INCREASED SPANISH ENGAGEMENT WITH CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000515

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU SP
SUBJECT: INCREASED SPANISH ENGAGEMENT WITH CUBA

REF: BRUSSELS 0555

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).


1. (C) Summary. Regional leader and Socialist Party (PSOE)
President Manuel Chaves touched off a minor political scandal
when he announced in Havana that King Juan Carlos and
President Zapatero would make official visits to Cuba in

2006. Representatives of both the King and President
Zapatero disclaimed the announcement and said they had no
plans to visit Cuba. The MFA Cuba desk officer insisted that
Chaves was either misinformed or acting on his own
initiative, but did confirm GOS plans to increase high level
contacts with the Cuban Government. GOS Development Minister
Magdalena Alvaro will travel soon to Havana for "routine
meetings" and Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque will
visit Madrid in March (at Cuba's request). Looking ahead,
Fidel Castro is invited to the Ibero American Summit in Spain
in October, though he has not indicated whether or not he
will participate. The GOS believes Castro is in a
wait-and-see mode in the wake of the EU's decision to
temporarily lift its restrictive measures on Cuba, though
Spain expects Cuba will release a large number of political
prisoners in the next several months.


2. (C) The MFA does not expect dramatic improvements in Cuban
behavior as a result of EU overtures, but Spain is determined
to improve ties with the GOC in order achieve small gains,
such as the reopening of the Spanish Cultural Center in
Havana. In our discussions, we have emphasized the USG's
continuing skepticism regarding the Spanish approach and
noted that Cuba will remain an issue of contention in the
bilateral relationship. The GOS hopes that we will accept
Spanish policy as complementary to USG Cuba policy, a point
MFA DG for Latin America Javier Sandomingo is likely to make
during his upcoming meeting with WHA A/S Noriega. We do not
believe the GOS will shift from its course on Cuba over the
near term, a course driven by a mixture of commercial
interests, lingering romantic notions of revolutionary Cuba
within the Socialist Party, and naivete regarding Spain's
ability to influence Castro. End Summary.

//SPANISH REGIONAL LEADER STUMBLES IN HAVANA//


3. (C) Poloff met with MFA Cuba desk officer Pablo Gomez de
Olea on February 7 to get a readout of the February 5-6 visit
to Havana of Andalucia Regional President Manuel Chaves and
to encourage the GOS to follow through with its announced
plans to increase contact with the Cuban opposition. Chaves,
who is also President of the ruling Socialist Party (Zapatero
is Secretary General of the PSOE),was the first significant
EU political figure to visit Havana since the EU's suspension
of its restrictive measures on Cuba. Chaves met with Fidel
Castro as well as with opposition leaders and touched off a
minor scandal for informing Castro that King Juan Carlos and
President Zapatero would make official visits to Havana in

2006. Both the Royal household and the President's office
denied any such plans, but most political observers doubt
Chaves would have raised the possible visits without
authorization/instruction from the GOS.


4. (C) De Olea insisted that the MFA "had no information" of
plans by either the King or Zapatero to go to Cuba and
suggested that there may have been a misunderstanding on
Chaves' part. He said he had not received a readout from
Havana of Chaves' visit, but that the MFA was pleased that he
had met for 45 minutes with dissident figures Manuel Cuesta
Morua, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Oswaldo Paya, Elizardo Sanchez,
and Vladimiro Roca. According to press reports, Chaves
relayed the Spanish Government's new policy on Cuba. Chaves
told the press that he found the opposition to be "divided...
lacking unity and cohesion."

//INCREASED HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES//


5. (C) De Olea confirmed Chaves' announcement that Cuban
Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque would travel to Madrid in
March for meetings with GOS officials. He said the meeting
was arranged at Cuba's request and that the Spanish did not
expect anything to come from the meeting. De Olea also said
that Spanish Development Minister Magdalena Alvarez will
travel soon to Havana for a "routine working visit" with
Cuban officials which would not involve any new Spanish aid
initiatives. (NOTE: Though de Olea did not mention it,
Chaves also urged Castro to attend the Ibero American Summit
in Salamanca, Spain in October. END NOTE.)


6. (C) De Olea said Spain believes that Castro is in a
wait-and-see mode with respect to the EU and said the GOS
does not expect dramatic changes in either EU-Cuban relations
or in Cuba's political environment. He does expect the GOC
to release significant number of political prisoners in the
next few months in an effort to maintain forward momentum in
relations with Europe. For its part, the Spanish Government
plans to use the next several months to cautiously begin
discussions with the GOC on the key bilateral issues. During
the Perez Roque visit, Spain will press for improved Cuban
servicing of its debt to Spanish entities and for increased
counter-terrorism cooperation. De Olea did not elaborate on
the latter item, but it is most likely a reference to Spain's
desire for greater Cuban cooperation regarding Spanish
investigations of ETA members who reside in or travel through
Cuba.

//ENGAGEMENT AT ANY COST//


7. (C) Poloff requested details regarding Spain's plans for
ramping up contact with the opposition, as the GOS said it
would do to counter-balance the easing of EU measures against
the Cuban Government. Poloff also reviewed USG suggestions
on possible options for increased engagement with Cuban civil
society, which we had previously shared with Spain and other
EU members. De Olea was familiar with the USG suggestions
and said that many coincided with Spain's ideas on how to
provide tangible assistance to Cuban activists.


8. (C) With this in mind, De Olea said the MFA is focused on
getting Cuban acceptance for the reopening of the Spanish
Cultural Center in Havana, which was closed down by the GOC
in September 2003. De Olea said he now favored acceding to a
standing Cuban demand for GOC oversight of the Cultural
Center's events and the right to veto any programs it finds
objectionable. He said it was more important to give the
Cuban public access to international news and other outside
information than to maintain the full independence of the
Cultural Center. (NOTE: It is not clear whether others in
the MFA would also be willing to give the Castro Government
such a degree of oversight of a theoretically Spanish
institution. END NOTE).


9. (C) Poloff asked whether MFA DG for Latin America Javier
Sandomingo would travel to Cuba for discussions with the
opposition, as he had been planning to do for several months.
De Olea said that Sandomingo would likely not travel to Cuba
soon, admitting that the Cuban Government refused to allow
him entry since his agenda would include meetings with
dissidents. De Olea argued that such a visit was no longer
necessary since Manuel Chaves had met with the opposition
during his recent visit. There are no GOS plans for
reciprocal impediments on official Cuban travel to Spain.

//SKEPTICISM OF SPANISH APPROACH//


10. (C) Poloff noted that the USG remained disappointed with
the EU's decision to suspend its restrictive measures since
Castro had done nothing to merit such an overture. In our
view, Spain's leadership of the move to ease the EU measures,
combined with the increased high level exchanges between Cuba
and Spain, virtually ensured that Cuba would remain a
significant irritant in U.S.-Spain relations. The USG hoped
that MFA DG Sandomingo would be able to discuss concrete
Spanish successes in support of Cuban democracy activists
during his February 14 meeting with WHA A/S Noriega.


11. (C) Poloff explained that there was particular skepticism
within the USG regarding the willingness of the Spanish
Ambassador in Havana to Havana to undertake measures to
support dissidents, given his obvious preference for working
with the Cuban Government. De Olea said the Spanish
Government was well aware that EU diplomats in Havana tended
to fall prey to the "Stockholm Syndrome" and said that most
of the hard work in support of Cuban dissidents would not be
undertaken by local EU diplomats. However, local EU
diplomats, including Spanish diplomats, would be expected to
"faithfully execute EU policy" with respect to aiding the
opposition.


12. (C) De Olea said he hoped the USG would understand the
Spanish approach and give the GOS time to let their
engagement effort bear fruit. According to de Olea, one
benefit of EU plans for engaging the opposition is that they
would force the opposition to speak to the EU with a single
voice, improving coordination among the fractious
organizations. Poloff lauded this goal, but noted that many
respected dissidents declined to participate in such
artificial unions because of the Castro regime's extensive
use of infiltrators and double agents, with several purported
leaders being among the prime suspects. De Olea acknowledged
this danger as significant impediment to any effort to aid
the opposition.

//COMMENT//


13. (C) GOS disavowals notwithstanding, it seems likely to us
that Chaves had explicit authorization from the Zapatero
Government to float the possibility of a Zapatero or Royal
visit to Havana next year since increased engagement with the
Castro Government is clearly a Zapatero/PSOE priority. The
GOS will likely continue on this course despite friction with
the USG over the issue. Spanish engagement with Cuba appears
driven by a combination of factors, including pressure by
Spanish investors in Cuba to improve the Spanish Government's
ability to lobby on their behalf. More importantly, Zapatero
remains focused on drawing a clear distinction between his
policies and those of former President Aznar. Improving
relations with Castro satisfies both this objective and the
desire of his leftist constituency to repair ties with a
leader many in Spain continue to view as a revolutionary
hero. Finally, FM Moratinos and other GOS officials seem
genuinely convinced that Spanish engagement with the GOC will
allow them to wield increased influence with Castro and his
successors. The fact that Spain has made concession after
concession to Castro with little to show for it has so far
not dispelled this illusion.
MANZANARES