Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05LJUBLJANA610
2005-08-24 08:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ljubljana
Cable title:  

SLOVENIA: LUNCH WITH PM: MOVING FORWARD ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR ECON SI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LJUBLJANA 000610 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM,
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: LUNCH WITH PM: MOVING FORWARD ON
PRIVATIZATION, CHALLENGES ON IRAQ

REF: A. LJUBLJANA 438


B. LJUBLJANA 449

Classified By: COM Thomas B. Robertson for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LJUBLJANA 000610

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DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM,
NSC FOR D. WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: LUNCH WITH PM: MOVING FORWARD ON
PRIVATIZATION, CHALLENGES ON IRAQ

REF: A. LJUBLJANA 438


B. LJUBLJANA 449

Classified By: COM Thomas B. Robertson for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In one-on-one lunch August 23, PM Jansa
said he would continue in September to try to move his
coalition toward accepting a deployment of trainers/mentors
to Iraq, noting that political progress on the Iraqi
constitution should make his job easier. He reported that
that day he had approved a decision to waive the port and
transportation costs for Hungarian T-72 tanks on their way to
Iraq. The PM made clear that it was in Slovenia's interest
to continue to support the beginning of EU negotiations with
Croatia as early as possible, and that the GOS would do all
it could to avoid exacerbating relations over the sensitive
border issue. On privatization he said the government was
favorably disposed toward an EBRD pre-privatization plan for
Slovenia's telecom and that steps might be begun in that
direction by the end of September. End summary.

Back Down from the Mountains and Ready to Meet CJCS
-------------- --------------

2. (SBU) The lunch came about as a result of COM's request to
speak to the PM before COM's departure to Washington, and
before the visit of CJCS General Myers in early September.
COM had last met Jansa high in the Slovenian Alps when they
had climbed Mt. Triglav together August 7. During that time
Jansa had mentioned GOS concern with rescuing Slovenian
climber Humar, trapped on the wall of Nanga Parbat in
Pakistan, and had asked about possible US assistance. COM
took advantage of beginning of lunch to tell Jansa about US
offers at that time to support Pakistani rescue efforts if
necessary. Told about General Myers trip, the PM agreed to
free up his schedule to meet with him September 5-6.

Iraq
--------------

3. (C) Asked about his strategy to get Slovenian trainers
into Iraq (Ref. A),PM Jansa told COM that he still had
difficulties with his coalition. He had begun discussion of
the issue in early July in the cabinet but continued to face

resistance from the Slovenia People's Party (SLS) and the
Pensioners party (DeSUS). Minister of Defense (and President
of DeSUS) Erjavec was on board with such a deployment,
however, he could not move his party's membership on the
issue. While Jansa might be able to force through a positive
decision within the cabinet, the subject would certainly be
raised in Parliament, and a decision could unwind if that
happened, as coalition parliamentarians might raise
opposition. Interestingly, Jansa said Social Democrats
president and opposition MP Borut Pahor had told him that he,
personally, could support such a deployment, but only if
Jansa had his own coalition on board. (Jansa smiled that he
knew how that was: he himself had spent a long time in the
opposition.) That said, Pahor admitted he would not be able
to deliver his party, either. Asked by COM what he could do
to help, Jansa volunteered that COM's meeting upon his return
from the States with SLS party President (and Environment
Minister),Janez Podobnik, and Erjavec might help. Jansa
said discussions would continue within the government when
they convened again in September. He stressed that Slovenia
had a number of fine officers who looked forward to
participating in such a deployment.


4. (C) Jansa volunteered that he was happy to see the
Slovenian media reporting the Iraqi negotiations over the new
constitution. This had a much more positive impact on the
public than the endless coverage of the insurgency, showing
that real progress toward a democratic state was going
forward. He agreed with COM that if a large segment of the
Sunni population could be brought on board with the
constitution, and it appeared likely for approval by the
population, this could significantly affect popular views of
the situation there. Most importantly, Jansa said it would
make easier his job to get his coalition on board for a
deployment of mentors/trainers into Iraq.

Good News: GOS to Waive Fees for Delivery of Hungarian T-72s
to Iraq
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The PM noted that he did have good news for COM on
Iraq front. He had just spoken to MOD Erjavec and agreed
that the GOS would waive the costs of transportation and port


costs of the Hungarian T-72s to be shipped to Iraq. COM
expressed thanks for this good news and asked what the costs
were associated with this, which Jansa said was 500,000 EUROs.

Croatia
--------------


6. (C) Jansa reiterated that it was a key interest of
Slovenia's to have negotiations begin as soon as possible for
Croatia's entry into the EU. While Slovenia fully supported
the timely beginning of negotiations with Turkey, beginning
those negotiations without a prospect for Croatia's
negotiations to begin soon would result in a very difficult
political situation in Croatia. PM Sanader had campaigned on
getting EU negotiations started, and if he had nothing to
show for it by the time of the next elections, he would pay
the price. Asked about Gotovina, Jansa expressed the opinion
that he was in Herzegovina and that he could move around more
easily since he had a French passport. Gotovina was less of
a problem for Croatia's EU negotiations than was the
continued presence of bad intelligence agents in the country.
Sanader had tried to clean some of them out and had made
changes, but there were still more who had to go. He said
the British had had a terrible time earlier in Croatia, since
some of these Croatian intelligence agents had undermined
what the Brits there were trying to do.


7. (C) On the recent announcement of Italian-Croatian
agreement on an eco zone in the Adriatic, Jansa said the
press was mistaken that the GOS had known nothing about it.
Italy and Croatia had been negotiating for over two years on
this. As for Slovenia, the former GOS had agreed with Italy
two years ago to assume the lines drawn between Italy and
Slovenia that went back to the original Italian-Yugoslav
agreement. It was impossible to conclude an eco zone
agreement with Croatia while the border was still disputed.
For this reason Slovenia would be cautious in any positions
on this it would take, making note of the fact that Slovenia
and Italy had agreed earlier to their division, while not
attempting to make any declaration that would appear to have
executive validity and that politically would only undermine
the delicate Slovene-Croatian relationship. Jansa
volunteered that the "lines are open" to Croatian PM Sanader,
that Sanader had in fact informed Jansa of their agreement
with the Italians, and that generally Sanader was acting
"with good will" towards Slovenia, although he had elements
in the HDZ that made his life difficult. Interestingly,
Jansa said the GOS had not yet gotten confirmation from Italy
that the agreement was in fact concluded, but they expected
it within days.

Privatization: Moving Forward with Telecom
--------------


8. (C) COM told Jansa that he had had lunch the day before
with EBRD reps to Slovenia and Croatia, and that they
appeared to have a pre-privatization package for Slovenia
Telekom that might help the GOS go forward. He reiterated
EBRD points that Slovenia not make the mistake Croatia had
made, namely selling off part of telecom (in that case to
Deutsche Telekom),but then delaying sale of the rest while
the price continued to drop. The lesson was to strike early
in order to get the best price. After all, given the rapid
changes in technology, one had to wonder what the current
Telekom would even be worth ten years from now. Jansa was
clearly in the loop and said that the GOS was reviewing
favorably the EBRD plan, and he thought that something might
go forward by the end of September.

Other issues
--------------

9. (C)

--Denationalization: Jansa agreed there had been no progress
made on US cases since last meeting (ref b),but underscored
that Justice Minister Sturm would introduce legislation
concerning the State Defender that would make it easier to
proceed more quickly.

--FDI: PM highlighted that the GOS decision to gradually
eliminate payroll tax was directed at improving atmosphere
for FDI.

--Referendum on Slovenian television law: Admitted that it
was too early to tell whether referendum to kill the recent


GOS law would be successful, saying it would depend on
turnout. Underscored that changes would "rationalize" state
TV, noting that RTV Slovenia had four times as many employees
as similarly sized private television networks.

--Changes in MOD: Jansa suggested that he had not been
involved in replacement of key MOD personnel, saying he did
not have enough time to micromanage the ministry. He noted,
however, that there was considerable "deadwood" at MOD and in
the Armed Forces, particularly in senior ranks.

--Recent flooding: Jansa did not think the GOS would have to
request EU assistance to deal with recent flooding in the
Southeast. He reported that heavy rains this August would
affect negatively GOS wine production, whatever weather
September might bring.

--Vega: Further changes in Mobitel management over the
coming several months might make a settlement with Vega more
likely. For that reason he did not believe the situation
would drag on for years in the courts.

--Troubles in textiles industry: Previous government had
allowed the continuation of subsidies to keep these
industries afloat, when funds would have been more wisely
spent in investments for retraining of employees to other,
more viable industries and business.



10. (C) Comment: Asked what COM might deliver as a message
from the GOS to his interlocutors in Washington, Jansa
quickly responded, "Tell them that Slovenia is a friend and
ally that will do what we can to support the United States."
Jansa is a leader who understands that NATO membership means
stepping up to contribute to stability in crises whenever it
is needed. His doubling the GOS contribution to ISAF,
commitment to triple Slovenia's contribution to KFOR by end
of 2005, and scheduling an increase in its EUFOR contingent
in Bosnia reflect this commitment.
ROBERTSON


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2005LJUBLJ00610 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL



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