RUPEL ON TRANSNISTRIAN ELECTIONS, SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L LJUBLJANA 000628

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD SI
SUBJECT: RUPEL ON TRANSNISTRIAN ELECTIONS, SOUTH OSSETIA

Classified By: CDA Maryruth Coleman for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) After meeting with Minsk Group Co-Chairs on Karabakh
(septel),Slovenian FM and OSCE CIO Dmitrij Rupel pulled
aside Ambassador Steven Mann for a private talk on
Transnistria. He said that he had spoken with Ukrainian FM
Tarasyuk a few days previously and Tarasyuk had talked up the
Ukrainian plan for Transnistria, focusing on plans for
elections in Transnistria. Tarasyuk claimed that the plan
was receiving EU and US backing and he solicited Rupel,s
assistance in putting together observers for the planned
December elections. Rupel said he was very cautious about
the elections. He cautions were intensified by Ukraine,s
request to send, as a high-level observer for the elections,
the former head of the Slovenian Communist Party. He told
Tarasyuk that this person's background might not make him the
best choice to reinforce a democratic election process.
Tarasyuk then asked Slovenia to nominate an alternative
candidate. The CIO asked for US views on the situation.


2. (C) Mann said that we had welcomed the advent of Ukraine
into conflict settlement. The situation had been frozen
because of Russian and Transnistrian intransigence and the
Kuchma regime's corruption and inefficiency. The Yushchenko
administration had given us hope for a solution. Each month,
though, we had seen our hopes cut back. Ukraine was
concentrating on the feel-good parts of a Transnistria
solution and was avoiding necessary, tough aspects such as
Russian munitions and peacekeeper withdrawal and effective
border controls. Worse, it appeared that Tkach was pressing
forward on elections in a way that would not give a free and
fair basis but would legitimate the Tiraspol regime.


3. (C) For that reason, Mann said, he had dispatched his
deputy to Kiev to attend a meeting today convened by Tkach.
The message the US would convey was the need to be realistic
in looking to any Transnistria elections. Fair elections
take a long time to prepare. They involve much more than
counting ballots and it was not realistic to believe that
they could occur in December. If Tkach persisted in moving
forward with a flawed and incomplete plan, despite many
months of detailed and candid consultations between
Washington and Kiev, the US would warn him that we may
publicly disassociate ourselves from the Ukrainian initiative.


4. (C) Rupel welcomed the US misgivings; they tracked with
his own. He conveyed his understanding from Tarasyuk that
the elections might indeed be put off until the Spring to
take account of criticisms that the preparatory time was too
short. He asked for the US view in that event; Mann replied
that we would consider whether the groundwork could be done
with a longer lead time but that given Tkach,s approach thus
far, we would be skeptical.


5. (C) Rupel also passed on a report that Transnistrian
strongman Smirnov had worn out his welcome with Moscow and
that Russia was preparing for a new leader in Transnistria.
He did not know the name but believed that it would be one of
the current ministers in the Transnistria administration.


6. (C) In advance of Rupel,s Sunday stop in Georgia, Mann
advised the CIO that the US would be taking a fresh look a
possibilities for progress in South Ossetia. We would be
encouraging Georgia to move ahead on the Zhvania-Kokoity
commitments and we would be encouraging Russia to have their
South Ossetia clients reach out a hand as well. Rupel told
of a recent meeting he had with Georgian Parliament Speaker
Nino Burjanadze in which she upbraided him for not supporting
President Saakashvili,s Strasbourg proposals.


7. (U) Amb. Mann has cleared this cable.

COLEMAN


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2005LJUBLJ00628 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL



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