Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05LIMA5210
2005-12-09 16:08:00
SECRET
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER OSCAR MAURTUA'S

Tags:  PREL SNAR PTER ETRD PE KICC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 005210 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015
TAGS: PREL SNAR PTER ETRD PE KICC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER OSCAR MAURTUA'S
TRIP TO WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 12-14

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(b/
d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 005210

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015
TAGS: PREL SNAR PTER ETRD PE KICC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER OSCAR MAURTUA'S
TRIP TO WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 12-14

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Oscar Maurtua believes
that the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement adds a new political
as well as commercial dimension to our relationship. He will
wish to discuss how we can take advantage of this to raise
the bilateral relationship to a higher level, emphasizing UN
Security Council cooperation (Peru will join the Council on
1/1/06),counternarcotics and counterterrorism
assistance/coordination, and seeking a meeting between POTUS
and President Alejandro Toledo to promote our common vision
on how to reduce poverty in the Americas. Maurtua also can
be expected to express Peru's concerns over regional
governability issues (particularly Bolivia),as well as arms
sales to the region (the Venezuela-Spain agreement and the
USG's approval of the Netherland's sale of F-16s to Chile).
On Article 98, Maurtua may argue that renewed talks should be
delayed until after the presidential elections conclude in
May or June 2006. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Maurtua, in recent conversations with the
Ambassador, emphasized that he expects to serve as Foreign
Minister through the end of the Toledo Administration in July
2006, and no further. He described his priority as focusing
his attention on advancing Peru's foreign relations where he
sees clear opportunities to do so. Maurtua, a career
diplomat, is one of the few Foreign Ministry officials who
understands that the U.S.-Andean Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
establishes both a new commercial relationship and a new
political relationship; that it is a conscious choice to
align Peru with the USG's vision on how to promote growth,
jobs, social justice and poverty alleviation. He views a
POTUS-Toledo meeting as an ideal mechanism to symbolize the
enhanced dimensions in our bilateral relationship and to
promote our shared vision for growth and development.


3. (C) While Maurtua generally understands the direction in
which he wants to lead Peruvian foreign policy, and that
Peru's participation in the UN Security Council needs to be

an element in this, he has yet to define the detailed
substance. His meetings in Washington will offer high-level
USG officials the opportunity to help Maurtua understand our
priorities, to prioritize our bilateral agenda, to establish
areas where we can cooperate, and to identify issues where
further discussion and coordination are needed.

4. (C) Maurtua's appointment at Foreign Minister was an
accidental one; Toledo needed an experienced professional to
take over when his previous appointment of political ally
Fernando Olivera engendered a Cabinet crisis, forcing
Olivera's resignation one day after taking office. Maurtua
is not/not a close confidant of the President's, and remains
uncertain with respect to his standing within the Cabinet.


5. (S) Based on the Ambassador's conversations with Maurtua
and the Foreign Ministry's Director for the Americas, Pablo
Portugal, as well as a 12/5 meeting between IO A/S Kristen
Silverberg and the Ministry's Directors of North American
Affairs Nestor Popolizio, Multilateral Affairs Julio Garro,
and Defense and Security Affairs Daul Matute, we expect that
Maurtua will also raise the following issues:

-- UNSC COOPERATION: Peru sees the UNSC as an opportunity
to enhance its relations with the USG through cooperation on
international security issues. Peru supports our
counterterrorism agenda, shares our concerns regarding Syrian
compliance with UNSC resolutions and Iran's atomic program,
and wants to be helpful on Middle East issues. Peru is
particularly concerned with peacekeeping operations in Haiti
(where it has over 200 troops) and in Africa (where it has
eight observers in various missions). With respect to Haiti,
Peru would like to see a firm gameplan and assistance
commitments aimed at nation-building. It would also like to
increase its participation in PKOs, but financial constraints
will limit this unless UN reimbursements can be speeded up.
Peru supports Brazil's bid for a permanent UNSC seat, but
recognizes that UNSC expansion is problematic at the moment
and is content to leave this on the backburner.

-- OTHER UN ISSUES: Peru agrees in principle with UN Reform
aimed at increasing ethical conduct and efficiency, but is
vague on details and opposes any assessment changes that
would increase its own financial contribution. It supports
replacing the UN Human Rights Commission (which Peru will
head next session) with a UN Human Rights Council. It has
no/no favorite candidate for the next UN Secretary General,
but supports the principle of regional rotation that would
favor an Asian candidate this time.

-- COUNTERNARCOTICS ASSISTANCE: Maurtua has publicly stated
that counternarcotics and counterterrorism cooperation are
high on his agenda for the Washington visit. While we have
informed GOP officials from Toledo on down that they can
expect reduced USG counternarcotics funding in the future and
the need to start preparing now for the gradual
nationalization of CN programs, the Peruvians continue to
complain about Colombia receiving more funding and to plead
for additional resources.

-- COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: The GOP and the Peruvian
Armed Forces have asked for increased USG intelligence
assistance and resource commitments (NAS helicopters) to
pursue the remaining Sendero Luminoso terrorist columns in
the Huallaga and Apurimac-Ene river valleys. We are
providing intelligence cooperation, and have agreed to
consider providing NAS resources on a case-by-case basis for
counterterrorism operations, given the symbiotic relationship
between Sendero Luminoso and narcotraffickers. We are
insisting that the Armed Forces and National Police work
together in developing integrated CT operational plans; a
process that has yet to bear fruit.

-- REGIONAL GOVERNABILITY CONCERNS: President Toledo and
his Cabinet are greatly concerned about threats to democracy
in the Andean Region: Hugo Chavez's support for
anti-democratic actors, the specter of Evo Morales winning
the Bolivian presidency, instability in Ecuador, and the
civil war in Colombia. That said, they have no idea how to
effectively address these problems and look to the USG to
provide answers.

-- REGIONAL ARMS SALES: The Toledo Administration has tried
to limit regional arms purchases in order to reduce political
tensions and in view of Peru's own severe fiscal constraints
and competing social demands. Consequently, Peruvian
officials have recently expressed serious concerns over
increased arms sales to the region as evidenced by the
Spain-Venezuela accord and by the USG's approval of the sale
of F-16 aircraft by the Netherlands to Chile.

-- ARTICLE 98: Maurtua physically shies away when renewing
negotiations on an Article 98 agreement is raised. Other
Foreign Ministry officials have suggested that such talks
should be postponed until after the presidential elections
are finalized in May/June 2006, so as to avoid this becoming
a campaign issue.


6. (C) It is also possible, albeit less likely, that
Maurtua will raise the following issues:

-- PERUVIANS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. The recruitment of
several hundred Peruvians by American companies, contracted
by the USG, to perform security services in Iraq and
Afghanistan has become a highly controversial domestic
political issue. The recent apparent suicide of one of the
Peruvians in Afghanistan resulted in the Foreign Ministry
requesting USG assistance in determining the facts of the
case and ensuring repatriation of the remains and ensuring
payment of contractual benefits to the deceased's heirs
(Septel). Maurtua previously suggested to the Ambassador
that the USG establish a liaison office in Iraq to oversee
the treatment of Peruvian and other third-country nationals
employed under USG contracts there, and to act as an
interface between these employees and their respective
governments.

-- MARITIME DISPUTE WITH CHILE. In early November, the GOP
promulgated legislation unilaterally fixing its maritime
boundaries. This has led to a diplomatic rumpus with Chile,
as Peru's claimed southern boundary would extend its maritime
jurisdiction into waters historically claimed by Chile.
Chile insists that the maritime boundaries were set by
regional agreements signed in 1952 and 1954, while Peru
argues that the 1952 agreement is irrelevant and that the
1954 agreement only applies to fishing rights, not maritime
boundaries. The USG is guarantor of the 1929 Peace Agreement
between Peru and Chile, but that agreement only deals with
land frontiers, not maritime boundaries. While Peru has
not/not sought to involve the U.S. in this dispute, and is
talking about taking the case to the International Court of
Justice, Maurtua may mention this issue in passing, in
connection with the F-16 sales to Chile, for example.
STRUBLE