MTCR/SPAIN: MORE SPANISH REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002714

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM AND EUR/WE; DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO
THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC ETTC TSPA KSCA SP MTCRE
SUBJECT: MTCR/SPAIN: MORE SPANISH REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL
ON NORTH KOREA

REF: A. 7/18/05 DURHAM-FORDER CLASSIFIED EMAIL


B. MADRID 2713

C. SECSTATE 127451

Classified By: ESTHOFF KEN FORDER PER 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) In a July 20 meeting with MFA International
Disarmament Affairs Ambassador Tomas Rodriguez Pantoja and
MFA MTCR POC Ambassador Manuel Viturro de la Torre, ESTHOFF
provided Ref A U.S. reaction to Ref B Spanish thoughts on Ref
C U.S. MTCR North Korea proposal. Rodriguez Pantoja and de
la Torre said they had discussed our North Korea proposal
with the French who, per Ref C, had received our proposal
from the U.S. Embassy in Paris. They also indicated that the
French had shared the U.S. proposal with the UK and perhaps
others and that the U.S. proposal would be discussed at a
July 26 meeting of EU MTCR members.


2. (C) The Ambassadors said that they and several European
counterparts had doubts about the wisdom of trying to
"formalize" greater scrutiny of North Korean activities via
the adoption of a formal MTCR consensus decision recorded in
the plenary's Chairman's Summary. They said that such a move
would be opposed by at least Russia, India, Brazil and South
Africa. They also stressed that many key European MTCR
partners, including Spain, France, the UK and Germany were
already doing what the U.S. proposal suggests (i.e., paying
closer attention to the activities of North Korean-flagged
vessels and ships bound from or going to North Korea).
Trying to formalize greater scrutiny of North Korea via the
MTCR could actually hurt rather than help, by giving
ammunition to opponents who would argue, "why only North
Korea and not Israel," or "why not via other multilateral
nonproliferation fora?"


3. (C) Given these concerns, the EU MTCR partners would
probably prefer to address the U.S. proposal in a more
informal Madrid plenary forum, such as the Heads of
Delegation dinner. The more limited participation would
reduce the chances that Heads of Delegation would feel
compelled to "grandstand" and take harder line positions to
impress their inter-ministerial delegation members. While
they agreed on the need to pay greater attention to North
Korean activities, the Ambassadors thought this could be
better achieved via informal vice more formalized MTCR
cooperation.


4. (C) The Ambassadors suggested that an EU/MTCR consensus
position on how to address North Korea at the September
Madrid MTCR plenary could emerge from the July 26 meeting.
It was clear that Madrid would almost certainly join this
consensus position.


5. (C) COMMENT: De la Torre's position has evolved since
the last time we spoke with him (July 18 - Ref B). In the
two-day interim, he: (1) hosted a Spanish inter-ministerial
working group meeting that discussed, inter alia, our North
Korea proposal; and (2) had in depth conversations with his
French MTCR counterpart. One or the other (or both) appears
to have increased his skepticism about the U.S. proposal to
use the MTCR to heighten the attention given to North Korean
proliferation concerns.

AGUIRRE