MOZAMBIQUE: FM SIMAO ON A SUDAN TRIBUNAL AND IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAPUTO 000128

SIPDIS
FOR AF/S - HTREGER, AF/FO, S/WCI, NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015
TAGS: PREL KAWC MZ ICC
SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE: FM SIMAO ON A SUDAN TRIBUNAL AND IRAQ
ELECTIONS

REF: A. STATE 13609

B. STATE 12757 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) The Ambassador delivered the demarche on the Sudan
tribunal concept (ref A) in the early afternoon of January
26, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Simao. The Foreign
Minister responded to the demarche by pointing out that
work toward any tribunal "would be difficult" at this
juncture because it might discourage involved parties from
"finishing the Abuja peace process." In any case, he
thought both sides would insist on some sort of amnesty
prior to any agreement. In his view, the time to find a
way forward on the tribunal issue would be after a peace
agreement had been signed, not now.


2. (C) Turning to the matter of the ICC's role, he doubted
that the Europeans would accept a non-ICC role for any
tribunal, since the ICC was "their brainchild." If both
the US and the Europeans persisted in forcing the issue
now, Mozambique would find itself in the uncomfortable
position of "being squeezed from both sides," he said,
something he hoped could be avoided. He assured the
Ambassador that the matter of punishing those responsible
for atrocities would not be forgotten, but reiterated that
dealing with them ought to be done at a later, less
sensitive stage.


3. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity to underscore
for Foreign Minister Simao the importance of the upcoming
Iraqi elections (ref B). Simao responded positively by
endorsing many of the points made and adding that there was
"no alternative" to holding elections at this stage, that
elections were "the only solution." He predicted, however,
that turnout would be very low. Nonetheless he thought
that the elections would help give the government more
legitimacy and that those left outside the process,
particularly the Sunnis, could be brought into the
government after the vote.


4. (C) Comment: The Ambassador's call on Simao took place
under somewhat unusual circumstances. Earlier in the day
the GRM announced that all ministers and governors would be
"dismissed" effective midnight January 26, in preparation
for the handover to the incoming government of
president-elect Guebuza, who will be sworn in on February

2. Simao suggested that the announcement was really for
public consumption only, saying that, in fact, government
officials would be at their desks up to the very end. He
noted, however, that under these conditions the meeting
with the Ambassador was his last official one as Foreign
Minister.
LA LIME