BAHRAIN "POSTPONES" AL QUDS CONFERENCE, WORRIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000839

SIPDIS

STATE PASS NSC FOR FFTOWNSEND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM KTFN BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN "POSTPONES" AL QUDS CONFERENCE, WORRIES
ABOUT OPPOSITION

REF: A. MANAMA 811 B. STATE 103714 C. MANAMA 823

Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe. Reason: 1.4 (B)(D)


1. (U) This is an action message -- see para 8.


2. (S) Summary. Bahrain has decided to "postpone" an Al Quds
Institute conference planned for next week, and the MFA has
assured us that postponement really means cancellation. In
delivering that welcome news, MFA MinState Abdul Ghaffar at
the same time passed on his concern that Embassy contacts
with boycotting opposition societies were sending the wrong
message and strengthening their resolve against the
government, rather than encouraging them to participate in
upcoming elections. Ambassador took the opportunity to
reiterate our hope that an amicable solution could be found
to the government's dispute with the dissolved Bahrain Center
for Human Rights (BCHR). Abdul Ghaffar reiterated past
criticism of BCHR, focusing especially on Abdul Hadi
Al-Khawaja, whom he called a dangerous man who should be on
our terrorist list. While it is U.S. policy to encourage
oppositionists to participate in the political process, the
Embassy has discovered that prominent members of several
opposition societies, including leading Shia boycotter
Al-Wifaq, and four members of Parliament were recently placed
on a Washington "VGTO" list of those ineligible to enter the
United States. Embassy requests guidance on this action. End
Summary.


3. (S) Following Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend's June
10 phone call to the Crown Prince, MFA Minister of State
Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar requested a meeting with the
Ambassador June 11 to advise that the government had decided
to "postpone" the conference that the Al Quds Institute had
planned to hold in Bahrain June 18-20. He said they were
using the word "postpone" but in fact had no intention of
letting it take place in Bahrain at a later date. He said
that the Foreign Ministry would never have let the conference
be scheduled if they had known about it; the Ministry of
Islamic Affairs had simply not focused on who would be
involved. (Note: Bahrain newspaper "Al-Akhbar Al-Khaleej"
reported on its front page June 12 that the organizing
committee, in coordination with the Al Quds Institute, had
decided to postpone the conference, saying that due to
current and unsuitable circumstances some prominent figures
had been unable to attend.)


4. (C) Noting that Bahrain had canceled the event at the
request of the U.S. (the Ambassador interjected that he hoped
Bahrain likewise considered the cancellation to be the right
thing to do, given the invited participants),Abdel Ghaffar
said that, on the other side, he hoped the U.S. would
cooperate with the Government of Bahrain in its efforts to
deal with the boycotting opposition societies. "When you
meet with them," he said, "or when visitors like DAS
Carpenter meet with people like Jawad Asfoor (board member of
the dissolved Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR),who
attended a dinner hosted by the Ambassador for DAS
Carpenter),"it sends the wrong message." Instead of
encouraging them to work with the government and participate
in the system, he said, it does the opposite. They tell
people that they met with American officials, who support
what they are doing. Be careful, he said. They tell you one
thing, but tell others something completely different.
"Strengthening these people," he added, "is bad for reform."
He cited Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja as a particular concern,
labeling him a "terrorist" trained in Iran who has his own
agenda which has nothing to do with participation in
parliamentary politics. He should be on your terrorist list,
he stated.


5. (C) The Ambassador said that embassies, as a matter of
course, meet with a range of people, and that our aim in
meeting with representatives of opposition or boycotting
societies is to encourage participation in the upcoming
elections. The Ambassador then raised the BCHR, noting
Minister of Social Affairs Dr. Al Belooshi's recent
statements that it must stop its activities or face
prosecution. He hoped that an amicable solution could be
reached with the BCHR and its members; heavy-handed action
against them would invariably generate international,
including U.S., criticism.


6. (C) Abdul Ghaffar said that the government very much wants
to encourage the boycotters to participate in next year's
elections. The problem is that some of these people, even if
they say they believe in the system and say they want to
participate, in fact do not. Al-Khawaja, who is associated
with the BCHR, is a dangerous man. People are reporting, he
said, that Al-Khawaja was behind the violence that took place
on the weekend over a wall built by a royal family member in
the Shia village of Malkiya. (Note: Others have said the
same, including Mansour Al-Jamry, editor of the independent
newspaper Al-Wasat, who has been publicizing the Malkiya wall
issue and participated in the weekend demonstration.
Al-Jamry says that Al-Khawaja is determined to provoke the
government to arrest him. End note.) Regarding the BCHR in
general, Abdul Ghaffar said that that it had burned its
bridges, especially through its association with Al-Khawaja
and his supporters. The first president, Abdul Aziz Abul,
quit because of the activities of Al-Khawaja within the BCHR,
he said. BCHR members, when they first approached the King
about establishing the Center, were very clear in stating to
the King that their intent was to document human rights
concerns. However, they have continually gone far beyond
what they agreed to do and what they were licensed to do.


7. (C) Comment. The Crown Prince told Frances Townsend that
he would welcome Embassy help to encourage boycotters to
participate in next year's elections. The next day, Adbul
Ghaffar -- seemingly contradictorily -- indicated that
Embassy engagement with the boycotters would have the
opposite effect of our intent: strengthening their resolve to
oppose the government and not participate. The Ambassador
will seek to engage the CP on exactly how he sees us helping
to encourage their participation.


8. (S) Action request. A major element of Abdul Ghaffar's
line of reasoning is that at least some of the boycotters
have dangerous connections to Iran and Hizbollah. While U.S
policy has been to reach out to boycotters and encourage
their participation, the fact that, according to post
consular section research, on May 7 at least seven boycotters
from Al-Wifaq and other opposition societies were placed on
the "VGTO" hit list as ineligible to travel to the U.S.
presents a conflicting position of what exactly the USG
position is towards the boycotters (four sitting members of
parliament were placed on the list the same day). Embassy
requests guidance on why these boycotters were deemed
ineligible to travel to the U.S., and what implications this
may have for our relations with and outreach to such
opposition societies as Al-Wifaq.
MONROE