Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05LIMA2158
2005-05-12 18:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lima
Cable title:  

COCALEROS ATTRACTIVE TO POLITICAL GROUPS BUT

Tags:  SNAR ASEC PGOV PTER PE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 002158 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2014
TAGS: SNAR ASEC PGOV PTER PE
SUBJECT: COCALEROS ATTRACTIVE TO POLITICAL GROUPS BUT
NARCOTRAFFICKERS GIVE THEM ALL THE SUPPORT THEY NEED

REF: A. LIMA 2055


B. LIMA 1929

C. LIMA 1794

D. LIMA 1712

E. LIMA 1418

Classified By: PolCouns Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 002158

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2014
TAGS: SNAR ASEC PGOV PTER PE
SUBJECT: COCALEROS ATTRACTIVE TO POLITICAL GROUPS BUT
NARCOTRAFFICKERS GIVE THEM ALL THE SUPPORT THEY NEED

REF: A. LIMA 2055


B. LIMA 1929

C. LIMA 1794

D. LIMA 1712

E. LIMA 1418

Classified By: PolCouns Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Although the various cocalero groups remain
fragmented with no national leadership or strategy, they are
courted by disparate radical elements in Peruvian society who
view the cocaleros as potential allies. In addition, there
is evidence that narcotraffickers are arming and radicalizing
cocaleros creating an increasing threat to eradication teams.
Bolivian followers of Evo Morales are traveling widely in
the Apurimac and Ene river valleys (VRAE) area to garner
support for a MAS-style Peruvian cocalero party. A coca
researcher's recent visit to the VRAE during the last two
weeks of April found cocaleros eager to be the ones to down a
helicopter. The Peruvian National Police (PNP) are
responding with interdiction operations in the Upper Huallaga
Valleys and VRAE, and they plan a prolonged eradication
operation in the area of recent helicopter attacks in
Polvora-Pizana area of San Martin. End Summary.


2. (C) In the wake of the fizzled Third Cocalero Congress
(Ref E),cocalero organizations have still failed to develop
an effective national strategy or organization. However,
cocaleros constitute an increasingly vocal single-issue bloc
in their own areas, and local cocalero power is turning some
districts into no-man's lands that defy the limited capacity
of law enforcement to respond; XXXXXXXXXXXX a lon
time Embassy contact told Poloff on 5/3 of his recent investigation
of VRAE coca growing areas; he found his contacts increasingly
reluctant to share information as the long reach of narcotraffickers
made talking to outsiders risky.


3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX contacts reported no knowledge of
Venezuelan agents in the Apurimac valleys, but they said that
Bolivian representatives of the MAS party were frequent
visitors. From a trip to Cuzco several weeks earlier,
XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that Bolivian MAS representatives
were making a heavy recruiting effort. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that the failure of MAS leader Evo Morales to complete a

planned trip to Cuzco in early April was the main reason that
Cuzco cocaleros did not rally to form a MAS-style party.


4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX contacts reported that APRA party
representatives were also canvassing cocalero areas in Cuzco
and the Apurimac Valleys, but that other political parties
were not in evidence except for "Peru Ahora," a traditional
supporter of cocalero causes. His contacts saw little
serious effort by labor unions to court cocaleros in these
areas. (Note: Labor centrals and left-wing parties have
supported cocalero protests in Lima and other urban areas,
but their courtship has not/not extended to aggressive
outreach to the cocaleros in their home areas. End Note. )


5. (C) What was increasing in the VRAE districts,
XXXXXXXXXXXX said, was the takeover of local politic
by cocaleros and narcotraffickers. He noted that the
creation of new districts in 1992 during the Fujimori era,
designed to increase state presence in remote areas,
had backfired, with whole districts having city councils
and mayoral administrations that favored cocalero interests.
Examples were Pichali, Santa Rosa and Sivia districts in the
VRAE. The increased buying power of cocaleros was one
reason for this infiltration of coca into local politics, fueled by a
significant increase in the hectarage under cultivation.


6. (C) Cocalero influence was gradually seeping into
provincial and regional politics, XXXXXXXXXXXX continued.
(Note: decentralization is bringing increasing control at the
regional and provincial level over government financial
resources. End Note.) The La Convencion Province (Cuzco
Department),for example, recently included in its budget a
line item for the "sacred leaf." Ayacucho Regional President
Omar Quesada (who in January declared coca a cultural
patrimony) did a publicized walking tour in late April to
connect with residents abutting a road project running
through provincial capital Querobamba (a relatively new
province, created in 1986). XXXXXXXXXXXX,s contacts
reported that at night Quesada met with cocaleros after his
publicized development meetings during the day. In March,
Quesada signed a declaration with Ayacucho cocaleros calling
on the GOP to suspend all eradication efforts and for an end to
alternative development programs. (Note: When PolCouns
confronted APRA co-Secretary General Jorge del Castillo with
this declaration, the latter stated that this did not reflect
APRA's position and that he would take this mater up with the
party's political committee. End Note.)


7. (C) The potential for cocalero violence appears to be
growing. XXXXXXXXXXXX contacts uniformly reported that
narcotraffickers were training and arming cocaleros. Local
employment is increasing of non-growers (frequently family
members of growers) for trafficking-related tasks such as
transporting coca paste with backpacks, driving pack mules,
operating maceration pits, manual labor for cocaine labs and
joining narcotraffickers as foot soldiers. The cocaleros
were increasingly receptive, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, to
viewing their coca fields as something worth fighting for and
to the offer of arms and firearm training to effect defense of
their fields. Cocaine labs were increasing, XXXXXXXXXXXX
continued, and the highest-paying jobs went to those entrusted
with delivering cocaine to Lima.


8. (C) While XXXXXXXXXXXX,s visit yielded little evidence
of direct Sendero Luminoso (SL) activity in the VRAE, the
narcotrafficker influence made the area equally dangerous.
XXXXXXXXXXXX on this trip was unable to enter areas tha
he had on previous trips. The contacts that would speak to him
reported that any contact with outsiders was increasingly
dangerous. Many people have disappeared in recent months,
either from running afoul of narcotraffickers or victims of
local score-settling that the lawless climate facilitates.


9. (C) The high level of organization that cocaleros have
used to menace helicopters on eradication missions further
north in the Upper Huallaga River region (Refs A - D) is an
indication of an escalation in their organization, training
and tactics. In a tactic that has become common during
eradication operations over the past weeks, cocaleros hang
back during eradication and the initial stages of evacuation
of the eradicators and their security elements. When all
helicopters have departed save one, and the PNP security is
withdrawing to mount the last helicopter, the cocaleros then
close in with extensive launching of rocks (up to 2 lbs) from
long-range slings. Security police and crew departing from
the last helos have reported that the front line of cocaleros
will launch their rocks, then crouch so that a second, and
then a third line of rock-slingers can launch their
projectiles against the helo cabin and rotor blades.


10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX,s visit to the VRAE came after the
April 12 attacks to the north (Refs A - D); his contacts reported
the wide dissemination of the perceived success by cocaleros
and their allies in damaging the helicopters. Groups of
cocaleros held parties to celebrate the helicopter attacks.
Several contacts noted that in past years SL fighters had
poor success in downing Army helicopters
XXXXXXXXXXXX,s contacts further reported that many
Apurimac cocaleros in the VRAE expressed hopes that they
could be involved in the downing of a helicopter.


11. (C) While so far cocaleros have used sling-launched rocks
against eradicators, their security elements and helicopters,
XXXXXXXXXXXX painted a disturbing picture for the future.
His contacts in the VRAE said that narcotraffickers are arming
cocaleros there at an unprecedented rate, either selling
modern selective-fire rifles such as FN-FALs and Galils - and
even rocket launchers - or giving them the arms as an advance
on coca sales. Cocaleros increasingly perceive their
interests as an armed resistance to any eradication efforts
in the future.


12. (C) National Police chief Marco Miyashiro has noted
privately to Emboffs and publicly that the PNP,s current
emphasis on interdicting cocaine base laboratories is
designed, and to a degree has been successful in delinking
coca growers from narcotraffickers. When PNP units strike
laboratories, coca growers are torn between protecting their
own fields and protecting narcotrafficker production labs.
By and large they choose to stay with their fields, and as a
result there have been few large-scale protests or assaults
on the PNP troops while they are destroying the pits. An
ominous sign for the future, however, is the growing trend
that coca growers operate their own maceration pits; some may
begin a more aggressive defense of their pits.


13. (C) Comment: This report, based chiefly on a well-placed
and historically reliable source may not reflect the entire
picture but is disturbing. GOP helicopters and eradication
teams, as well as alternative development workers, will be
put at ever higher risk without action by the government to
exert state control over the increasingly lawless coca zones
such as the VRAE and Upper Huallaga. The PNP raid of April 24
(Ref B) found evidence that clearly linked the SL and
narco-trafficking in the San Martin/Ucayali/Huanuco
Departments. Current PNP plans to mount extensive operations
where helicopters have been attacked are promising. The PNP
is continuing interdiction operations in the Upper Huallaga
and in the immediate future, DIRANDRO will deploy 350
counter-narcotic police to the Polvora-Pizana area in support
of a prolonged eradication and interdiction operation. In
addition, a multi-tiered enforcement operation will begin in
the VRAE in June to destroy cocaine-base labs. Enactment of
a new coca law that continues to be advanced by some
congressmen would probably reinforce the growing power of
local and regional coca politicians and give cocaleros an
incentive to unite on a national basis; the Embassy will
continue to discourage consideration of a coca law on all
fronts.

STRUBLE