PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS ON FUJIMORI, MARTIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 004842

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KSUM PE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS ON FUJIMORI, MARTIME
BOUNDARY DISPUTE, AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(b
/d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Top presidential political advisors Juan de la
Puente and Juan Sheput, in recent meetings with Polcouns,
addressed the principle political issues of the moment as
follows:

-- Ex-President Alberto Fujimori's extradition: Peru will
have a hard time preparing an adequate extradition request to
Chile, but is determined to devote the necessary resources to
achieve Fujimori's return for prosecution. The extradition
request will likely be limited to those charges linked to
human rights abuses that would carry significant sentences.

-- Maritime boundary dispute with Chile: Peru was surprised
by the vehement public Chilean reaction, but pleased at this
development as it guaranteed passage of the new maritime
boundaries law and provides the GOP with a chance of
obtaining congressional ratification of the Law of the Sea
Convention.

-- Defeat in the decentralization referenda: The public's
overwhelming rejection of the decentralization referenda
could have been a political disaster for the GOP, but the
martime boundary dispute and then Fujimori's surprise return
has consigned it to the dustbin. National Decentralization
Council head Luis Thais will stay on, and the GOP will seek
to set the stage for a second and better prepared batch of
referenda under its successor government in 2007.

-- The 2006 presidential race should come down to either
former Interim President Valentin Paniagua (Accion Popular),
former President Alan Garcia (APRA) or Unidad Nacional
alliance leader Lourdes Flores, with little chance at this
stage for an outsider to make a surprise surge. President
Alejandro Toledo and his Peru Posible party have not
finalized an election strategy, but both de la Puente and
Sheput are urging that the ruling party offer its
presidential candidacy to Alberto Borea, Peru's former
Ambassador to the OAS and leader of the small Fuerza
Democratica party. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Polcouns met with President Toledo's Political
Advisor Juan de la Puente on 11/9, and the day before lunched
with one of Toledo's top unofficial political counselors,
Juan Sheput. The latter recently resigned as Labor Minister
to maintain his eligibility to run for Congress in 2006, and
remains one of the leading figures of Toledo's Peru Posible
party. Polcouns discussions with the presidential advisors
focused on the most significant domestic political issues of
the moment: Fujimori's extradition from Chile, the maritime
boundary dispute with Chile, the unsuccessful
decentralization referenda and the 2006 general elections.

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EXTRADITION OF FUJIMORI
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3. (C) Sheput said that he has been advising Interior
Minister Romulo Pizarro on preparing Peru's extradition
request to Chile and was scheduled to be a part of Pizarro's
high-level mission to Santiago, but was pulled at the last
minute out of concern that his inclusion would lend a
"political" character to the delegation (Ref A). He
characterized Peruvian extradition preparations as a mess,
explaining that Ad Hoc Anti-Corruption State Attorney Antonio
Maldonado means well, but is not in a position to follow up
Peru's preventive detention request with the necessary
air-tight extradition documentation within the 60-day window
permitted under Peru's extradition treaty with Chile. The
GOP is looking at hiring top-notch private attorneys to
review the evidence and assemble the cases, he added.


4. (C) De la Puente agreed that Fujimori's sudden arrival
in Santiago caught the GOP off-guard, and that the Ministry
of Justice and Maldonado's team, even with outside support,
will have to scramble to meet the 60-day deadline. He added
that the Government recognizes that Fujimori's extradition
will have both political and legal aspects. It is concerned
that Chilean political and/or judicial authorities may seek
to frustrate the extradition process, either out of pique
over bilateral problems, such as the maritime border issue or
the criminal proceedings against Chilean businessman
Andronico Luksic, or because they have been suborned by
Fujimori. Consequently, de la Puente explained, the Peruvian
extradition request will likely be limited to perhaps six or
seven of the 21 criminal proceedings currently underway
against the ex-President. The prioritized cases, he
continued, will focus on human rights violations carrying
long prison terms, as this should enhance Chilean domestic
political pressure on the Lagos Administration to extradite
Fujimori, as well as avoid the danger of the Chilean courts
approving Fujimori's extradition on minor charges, which
would obviate Peruvian prosecution for other major criminal
violations under the Rule of Speciality. Cases that have a
political aspect, de la Puente concluded, such as the charges
that Fujimori subverted democracy by staging his 1992
auto-coup, will not/not be included in the extradition
request package.


5. (C) Sheput indicated that the GOP is playing the human
rights card on the political level by encouraging Peruvian
human rights groups to lobby their Chilean counterparts to
pressure the GOC to be forthcoming on Fujimori's extradition.
He hinted that the Government helped facilitate such
contacts between local groups representing the family members
of those killed in the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacre
and Chilean human rights groups representing the family
members of those killed during the Pinochet regime.

6. (C) COMMENT: Sheput's and de la Puente's concerns over
Peru's extradition requests corroborates what we have heard
from several other informed sources. Former Ad Hoc
Anti-Corruption State Attorney Luis Vargas Valdivia, during a
10/4 meeting with Emboffs, predicted that the GOP would have
a difficult time assembling convincing extradition cases
against Fujimori. He noted that Maldonado is a human rights
lawyer, not a criminal specialist, and that in replacing
almost all of Vargas' team he eliminated the office's
institutional memory. Since most of the cases against
Fujimori involve tens of thousands of documents, testimony
from hundreds of witnesses and complex linkages of financial
transactions, it will take quite some time for Maldonado's
appointees to come up to speed. Our contacts at the Japanese
Embassy have consistently told us that Peru's two extradition
requests were ill-prepared, consisting of hundreds of
documents that were not linked together in a well-organized
fashion. Javier Ciurliza, a member of Peru's legal team on
the extradition, informed Poloff several months ago that he
had been brought into the case to straighten out the
extradition cases with Japan, and that he was appalled at the
state of Peru's submission. END COMMENT.

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THE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE
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7. (C) De la Puente said that the GOP was surprised by
Chilean President Lagos' vehement public reaction to the new
Peruvian law on its maritime boundaries (Ref B). The Foreign
Ministry, he explained, was prepared to receive complaints
through diplomatic channels, and was taken aback when Chile
filed its official protest before the measure was even
considered by the full Peruvian Congress. The Chilean
response played into the GOP's domestic hand, however, as it
precluded the opposition from raising objections to the law,
ensured its passage by a resounding 98-0 vote, and won the
GOP kudos from the media and nationalist circles. The
Government is hopeful, de la Puente added, that this spirit
of unity will carry over into the debate on Peru's
ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, which has
engendered significant opposition in the Congress, Armed
Forces and ultra-nationalist circles who oppose converting
the country's claim to a 200 mile territorial sea into a 200
mile exclusive economic zone.

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THE DECENTRALIZATION REFERENDA
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8. (C) Sheput termed the public's overwhelming defeat of
the decentralization referenda (Ref C) as a real defeat for
the GOP. He chiefly blamed National Decentralization Council
(CND) head Luis Thais for the debacle, arguing that this
position does not require a technocrat, but rather a
political operator with expertise in conciliation who can
hammer out compromise agreements that the political parties,
central government and local governments can live with.
Sheput noted that the opposition APRA party had effectively
mobilized its cadres to torpedo the "yes" campaign in the
north, a traditional APRA stronghold, as it could not take
the chance that Lambayeque Regional President Yehude Simon,
an independent, would dominate the proposed macro-region
there. On the other hand, he pointed out, APRA supported the
"yes" vote in Arequipa (the only department which voted to
join a macro-region) and Ayacucho, because it could expect
that their Aprista regional presidents would dominate the
proposed macro-regions.

9. (C) De la Puente stated that the GOP feared the
decentralization referenda vote could have become a
"political disaster," but was saved by the maritime
boundaries dispute with Chile and Fujimori's surprise
arrival/arrest in Chile, which diverted media and opposition
attention. While the CND's Thais has submitted his
resignation, he added, President Toledo was not inclined to
accept it and would ask Thais to stay on. The GOP recognized
that decentralization was now an issue for its successor,
but would seek to garner consensus from the leading
presidential hopefuls to cooperate in designing a new
approach and aiming for better-prepared macro-region
referenda proposals in 2007 (the next referenda are scheduled
for 2009, but could be moved up by amending existing
legislation).

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THE 2006 ELECTIONS
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10. (C) Sheput predicted that the 2006 presidential race
will come down to a runoff between former presidents Garcia
and Paniagua. Garcia's APRA, he noted, has the best
political organization in the country, as it again
demonstrated in crushing the decentralization referenda.
Panigua's Accion Popular, Sheput said, has a respectable
political organization which will be supplemented by smaller
leftist parties and civil society groups. Furthermore, he
argued, the center-left media can be expected to throw its
support to Paniagua, attack Garcia, and ignore the other main
candidate, Lourdes Flores, of the Unidad Nacional alliance.


11. (C) While Flores is leading in the polls, Sheput
discounted her chances of reaching the second round following
the April 2006 vote. Unlike APRA and Accion Popular, Flores'
small Popular Christian Party (PCP) and its Unidad Nacional
allies have minimal political organizations outside Lima and
the major coastal urban centers. Furthermore, APRA is
pressuring her largest Unidad Nacional ally, Lima Mayor Luis
Castaneda's National Solidarity party, to bolt the alliance
through threats to bring corruption allegations against
Castaneda. In addition, Sheput claimed, APRA intends to
raise questions about Flores sexual preferences (she is
single),and will likely choose Susana Pinella (who heads an
NGO that assists small enterprises) as its First Vice
President nominee and have her show off her husband and three
children at every opportunity as a visible contrast to
Flores' solo status.


12. (C) De la Puente was not so ready to write off Flores'
presidential chances, stating that the GOP, prodded by Prime
Minister Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, may be coming around to the
conclusion that she is the candidate most likely to continue
the Toledo Administration's policies and thus merits at least
tacit support. He, along with Sheput, was confident that the
country will elect one of the three top contenders, rejecting
the prospective "outsiders" in favor of an experienced
politician. De la Puente thought that ultra-nationalist
Ollanta Humala had no/no chance to mount a serious
presidential challenge, adding that the GOP was quietly
encouraging the media to build up left-wing Congressman
Javier Diez Canseco's Socialist Party to siphon off votes
from the expected alliance between Humala and the far-left.



13. (C) According to Sheput, Toledo's Peru Posible party is
aiming to secure a 10 percent vote for its congressional
candidates. The "hard wing" ("ala dura") of the party had
recently met, he confided, and had adopted the following
strategy:

-- wait until the last minute to nominate its presidential
and congressional candidates to maintain suspense and
minimize the time the media and opposition parties will have
to attack the nominees; and

-- discard most of the current Peru Posible congressional
bloc, particularly the provincial legislators who have been
almost impossible to control, as they have been completely
discredited with the voters. By waiting until the last
minute to nominate the congressional list for 2006, the party
expects to be better able to control these legislators,
although it expects them to go into opposition as soon as
they learn that they are not on the 2006 ballot.


14. (C) Sheput and de la Puente said that they favored
recruiting an independent to head Peru Posible's presidential
ticket in 2006, and both cited Alberto Borea, until recently
Peru's Ambassador to the OAS and head of the small Fuerza
Democratica party, as their preferred choice. They
acknowledged that others in the party are pushing Vice
President David Waisman and former Housing Minister Carlos
Bruce for the honor, but, according to Sheput, while Waisman
and Bruce have approval ratings over 30 percent, neither has
demonstrated an abilility to translate this popularity into
voting preference in the polls.
STRUBLE