque are aligned with Sheik Aminuddin Mohamed of the
Islamic Council of Mozambique or with the Mozambican
Council of the Ulama, represented by Nasir Lunat. (Both
men are Sunni imams of Indian ethnicity, born in Mozambique
and trained in Pakistan, but their groups have visions of
Islam for Mozambique that differ in subtle but significant
ways. Islamic Council followers tend to be native African,
Council of the Ulama followers generally South Asian.)


4. (SBU) Growing numbers of Muslims from South Asia and
East Africa have entered Mozambique in recent years. Many
of these migrants see Mozambique as a transit point to
South Africa, with a few targeting the United States or
Europe. Recent examples of migrants in transit to South
Africa include 34 Bangladeshis who were apprehended by
Mozambican police after flying from the Comoros into
Nampula city in December, and 18 Pakistanis detained in
mid-January by authorities at Inchope, Manica province (see
reftel C). Nampula is the primary hub for migrants, both
as a transit point and also as a magnet for Muslims of a
vast range of nationalities, especially Pakistanis,
Indians, Tanzanians, Guineans, Nigerians, Somalis, and
Malians. Many are intent on staying; in an early 2004
interview, the national Director of Migration estimated
that approximately 500 Pakistanis per month had acquired
Mozambican residency documents in the past year. (Some of
these were probably from India; the terms Indian and
Pakistani are often used interchangeably.) (see reftel A)
Many newcomers have also picked up legitimate but illegally
secured Mozambican passports. Traffic in illegal passports
is a big and dangerous business unto itself, operated by
and for Muslim immigrants. On July 16, 2004, Jawed Hashim,
a Pakistani immigrant who owned the prominent local J&B
Recording label and was widely considered to be a
ringleader of illegal passport (and drug trafficking)
activities, was murdered outside a Maputo restaurant. His
partner, known as Babu, met the same fate in Karachi one
month earlier.

--------------
Moderate Mozambique
--------------

5. (SBU) For most Mozambican Muslims, crime and smuggling
seem a world apart. On a Friday night in downtown Maputo,
young men and women of all religious backgrounds dance in
the open air at the city most popular late night
discotheque, directly below the minaret of the city oldest mosque. It is indicative of tolerance and
integration among Mozambicans of different religions, which
is a source of pride among religious leaders of various
faiths. In fact, native African Muslims are arguably more
integrated into Mozambican culture than into their own
religious community -- native African and South Asian
Muslims are quite segregated from each other. For example,
the Comunidade Mahometana, a prominent Muslim organization
that operates many of the country largest Muslim schools,
maintains a rule that only Muslims of Indian origin can be
official members of their society, not African Muslims.
(All Muslims can enroll in the school, however.)


6. (SBU) Muslim integration is especially notable within
the political realm. Both the ruling Frelimo and
opposition Renamo parties feature significant Muslim
constituencies. Some northern Muslim tribes, particularly
the Makonde, have long been part of the Frelimo ruling
coalition, even during the party early Marxist phase.
South Asian Muslims have also been heavy Frelimo
supporters, partly as a means of ensuring business
viability. Renamo has historically been the party of the
central, non-Muslim tribes, but remained competitive
through 2003 based on its ability to draw significant
support from the Muslim coastal areas of the north. The
2004 presidential election indicates that Muslims are
starting to favor the ruling party in increasing numbers,
as evidenced by the massive (15-25%) vote swings toward
Frelimo in the Muslim coastal towns of Angoche, Nacala, and
Ilha de Mozambique, all of which have Renamo-led municipal
governments. In some areas of the country, such as
Inhambane province, Muslim religious leaders publicly
endorsed Frelimo presidential candidate Armando Guebuza.
In others, prominent Muslim businessmen, many of
Indian/Pakistani ethnicity, were elected as Frelimo members
to the National Assembly. Notably, the Muslim community
completely rejected the Independent Party of Mozambique
(PIMO),a nominally secular party operating on conservative
Islamic principles. PIMO and its presidential candidate,
Ya ub Sibindy, campaigned vigorously in the 2004
elections, receiving significant media coverage, but earned
less than 1% of the national vote. Educated Muslims were
rather embarrassed by PIMO in general, and didn see any
need for a Muslim stealth party.


7. (C) Muslims and other Mozambicans share similar opinions
of the United States and its foreign policy. That is, they
disagree with U.S. military intervention in the Muslim
world but hold little personal animosity toward the U.S.
and wish to collaborate on other issues. Mozambicans were
almost uniformly opposed to U.S. military action in Iraq, a
position reflected in Embassy contacts everywhere, from the
Mozambican government to the evangelist churches to the
U.S.-Mozambican Chamber of Commerce. Mozambicans are often
equally unsupportive of U.S. activities in Afghanistan,
even among those who know that Usama Bin Laden planned the
9/11 attacks from a base there. The most common argument
was summed up to Emboff by a Muslim Renamo delegate in the
National Assembly, who said that Mozambique must oppose
U.S. military intervention to stand in solidarity with
other poor countries, who, though they may have terrible
governments, nonetheless deserve the right to peaceful
internal change rather than change forced from outside.
Opposition is almost never publicly stated in explicit
religious terms. Sheik Aminuddin, Mozambique leading
imam and Muslim scholar, has used his weekly newspaper
column to criticize U.S. treatment of Muslims in general,
but has not defined the U.S. action in Iraq as specifically
anti-Muslim. In fact, opposition is rarely stated in
public at all -- despite anger with U.S. policy over Iraq,
only two demonstrations were held, on March 14 and March
15, 2003. Post estimates that about 1,500 people
participated in the second march, a peaceful affair
organized by the Islamic Council of Mozambique. Some of
the marchers and organizers have since turned out to be
Embassy contacts.


8. (C) New Muslim immigrants have not significantly altered
the tone of moderation in Mozambique, but some groups are
trying. One such organization is Jama'at al-Tabligh (JT),
a society based in India and Pakistan that is dedicated to
a very conservative, almost pre-modern vision of Islam. JT
has increased its membership (known locally as "tablikis")
in recent years on the strength of new immigration from
Pakistan and the Gujarat, and has financed the arrival of
many missionaries from South Asia. JT's emir is based in
Beira; its activities appear to be nationwide. Women
affiliated with JT are often veiled and fully covered -- a
sight that is increasingly common throughout Mozambique,
and not just with JT associates. Post has no evidence
linking JT or similar groups with potential terrorist
activity.

--------------
Rising Economic Force
--------------

9. (SBU) Prominent secular figures in the Muslim community
have been less concerned with protest and more concerned
with profits. In particular, Mozambicans of South Asian
origin dominate the trade and money exchange sectors. They
also own a growing share of the agricultural processing and
hotel industry. Muslim-owned businesses feature
prominently in Mozambique Top 100 companies list,
compiled by the KPMG consulting firm and issued in December

2004. The two largest private, principally
Mozambican-owned companies were Africom and Delta Trading
(11th and 12th overall),with Merec and Gani Comercial
close behind. The primary owners of these companies are
Mozambican citizens of Indian or Pakistani origin. Africom
and Merec were established by recent Indian immigrants in
1994 and 1998, respectively, and gained dominant market
share in flour, wheat, maize, and coconut oil processing
shortly thereafter. The companies are thought to be
well-managed, and to have benefitted from a favorable
arrangement with the government, in which they are nearly
exempt from taxes.


10. (SBU) Delta Trading fits the more negative archetype
image commonly imputed to businesses owned by South Asian
Mozambicans: the company focuses on the import of goods
from South Asia and China; its owners are third-generation
Mozambicans but its managers are largely new immigrants;
and it has been plagued through the years by rumors of
contraband and smuggling in hashish, heroin, and other
drugs. There are many others of this type, with Gani
Comercial, Grupo Gulamo, and the MBS Group among the more
prominent ones. The first two are both importer-exporters
and agricultural processors (tea, cashews, flour) based in
Nacala and Nampula. In August 2003, Mohamed Aquil
Rajahussen, CEO of Grupo Gulamo, launched Air Corridor,
Mozambique first private commercial airline to operate
nationwide (see controversy regarding Air Corridor in
reftel B). The MBS Group is primarily a clothing retailer
that has transformed itself quickly into a
multimillion-dollar empire; MBS is now financing the
construction of the country largest shopping center,
located in downtown Maputo. Both MBS and Grupo Gulamo
declined to turn in financial information for the KPMG
survey; media reports suggest fear of auditing.


11. (C) Most Indian-Pakistani businesses are suspected by
public opinion to be smugglers, but, to some extent,
"involvement in contraband" is just a reflection of the
bribes that must be paid to local authorities in order to
stay in business in Mozambique. In recent years, however,
Gani Comercial and Grupo Gulamo members have been arrested
for smuggling hashish; each was able to buy its way out of
prosecution. MBS is more notorious yet. Local authorities
and religious leaders assert that the company has a
sweetheart relationship with FRELIMO in which it does not
have to pay import duties or taxes for any products. In
exchange, goods ordered by key FRELIMO party members,
including President Chissano and family, are sold to them
at sub-market prices. This type of arrangement is
reportedly replicated to a lesser extent by other south
Asian import-export businesses, such as the owners of Tiger
Shopping Center in Maputo. These businessmen are among the
major donors to the construction of mosques, schools, and
religious charities throughout Mozambique.

--------------
Who Owns the Mosques and Schools?
--------------

12. (SBU) Numerous building projects are underway in
Mozambique, but no sector is more vibrant than mosque
construction and rehabilitation. In the past few years
Muslim school construction has also taken off. Financiers
of specific mosques are at times hard to identify, but
broad patterns are easily detected. The most prominent new
mosques are the work of Mozambican businessmen building, in
part, shiny monuments to themselves. In a second group are
mosques in communities which rely on support from the
Islamic Council or the Comunidade Mahometana (mentioned in
para 5 above) -- Mozambican organizations which depend to
some extent on contributions from local businessmen. The
main difference between these two organizations is that the
leadership of the former is made up of native Africans and
ethnic South Asians who have been in Mozambique for
generations, whereas recent South Asian immigrants dominate
the latter. Also, the Islamic Council receives significant
funding from the Saudi Arabian government for its
activities; it is unclear how much goes into mosque
construction. Finally, many poorer Muslim communities in
the north rely directly on foreign organizations for
rehabilitation of their smaller mosques.


13. (SBU) Nasir Lunat, president of the Council of the
Ulama, is unique in that he is not only an imam but also
one of the most prominent local benefactors of mosque
construction. Nasir and family own the Maputo currency
exchange house Lunat Cambios and he was also a FRELIMO
representative in the National Assembly from 1995-2000.
Lunat Cambios was one of the principal exchange houses used
for money laundering purposes in the BCM scandal,
Mozambique worst bank fraud (the investigation of which
led to the murder of prominent journalist Carlos Cardoso).
Lunat was the imam at Maputo Polana Mosque until 2001.
After leaving Polana, Lunat has been the driving force and
ostensibly leading financier behind construction of the
impressive new Taqwa Mosque in central Maputo. Religious
practices are more conservative at Taqwa than at Polana -
for example, in contrast to most Maputo mosques, Taqwa has
no prayer rooms for women. This has raised suspicions that
the real financiers are fundamentalists from other
countries.


14. (C) Other South Asian-Mozambican businessmen-as-donors
include Mohamed Bashir Suleiman, owner of MBS, who gave a
reported $1 million in 2003-2004 for reconstruction of
Mozambique Baixa Mosque, in downtown Maputo. The Gulamo
family, who number among the few Shi s in the north, has
built the new Gulamo Mosque in Nampula, rebuilt the Central
Mosque on Ilha de Mocambique, and is building another
mosque in Nampula. The Gani family has built two mosques
in Nacala. In Pemba, Osman Yacob, by far the biggest
businessman in town, has built the Osman Yacob Mosque.


15. (C) Many Mozambican Muslims see these figures as
corrupt, with lifestyles that are obviously not in line
with Muslim principles, and resent the influence of these
figures in their religious lives. Sources indicate that
Nasir Lunat was fired as imam of Polana Mosque (the mosque
of choice for Maputo intellectuals) because many considered
that his involvement in money laundering made him an
inappropriate spiritual leader. Shortly thereafter the
Baixa Mosque turned down Lunat offer of hundreds of
thousands of dollars for reconstruction. The old mosque
also turned down a million-dollar donation from MBS, but
eventually accepted the money after Mohamed Bashir swore an
oath (apparently in tears) that he had been a good Muslim
and was not involved in corrupt activities. Despite this
oath, in 2004 many worshipers left the mosque because of
his reputation and set up their own makeshift place of
worship in the second floor of a nearby building. Northern
cities have also seen their mosques fracture and subdivide
in recent years for similar reasons. For example, the
South Asian community left Nampula venerable Cuat Islam
mosque in the 1990 due to a squabble over whether certain
businessmen should be allowed to fund reconstruction. The
South Asians are now found primarily at the Central Mosque,
and the Cuat Islam Mosque now appears dilapidated with an
entirely native African population.


16. (C) Foreign contributors are also present in mosque
construction, including the Kuwait-based African Muslim
Agency (AMA) and also the South Africa-based Jamiatul Ulama
Transvaal (JUT). AMA, largely financed and staffed in
Mozambique by South African citizens of South Asian
descent, has constructed a wide range of smaller mosques
throughout northern Mozambique and also provides support to
the madrassas. AMA projects include at least five mosques
in Nampula city, the Islamic Cultural Center in Nacala, and
the Omar Bun al-Kattab mosque in Pemba. AMA financing has
also been reported in very small rural communities in
Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces. Sources claim that JUT
has channeled Saudi Arabia-based sources and clerics for
support of Taqwa Mosque. AMA and JUT mosques tend to have
a more conservative tone, but do not appear to preach
radical Islam. Conservative mosques will appeal to certain
Mozambicans, especially poor people alienated by wealthy,
westernized mosque builders. AMA has also attracted some
support among native Africans by challenging South Asian
religious leaders who charge their followers for marriage,
burial, and other services. The AMA has also taken a
rather moderate approach to questions of women's dress;
sources suggest that this has been done out of cultural
necessity in northern Mozambique, rather than conviction.
AMA-financed mosques have not, however, elevated native
African Mozambicans to positions of authority (such as imam
or mualimo) and still are viewed with suspicion by many.
AMA has also clashed with northern Muslims over its efforts
to eradicate traditional Mozambican customs within the
mosques. In 2003 a dispute about proper practice of Islam
at Pemba prominent Paquitequete mosque degenerated into a
public fistfight between AMA staff and locals. A similar
incident was reported in Quissanga, also in Cabo Delgado
province. The final verdict on AMA influence is difficult
to categorize neatly.


17. (C) Some Middle Eastern and East African governments
also provide modest but significant support for religious
activities. Egypt is reportedly the only country that has
a direct bilateral agreement with the Mozambican government
to provide such aid, which comes primarily in the form of
Arabic, math and science teachers for Muslim primary and
secondary schools. Some medical assistance is also
provided. Other governments provide direct assistance to
non-governmental organizations; for example, Saudi Arabia
works directly with the Islamic Council to set up medical
clinics and run other charities. Some recruiting for
educational programs takes place in these contexts. Other
countries have provided state-sponsored religious aid in
the past, recruiting for potentially more dangerous
activities. Sheik Aminuddin explained to Emboff that the
Iranian embassy had provided significant religious aid to
Mozambique in the 1980s and early 1990s. He commented that
their agenda was very politicized, that they were openly
seeking recruits, and that Mozambicans were not receptive
to their entreaties. Iran has since pulled its embassy and
aid programs from Mozambique.


18. (C) Foreign Muslim aid groups have played an especially
large role in education. Munazzamaat Dawat Islamia,
affiliated with the Sudanese government, has for many years
provided scholarships to religious schools in Sudan, Libya,
and Saudi Arabia. Some students on scholarship focus on
science and technology, rather than pure religious
instruction. MDI has built a school and mosque in Nacala
and is now doing the same in Xai-Xai, Gaza province. The
AMA, JUT, and Saudi Arabian charities have also provided
scholarships for religious study in South Africa, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, and elsewhere. The vast majority of
those who travel to Sudan and Saudi Arabia are native
African; scholars of South Asian descent are more likely to
choose South Africa or Pakistan. Observers note that
Mozambicans who study Islam for several years overseas tend
to return more serious and more committed to implementing
strict Islamic practices. All Embassy contacts insist that
there are no signs of radicalization, however. One
contact, who attended Medina University in Saudi Arabia on
scholarship, told Emboff that he knew classmates from other
countries who had gone off to fight the U.S. in Afghanistan
and Iraq. He said that Mozambicans have no interest in
such adventures, emphasizing that Mozambicans have a duty
to take advantage of an educational opportunity that does
not exist in Mozambique and apply knowledge at home.
(Note: Mozambican cultural contact with Saudi Arabia is
low; for example, only 350 Mozambicans are estimated to
have made the pilgrimage to Mecca this season, a slight
decline from previous years.) Another contact who had
spent time in Egypt on a scholarship said that such
educational opportunities are often the only way that
native Africans can get the training necessary to attain
positions of religious authority. Despite receiving an
extensive education overseas, many native Africans who
return home with impressive theological credentials still
have difficulty finding positions of religious authority in
a hierarchy dominated by South Asians. Native African
embassy sources are visibly bitter about this.


19. (SBU) Increasingly, formal Islamic educational
opportunities (beyond the madrassas) are starting to take
place in Mozambique. Mozambique has long-standing Muslim
schools in most of the major cities; these schools
generally provide instruction in Portuguese only and often
are funded by the Comunidade Mahometana. There are also
small schools in Nampula, Nacala, and Quelimane that
provide instruction only in Arabic. Post has not been able
to determine the funding sources behind such schools. No
Muslim universities exist, per se, but the Mussa Bin Bique
University in Nampula was started in 2003 to address this
need. The AMA pulled funding, however, when its directors
refused to adapt to AMA's rather conservative religious
vision of the school. The school now is operated by the
Ministry of Justice and does not provide religious
education, though many of its students and all of its
administrators are all Muslim. The Embassy provided
support to build an American corner (much of the school small library) at Mussa Bin Bique in 2004.


20. (SBU) In 2003 Sheik Aminuddin opened Hamza School in
Matola (near Maputo),Mozambique first school that
provides instruction in both Portuguese and Arabic. The
school operates as a boarding school for boys and as a day
school for girls, attracting students from across the
country, almost all of them native Africans. Tuition is
free. (As are funeral services provided on school grounds;
this is somewhat of a slap at the South Asian community,
which insists on its own separate, more expensive rites.)
Instruction is traditional but not fundamentalist.
Education for girls is focused as a preparation for
motherhood, but the Sheik also teaches that women should be
encouraged to work in a professional capacity outside the
home and can even become president of the country.
Financing for the school has come from Mozambican
businessmen, according to the Sheik, who adds that some of
them are "probably not the best Muslims." Sheik Aminuddin
plans to open another school in Pemba in 2005. Only one
mile down the road, the Aga Khan Foundation has started
construction on an ambitious new secondary school. The
school, while operated by an Ismailite Muslim foundation,
will not provide religious education, will charge tuition
and is expected to attract elite Mozambicans of all
religious backgrounds.

--------------
The Ismailites
--------------

21. (SBU) The economic strength of the Ismailite community
in Mozambique has grown exponentially in recent years.
Mozambican Muslims have looked on skeptically. Though
reportedly fewer than 1,000 in number, Ismailites own the
two largest private Mozambican-owned businesses, Africom
and Delta Trading -- along with Merec, the Hotel VIP,
several small computer services and technology companies,
and ISCTEM (a Maputo university). The Aga Khan Fund for
Economic Development owns the prestigious Hotel Polana.
Ismailites are something of a mystery to Mozambicans; the
Ismailite Aga Khan mosque in Maputo has always been a
closed community, mysterious and inaccessible to most
Mozambican Muslims. At the same time, Ismailites express
social values that are alarmingly progressive for some
Muslims, particularly with regard to the role of women,
dress patterns and education. Embassy sources have also
claimed (rather scornfully) that major donors, such as the
Gulamo family and Mohamed Bashir, are "Ismailites," even
though it seems clear that they are not. "Ismailite" has
come to be a term used loosely by religious leaders and
other Muslims to deride local Indian-Pakistani businessmen
who have grown too big for their britches and too far from
Islam. Ismailites, for their part, have made an effort to
strengthen bonds to the broader Muslim community by funding
local charity programs and also by providing support
through the Aga Khan Foundation, which carries out
agriculture, health and education programs in Cabo Delgado
province.
?
--------------
Final Thoughts
--------------

22. (C) The Muslim community in Mozambique has some clear
lines of fission: South Asians vs. native Africans; rich
vs. poor; the Council of the Ulama vs. the Islamic Council;
corrupt vs. disenfranchised; modern vs. traditional. Yet
these divisions are not always mutually reinforcing. For
instance, different groups of South Asians represent the
far end of both modern and fundamentalist Islam. Through
financing of new mosques, businessmen of questionable
repute are promoting several different versions of Islamic
teaching. The Islamic Council is the more moderate
religious organization, but receives direct funding from
the Saudi Arabian government. Despite these complications
and ironies, the good news is that the center, as
represented by the imams in the more traditional mosques
and their followers, appears to be holding nicely. Any
signs of possible radicalization among the Muslim
population are extremely difficult to detect. But if
Mozambique extreme poverty continues without much
improvement, the beautiful new and largely moderate mosques
may become associated with rich, corrupt, and politically
connected Indians and Pakistanis. Young people could begin
turning in numbers toward fundamentalist alternatives that
already exist in the country. Thankfully, all signs
indicate that Mozambique is not there yet.
LALIME