SPANISH CONGRESS' FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001477

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STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, WHA/AND, WHA/BSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPANISH CONGRESS' FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIR
ON U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Rafael Estrella, Socialist spokesperson on Congress's
Foreign Affairs Committee (committee chairman equivalent)
told us that he believes relations have "completely
normalized" between the U.S. and Spain. According to
Estrella, Spain's engagement with Venezuela should not pose
an obstacle to improving U.S.-Spain relations because Spain
and the U.S. share the same goals on Venezuela, and differ
only in strategy. On NATO caveats, Estrella believed it
would be much easier for Spain to dispense with NATO command
structure billet caveats than with caveats on its troops'
participation in ISAF. Estrella thought upcoming high-level
meetings between U.S. and Spanish officials would be very
helpful for countries' relations, but was disappointed
Foreign Minister Moratinos could not meet with National
Security Advisor Hadley, because direct communication between
the Zapatero government and the White House was key. End
summary.

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"Normalized" Relations?
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2. (C) After remarking that he felt relations between the
U.S. and Spain had normalized, Estrella said he was
personally very happy that President Zapatero met with Deputy
Secretary Zoellick for nearly two hours in Madrid April 2.

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Estrella stated that by meeting for so long, Zapatero was
sending a message that he believes relations with the U.S are
very important. Poloff cautioned Estrella that while
U.S.-Spain relations had certainly improved, obstacles to
further improvement remained, such as Spain's plans to sell
military ships and planes to Venezuela.

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Spain's Engagement with Venezuela
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3. (C) On the Venezuela sale, Estrella said the Chavez
government has assured Madrid that it will not use the
hardware offensively. He added that none of the ships or
planes will be outfitted with large guns or other armaments
that would be typical for offensive operations. The Zapatero
government's goal in Venezuela is to engage Chavez to give
him a sense of security and "international belonging" that
will deter him from adventures in the region. When asked why
insecurity would cause Chavez to launch adventures in the
region, Estrella said Chavez might feel the need to "keep the
U.S. busy" with "little conflicts and problems all over Latin
America," thus deflecting the U.S.'s focus from Venezuela to
other areas in the region.


4. (C) Estrella emphasized that Spain, like the U.S., does
not want Chavez to spread his populist ideology around Latin
America. He believes Brazil's Lula wants to engage Chavez
for the very same reason: Although Lula has a populist
message, he doesn't have the Chavez government's oil money
with which to ply the masses, and thus is concerned that
Chavez' ideas and message may strike a chord in Brazil.
Estrella also commented that Spain knows well that although
Chavez claims he is a populist democrat now, if oil prices
drop significantly, he could quickly turn into a "populist
totalitarian." Nonetheless, the Zapatero government believes
the U.S. and Spain share common goals in Venezuela and differ
only in strategy. Spain believes Chavez can be contained
best through engagement.

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NATO Caveats
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5. (C) On the question of NATO caveats, Estrella said that
for Spain, NATO command structure caveats will be much easier
to eliminate than caveats on ISAF participation in
Afghanistan. The ISAF caveats allow the Spanish government
to maintain operational control over its troops and
equipment, and it will be difficult, if not impossible for
the government to relinquish operational control to a local
commander. Estrella said he understood the problems
presented by this arrangement for local commanders and unit
agility and flexibility but said as a political question, the
Zapatero government will have an extremely hard time giving
up command of Spanish troops and equipment. On the other
hand, Estrella said that he and many other Spanish government
officials, including the military leadership, believe Spain
and other NATO allies need to give up their caveats on NATO
command structure billets. Although doing this for Iraq will
be difficult, he believes Spain will eventually let go of
NATO command structure caveats in general because the
Zapatero government understands that NATO cannot function
with an uncertain command structure mission to mission.

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High-level Meetings
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6. (C) Estrella believed meetings between Foreign Minister
Moratinos and Secretary Rice, and Defense Minister Bono and
Secretary Rumsfeld were key to continuing to improve

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relations between the U.S. and Spain, but was disappointed
Moratinos would not be able to meet with National Security
Advisor Hadley. Estrella said direct contact between the
Zapatero government and the White House was very important.

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Comment
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7. (C) Estrella, a good Embassy contact, is one of the
Socialists' more pro-U.S., pro-transatlantic relations
officials, which partially explains his overly optimistic
view that relations had "completely normalized." His remarks
on Venezuela and the reasons for Spanish engagement there
echoed what we have heard from numerous officials in the
Zapatero administration. His disappointment that Moratinos
could not meet with NSA Hadley is also something we have
heard from other Socialists who, like Estrella, believe Spain
has made enough positive gestures to warrant high-level
meetings not just at the State and Defense Departments, but
also at the White House.


MANZANARES