Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MANAMA158
2005-02-03 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

U/S BOLTON PRESSES FOR MOVING IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

Tags:  PARM PREL PGOV PTER BA IR KICC 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000158 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV PTER BA IR KICC
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON PRESSES FOR MOVING IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
TO SECURITY COUNCIL, ARTICLE 98 RATIFICATION


Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000158

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV PTER BA IR KICC
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON PRESSES FOR MOVING IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
TO SECURITY COUNCIL, ARTICLE 98 RATIFICATION


Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Under Secretary Bolton January 30 met with Foreign
Minister Shaikh Mohammed, Defense Minister Shaikh Khalifa,
and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Abdul Ghaffar to
discuss Iran's nuclear program and bringing into force the
bilateral Article 98 agreement. In response to U/S Bolton's
presentation on Iran, Shaikh Mohammed agreed that the matter
is very serious and important, and said that Bahrain
supported keeping the issue in the IAEA for now. Public
opinion required that the GOB allow the IAEA to take the lead
until there is a decision to move the issue to the UN
Security Council. Noting that Bahrain currently chairs the
GCC, he offered to coordinate a GCC statement on Iran, if the
U.S. thought it would be helpful. MinDef Shaikh Khalifa said
that Bahrain recognizes the Iranian threat and estimates that
Iran is 3-5 years away from acquiring nuclear weapons. The
focus of international efforts must be on stopping Iran's
program, preferably by means other than military force. On
Article 98, Shaikh Mohammed asserted that Bahrain would
continue to protect Americans in Bahrain, and the GOB was
considering the best way to bring the agreement into force.
The government was still developing a relationship with
parliament, which was reconstituted only two years ago, and
the parameters for concluding executive agreements vice
parliamentary ratification were not yet clear. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Iranian Strategic Decision to Acquire Nuclear Weapons
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security Bolton, accompanied by T Senior Advisor Timbie,
opened his January 30 meetings with Foreign Minister/Deputy
Prime Minister Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa,
Defense Minister General Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa,

and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs/Information
Minister Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar by briefing them on U.S.
concerns related to Iran's nuclear program. He asserted that
we are opposed to Iran getting a nuclear capacity, and we
believe that Iran made a strategic decision to acquire
nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to carry them.
The UN Security Council is the proper forum for dealing with
Iran, and U/S Bolton passed the Bahraini officials a paper on
options for dealing with Iran in the UNSC. The EU-3 fully
agree with our assessment of Iran's nuclear program but
believe they can bring about a change in Iranian behavior
through negotiations. The EU-3 and Iran are far apart on the
central issue of cessation of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle
efforts, so the negotiations may well not succeed. This is
not just a confrontation between Iran and the U.S.; rather,
it is between Iran and the rest of the world. The United
States' overwhelming preference is to reach a negotiated
solution but, though we have no military plans now, we have
taken no option off the table.

-------------- --------------
ForMin: IAEA Responsible for Iranian Nuclear File
-------------- --------------


3. (C) ForMin Shaikh Mohammed agreed that this is a very
serious and important issue. Saying that Iran is "next
door," he stated that the international community must
convince Iran not to proceed with its nuclear program. He
noted that he had raised this issue during his August 2004
visit to Iran, and his interlocutors insisted Iran is not
developing nuclear weapons.


4. (C) Shaikh Mohammed said that the IAEA should be in
charge of the Iran nuclear file. It is the organization
responsible for nuclear matters, and Bahraini public opinion
would only support the IAEA taking the lead. The GOB
supports the United States and will agree to move the issue
to the UNSC if necessary. But the IAEA should be given the
chance to see through its investigation. Bahrain currently
is chair of the GCC, and the GOB could coordinate a GCC
statement on Iran based upon the IAEA position, if the U.S.
considered this to be helpful.


5. (C) U/S Bolton said that the United States continues to
work with the IAEA, but is concerned that Iran, in its
submissions to the agency, has not dealt with many of the
outstanding questions. (Note: Senior Advisor Timbie passed
the list of unanswered questions to an MFA official attending
the meeting. End Note) Iran has made concessions at the
IAEA in response to the U.S. threat to take the issue to the
UNSC.

-------------- -
MinDef: Iran 3-5 Years from Acquiring Weapons
-------------- -


6. (C) Defense Minister Shaikh Khalifa told U/S Bolton that
Bahrain recognizes the Iranian military and terrorist threat.
The Iranian Ambassador told Shaikh Khalifa just a few weeks
earlier that the Iranian nuclear program is for peaceful
purposes and requested the support of regional countries.
However, the GCC issued a statement opposing the program.
Bahrain estimates that Iran is 3-5 years away from developing
nuclear weapons. The focus of international efforts must be
on stopping Iran's program. The question is the means, and
using military force should be the last option.


7. (C) Shaikh Khalifa noted that a strike against the
Bushehr reactor would have environmental, political, and
military consequences for the countries of the region. A
solution coming as a result of negotiations or even sanctions
would be the best outcome for the region. The United States
should be careful and calculate all the risks involved.
Bahrain supports the U.S., but it cannot apply heat or
threaten Iran because it is a small country.


8. (C) In response to the MinDef's question, U/S Bolton said
that the government of Pakistan had provided some information
on the A.Q. Khan network. While we know that he passed
weapons design information to Libya, we do not know if he did
so to Iran. He said that Pakistan, along with other OIC
members Algeria, Tunisia, and Yemen, are on the IAEA board,
and we encourage Bahrain to encourage them to support moving
the Iran nuclear issue to the UNSC. There, the heat and the
spotlight would be firmly on Iran. Additionally, Russia
would see the issue in a new light. Currently, it acts as a
supplier of nuclear technology. But in the UNSC, it would
have to act as a member of the P-5, with a different set of
interests. Shaikh Khalifa noted that the Iranian ambassador
had told him that all Iranian universities were now involved
in the development of high tech systems, so Iran may not need
to rely upon technology from outside sources.

--------------
Abdul Ghaffar Supports IAEA Lead
--------------


9. (C) Minister of State Abdul Ghaffar agreed that it is
very important to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Concurring with U/S Bolton's statement, he said that in order
to prevent Iran from portraying the conflict as Iran-U.S.
rather than Iran and the rest of the world, the international
community should work the issue through the IAEA. U/S Bolton
noted that Iran had not allowed the IAEA to inspect all the
places it wanted to see, in particular certain military sites
that we believe are centers for weapons development. He
related that at one site in Iran, the IAEA had found several
feet of soil cleared away, thus preventing the agency from
checking for the presence of uranium.

--------------
Activating Article 98 Agreement
--------------


10. (C) Turning to Article 98, U/S Bolton stated that we
have signed 97 agreements worldwide, 87 of which had entered
into force. Unfortunately, Bahrain is one of the 10 that had
signed but not activated the agreement. He noted that there
were two ways to bring the agreement into force: by
parliamentary ratification, and by a legally binding
agreement between the executive branches of the two
countries. The United States did not need to obtain
congressional ratification and was willing and able to
activate the agreement with Bahrain via an exchange of
diplomatic notes.


11. (C) Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammed assured U/S Bolton
that the GOB would continue to protect Americans in Bahrain,
as it had done for over 50 years. He said that the GOB would
respect its signing of the agreement. The government was
determining the right timing to push the agreement forward to
parliament. Currently, the GOB put priority on gaining
parliamentary ratification of the free trade agreement, and
did not want to jeopardize this ratification by also
submitting the Article 98 agreement.


12. (C) U/S Bolton indicated that two-thirds of all the
Article 98 agreements had entered into force via diplomatic
notes rather than parliamentary ratification, and asked
whether this was the better route to use. Shaikh Mohammed
replied that the GOB was "at the beginning" of its
relationship with parliament, which had been reconstituted
only two years ago. The government would first need to reach
agreement with parliament about what comprises an executive
agreement, vice treaty, before it took this route to activate
Article 98. MinDef Shaikh Khalifa told U/S Bolton that
finalizing the agreement was a domestic political issue that
the government was working on.


13. (U) Under Secretary Bolton cleared this message.

MONROE