Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05LIMA5335
2005-12-16 20:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

THE ONGOING DEBATE: IS TERRORISM BACK ON THE RISE

Tags:  PTER PGOV ASEC SNAR PE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 005335 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC SNAR PE
SUBJECT: THE ONGOING DEBATE: IS TERRORISM BACK ON THE RISE
IN PERU?

REF: A. LIMA 5203

B. LIMA 4985

C. LIMA 4784

D. LIMA 1471

Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 005335

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC SNAR PE
SUBJECT: THE ONGOING DEBATE: IS TERRORISM BACK ON THE RISE
IN PERU?

REF: A. LIMA 5203

B. LIMA 4985

C. LIMA 4784

D. LIMA 1471

Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Remarks by Prime Minister Kuczynski alleging
a growing terrorism problem in Peru have rekindled public
interest in this issue, but have generated little consensus
on how grave the problem really is. In private, Embassy
contacts point to an increasing involvement of Sendero
Luminoso in narcotics trafficking, including a vertically
integrated, FARC-like approach to coca paste production by at
least one SL group. Our contacts were also concerned about
possible subversive activity by the almost 1,000 terrorists
who have been released from jail over the past three years;
however, there is general consensus that these individuals
are not/not attempting to return to armed insurrection, and
do not have strong links to SL combatants in the field. Our
principle conclusions regarding the direction of SL and of
GOP counterterrorism efforts at present are that:

-- Especially in the VRAE, SL has increased its involvement
in the drug trade, and the resulting income has allowed SL to
extend its influence and increase offensive operations within
its geographical base. PNP field officers believe the number
of SL operatives in this area has increased slightly.

-- SL, by defending coca production/marketing, has
established a base of support within local communities
dependent on coca; this is a significant change from past
rejection by local communities. As a result, SL feels more
secure, confident, and in control within its home territory.

-- The drift in SL's basic orientation -- away from
insurrection and toward consolidation of the economic
benefits of criminal enterprises -- may make the group more
viable in the long run.

-- Outrage over the 12/5 killing of five police in an SL
ambush should keep pressure on the GOP to sustain efforts to
keep SL in check during the remaining months of the Toledo
Administration. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Everyone Has an Opinion
--------------


2. (U) Public focus on the issue of terrorism in Peru, which

had diminished over time as violent attacks by terrorist
groups became increasingly infrequent, has come back into
prominence. In mid-September, Prime Minister Pedro Pablo
Kuczynski (PPK) remarked on CPN Radio's "Viewpoints"
interview program that Peru suffered from "a terrorism
problem that is more intense today than it was four years
ago." PPK went on to say that his statement was based on GOP
statistics detailing terrorist activities throughout Peru.


3. (U) What PPK undoubtedly intended to be a simple statement
of fact, and a mild remonstration not to become complacent,
set off a series of denunciations of his message, seemingly
by any public figure who happened to be close to a
microphone. Former President Alan Garcia said PPK's
statement constituted a grave accusation against the current
government, being made by one of its own leaders. Vice
President David Waisman, never shy about adding fuel to a
blazing controversy, said it was unfortunate that someone had
made PPK slip up by giving him incorrect information, and
that as far as the VP was concerned (and the Ministers of
Defense and Interior, for good measure),there was no
resurgence of terrorism.


4. (U) President Toledo finally weighed into the fray,
telling reporters that they had simply misunderstood the PM,
and that there was clearly "no resurgence of terrorism going
on around here." After the President's pronouncement, a
chastened PPK made a terse statement that he was certainly
not going to contradict the President.


5. (U) Given the intensity of the dispute, Congressional
Defense Committee Chairman Luis Iberico held a hearing on the
matter on 9/27. After listening to PPK's presentation,
Iberico said he had concluded that there was no new outbreak
of insurgency in the country, but that there was evidence the
Sendero Luminoso (SL) was reorganizing, especially in
coca-producing areas. Iberico later announced that SL
members, "are present in coca growing valleys and they are
even growing coca. They have obviously infiltrated movements
of coca growers, which are legitimate, but which have been
infiltrated."

6. (U) Editorial pages have also picked up the terrorism
theme in their commentary. "La Republica" noted on 10/13
that it is a matter of concern to Peruvians that even though
SL was not as intimidating as in the 90s, it had still
managed to keep on operating after all these years. The
commentary questioned whether the SL's ideology had been
totally defeated, and urged Peruvians not to discount the
threat posed by Sendero and like organizations. In the daily
"Expreso" of 10/18, editor Carlos Espa contended that SL was
regrouping and resurging in areas where there was a lack of
state presence. Espa also said that through lack of action
against SL, President Toledo was knowingly leaving "a time
bomb" for the next administration.

--------------
Emulating the FARC, But on a Smaller Scale
--------------

7. (C) Sociologist Jaime Antesana has written frequently
about drug trafficking and terrorism trends. In an 11/4
meeting, Antesana told D/Polcouns that the SL remnant in the
VRAE had gone beyond its previously reported practice of
receiving payment for protecting the transit of cocaine, and
had now adopted the same strategy employed by the FARC in
Colombia: involvement in all aspects of the coca paste
industry, including planting and harvesting of coca plants,
management of maceration pits, and sale and transport of coca
paste. Antesana said this new SL strategy had been reported
to him by contacts in the VRAE, and had existed at least
since July, but possibly for much longer. The obvious
difference from the FARC, he said, was one of scale -- the
area of coca controlled by the SL was at present minimal, and
there were probably no more than 60 SL members involved in
this activity. (NOTE: Other Embassy sources believe more SL
may be involved, possibly as many as 150. END NOTE.)


8. (C) Antesana contended that the VRAE SL had been able to
implement this "vertically integrated" approach to coca paste
production because the group was not being actively pursued
by the GOP. He noted, however, that he did not see
indications that SL was involved in recruiting of new
members, either in the hinterlands or in their previous
stronghold in Peru's universities. Antesana also felt that
there was little or no coordination going on between the
Senderistas still operating in remote areas and SL members
(many of whom have been released from prison after serving
jail sentences) located in Peru's urban centers.

--------------
Army Is Concerned, Lacks Capabilities
--------------


9. (C) Emboffs met on 11/18 with the Army's Director of
Intelligence, General Pedro Beingolea Although he did not
perceive SL as actively seeking to increase its combatants in
the field, Beingolea said that Sendero was certainly
attempting to expand its influence in the most remote areas
of Peru. He said that military intelligence had verified the
existence of groups of 10 to 15 SL members acting like
circuit riders within their respective areas of operations.
These groups will periodically visit local villages to carry
out proselytizing activities and make their presence known.
Beingolea emphasized that SL no longer had the adversarial
relationship with the local populace that had existed at the
height of the internal conflict in Peru, but rather portrayed
themselves as the defenders of peasant interests, and
specifically of the cocaleros.


10. (C) Beingolea was especially concerned at the paltry
resources the Peruvian military had available for dealing
with the defiant activities being carried out by the
Senderistas. Asked to compare current GOP capabilities with
what had existed during the peak years of terrorist violence
in the late 80s and early 90s, Beingolea said the difference
was "abysmal." He lamented that "we've lost our eyes and
ears," since almost all the equipment and most of the
advanced bases used for monitoring and counteracting Sendero
had ceased to exist. Considering the growing involvement of
SL in the narcotics trade, and the money this would make
available to the terrorists to expand their operations,
Beingolea felt it essential that the GOP reassess its
policies and retake the initiative in order to eliminate SL
once and for all. He was convinced, however, that this was a
task that would fall upon the new presidential administration
that will take office in July of 2006 -- given the current
lack of political will, the best anyone could hope for until
then was a holding action.

--------------
Interior Ministry Views and Initiatives
--------------


11. (C) Interior Ministry Intelligence Director Jorge
Cardenas told D/Polcouns on 11/29 that MinInt and the
Counterterrorism Police (DIRCOTE) also feel strapped for
resources compared to their situation ten years ago, but that
he was beginning to see signs of PM Kuczynski concerns about
a resurgence of terrorism being translated into additional
funding support for MinInt. Operationally, Cardenas outlined
some positive trends in the GOP efforts to deal with the
remnants of Sendero Luminoso. He referred to information his
office had about the activities of two female companions of
SL leader "Artemio," and said he was hopeful of undertaking
an operation in the near term against Artemio and members of
his group. He also noted that MinInt had detected the
movement of a large group of Senderistas, perhaps as many as
a hundred, in the general vicinity of the Doe Run mining
facility in Cobriza, Huancavelica, and said the Ministry was
taking security countermeasures.


12. (C) Cardenas agreed with the thesis that, at least in the
VRAE, SL members are moving toward a fully integrated
approach to coca paste production, even to the extent of
abandoning other methods of fund-raising, such as extortion
and protection of commodity smuggling. Even though Sendero
did not appear to be enlisting new recruits, its improved
economic situation was giving SL improved mobility, leading
to growing reports of intimidation of the local populace.
(NOTE: PNP sources operating in the VRAE reported to Embassy
NAS on 12/15 their belief that SL had added 30 combatants to
their contingent operating in the area of Vizcatan, Ayacucho,
thereby increasing the number of platoons deployed in the
area from four to six. END NOTE.)


13. (C) Cardenas also said there were some indications that
the various groups operating in the VRAE and the Huallaga
were communicating more readily, and might be putting aside
some of their past philosophical differences. Cardenas did
not, however, detect any strong level of integration of SL
elements in urban settings (such as members who have
completed their jail terms and are now increasingly active in
universities) with the group's combatants in the field.

--------------
Recent Signs of Intensified Hostility
--------------


14. (C) The nature of the most recent SL attacks is a cause
for concern. Outside of a handful of high-profile
kidnappings and killings, SL deployments in the past few
years have typically been limited to small groups involved in
indoctrination and intimidation activities in local
communities. Lately the group has mobilized larger
contingents and has taken the offensive against GOP and USG
interests. The most egregious recent example was the ambush
by 15 to 20 SL members of a PNP convoy on 12/5 near the city
of San Francisco, Ayacucho, resulting in the death of five
officers (Ref A). A few days after this ambush, a PNP
helicopter searching for the attackers received ground fire,
wounding a PNP officer.

--------------
Comment
--------------


15. (C) The trends regarding Sendero Luminoso that were
highlighted in Ref D have persisted in the ensuing nine
months. The terrorist group appears to have increased its
involvement in the drug trade, and the resulting financial
well-being has allowed SL to extend its influence and to
increase harassing-type and even offensive operations within
its geographical base. SL has become much better integrated
with local community members, especially narcotics
traffickers and cocaleros, than was the case in the past.
Threatened local communities, through their rondero patrols,
were key to defeating SL in the 80s and 90s. The current
trend toward Sendero receiving local support and
collaboration is a significant change and creates a new
paradigm for the social dynamic of these areas.


16. (C) We also understand that SL leaders such as Artemio
maintain an elaborate security cordon, and have extensive
intelligence networks, drawing on the goodwill they have
cultivated with rural community members. In the case of the
AID contractors temporarily kidnapped by SL this November
(Ref C),we believe community members aided the Senderistas
in luring the contractors into a trap. The conclusion we
would reach is that rather than being marginalized, SL feels
more secure, confident, and in control within its home
territory.


17. (C) Concerns remain about the possibility of subversive
activity by terrorists who are no longer incarcerated --
Congressman Iberico announced on 11/30 that in the past three
years, 981 persons accused or convicted of terrorism have
been released from prison. Even so, almost all analysts
agree that these individuals are engaging in political
activity, albeit radical, rather than attempting to return to
armed insurrection, and do not have direct links to the SL
combatants in Peru's interior.


18. (C) What we may be witnessing with SL is its gradual
transmogrification from a revolutionary political group into
a criminal gang with a thin philosophical veneer, similar to
what has taken place with the FARC in Colombia. Former SL
Central Committee member Oscar Ramirez ("Feliciano"),who has
testified against Sendero founder Abimael Guzman in the
ongoing "megatrial" of SL leaders, said during a 10/12 court
appearance that, "Sendero Luminoso is finished, it doesn't
exist any more." The drift of SL members in the field away
from insurrection and toward consolidation of criminal
enterprises, would tend to support Feliciano's reading of the
tea leaves. The problem for the GOP is that the new,
economically-motivated SL may prove to be more viable than
the old, revolutionary model.


19. (C) Even though he was widely accused of being Chicken
Little, the fact that PPK raised the issue of a possible
resurgence of terrorist activity has reinforced the hand of
responsible individuals in the GOP who understand the
potential danger that Sendero Luminoso represents, and want
to keep this group in check. Although it is unlikely with
the election season heating up and the Toledo Government
winding down that the current GOP will mount a concerted
campaign against SL, the public notoriety that PPK has
generated about the group, coupled with outrage over the 12/5
death of five police in the Ayacucho ambush, should ensure
that this matter doesn't simply get swept under the rug until
the new administration is up and running next August.
Embassy will continue to stress this issue with contacts
here, and reiterates its appreciation to Washington agencies
for their ongoing support of counterterrorism training and
assistance in Peru.
STRUBLE