Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MANAMA1594
2005-10-31 13:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

MFA GOES PUBLIC ON IMPENDING TRANSFER OF BAHRAINI

Tags:  PTER KAWC PHUM PINR BA 
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311320Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001594 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2015
TAGS: PTER KAWC PHUM PINR BA
SUBJECT: MFA GOES PUBLIC ON IMPENDING TRANSFER OF BAHRAINI
GTMO DETAINEES

REF: A. MANAMA 1553 B. SECSTATE 199146 C. MANAMA 1547

Classified By: Ambassador William T.Monroe. Reason: 1.4 (B)(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001594

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2015
TAGS: PTER KAWC PHUM PINR BA
SUBJECT: MFA GOES PUBLIC ON IMPENDING TRANSFER OF BAHRAINI
GTMO DETAINEES

REF: A. MANAMA 1553 B. SECSTATE 199146 C. MANAMA 1547

Classified By: Ambassador William T.Monroe. Reason: 1.4 (B)(D)


1. (U) Unidentified "sources" at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs told the Bahraini press on October 30 that some of
the six Bahrainis detained at Guantanamo would return to
Bahrain shortly, possibly over the upcoming Eid holidays.
This story became a lead front-page news in both the English
and Arabic press on October 31, with extensive reporting on
how the detainees might be handled upon their return and
interviews with families of all six detainees as well as
their American lawyer and a human rights activist. One
article quoted a senior official as saying the returned
detainees would be turned over to the Bahraini authorities so
that they could be sent to their respective families, and
doubting that they would be tried or placed under house
arrest. Another source was quoted as saying that, although
the returned detainees would not necessarily be held in
prison by the Bahraini authorities, there would be a security
arrangement or agreement between the government and the
detainees. The source did not give specific details, but
said it would include conditions and certification that the
returned detainees not resume any communications or
connections with any group associated with Al-Qaida or other
terrorist movements.


2. (U) Relatives of all six detainees expressed joy at the
news of the possible return of their family members, but
worried whether their own family member would be in this
group coming back. American lawyer Joshua Colangelo-Bryan
said he had not heard of the impending release, but would not
have expected the USG to inform him in any event. A Foreign
Ministry source said that the release of the detainees from
Guantanamo was the result of "strenuous efforts" by the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior as well as the
families' attorneys. Nabeel Rajab of the now-dissolved
Bahrain Center for Human Rights also claimed credit for
applying pressure that led to the release. A representative
of the Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, apparently miffed
at also not being able to claim credit, called the Embassy to

complain that the Ambassador had not informed them of the
impending return in a meeting earlier this month (ref C).


3. (C) The Embassy first learned that the MFA had gone public
with the news of the impending return when it was called for
comment by the press on the evening of October 30. The
Ambassador immediately called Minister of
Information/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed
Abdul Ghaffar (our point person on the detainees) as well as
Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Khalid Al-Khalifa to
register concern that premature release of information about
the transfer could create legal complications that could
jeopardize the transfer. Shaikh Khalid said that the
decision to release information about the return was made on
the margins of the October 30 Cabinet meeting. The public
pressure to get results on the Bahraini detainees had just
grown too great, and the leadership felt it had to say
something.


4. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity to impress upon
Shaikh Khalid the importance of handling the detainees in a
way that, consistent with our exchange of notes, ensured that
the returned detainees were prevented from posing a
continuing threat. Before returning them to their families,
for example, it was essential that they be fully questioned.
If no charges were to be brought, it was important for the
government to develop a system of monitoring and
surveillance. It is in our strong mutual interest that any
returned detainees not be discovered renewing contacts with
terrorist elements or engaging in terrorist-related
activities. Shaikh Khalid assured that the Government of
Bahrain shared that view, and would put in place systems to
prevent that from happening.


5. (C) The issue of the returning detainees was also
discussed in an October 31 meeting between the Ambassador and
Deputy Prime Minister (and former Foreign Minister) Shaikh
Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa. Shaikh Mohammed said that
the whole town was talking about the possible return of the
detainees. The Ambassador raised concerns about press
reporting from unidentified sources suggesting that the
detainees would not be tried or put under house arrest. He
cautioned that Washington will be watching closely how the
Bahraini detainees' return is handled. He passed a copy of
the diplomatic note outlining USG conditions for the transfer
(ref B),and stressed the importance of developing a system
whereby the detainees are interrogated, monitored, and
rehabilitated on their return. The worst thing that could
happen, he stated, would be to learn that they were in
contact with suspected terrorist elements in Bahrain or
elsewhere. Shaikh Mohammed pledged that the government would
take all steps necessary to prevent that possibility.


6. (C) The Ambassador raised his concern that the detainees'
return could result in their being treated as heroes. These
are not benign individuals, he noted. Shaikh Mohammed
responded that, even if some Bahrainis support them, they are
a minority voice and do not represent the majority opinion.
He concluded by saying that Bahrain does not want to see new
groups breeding in Bahrain. "We need to keep our eye on all
these elements," he stated.


7. (C) Comment: The MFA's decision to release information
about the planned upcoming return of three of the six
Bahraini detainees in the coming days comes in the context of
a steady barrage of press reporting of alleged mistreatment
of one of Bahrain's detainees, Juma al-Dossari (not one of
the three approved for release),beginning on October 19 and
continuing regularly since then (ref A). These articles have
only intensified the clamor from the press, parliamentarians,
and NGOs for a return of the detainees. Concern over the
detainees has even led to a rare criticism of the U.S. Navy's
presence in Bahrain. An op-ed writer on October 31 called
departing Admiral Nichols' recent press statement that the
Fifth Fleet had no intention of leaving Bahrain bad news for
Bahrain because, while the U.S. uses Bahrain to protect its
interests, Bahrain has not been able to use its good
relations with the U.S. to get its detainees back.


8. (C) Comment continued. The Ambassador, in recent meetings
and discussions with Minister of Interior Shaikh Rashid, DPM
Shaikh Mohammed, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Khalid,
and MFA Minister of State Abdul Ghaffar, has stressed the
importance of handling the detainees in a way that prevents
them from becoming a threat once again. All officials have
given their assurances that they will do so, while
acknowledging that they face certain legal and resource
constraints that make it difficult to hold them for any
length of time, prosecute, and provide continuous
surveillance and monitoring. Embassy's best guess is that
the GOB will detain the returning detainees for the up to 48
hours allowed under Bahrain law without charges, release them
to their families, and embark on a program of rehabilitation
and calibrated monitoring to ensure that they don't go astray.
MONROE