Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05LILONGWE348
2005-04-22 11:21:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Lilongwe
Cable title:  

IMF MALAWI PROGRAM DEPENDS ON FOOD SOLUTION

Tags:  EFIN EINV ECON MI 
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UNCLAS LILONGWE 000348 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/S ADRIENNE GALANEK AND KENDRA GAITHER
STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA FRANCES CHISHOLM
STATE FOR EB/IFD/ODF LINDA SPECHT
TREASURY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS/AFRICA/BEN CUSHMAN
JOHANNESBURG FOR FCS
MCC FOR KEVIN SABA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON MI
SUBJECT: IMF MALAWI PROGRAM DEPENDS ON FOOD SOLUTION

REF: LILONGWE 198

This message is sensitive but unclassified-not for Internet
distribution.


SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS LILONGWE 000348

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/S ADRIENNE GALANEK AND KENDRA GAITHER
STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA FRANCES CHISHOLM
STATE FOR EB/IFD/ODF LINDA SPECHT
TREASURY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS/AFRICA/BEN CUSHMAN
JOHANNESBURG FOR FCS
MCC FOR KEVIN SABA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON MI
SUBJECT: IMF MALAWI PROGRAM DEPENDS ON FOOD SOLUTION

REF: LILONGWE 198

This message is sensitive but unclassified-not for Internet
distribution.


SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) As the IMF's team comes to negotiate a new program for
Malawi, it is clear that the central issue is food. The poor
crop is expected to lower GDP to 0-2 percent, and food-driven
inflation is already rising. The need for humanitarian
relief has become clear, and one of the main points to be
negotiated is the size and nature of the GOM's response. End
summary.


2. (U) The International Monetary Fund's Malawi team arrived
in Lilongwe early this week hoping to conclude negotiations
for a new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). As
reported in reftel, both parties agreed in March to suspend
negotiations until the country's food situation could be
clarified enough for budget purposes. With second-round crop
estimates showing a clear need for a humanitarian food
program, it is hoped the GOM will be able to quantify the
budget impact of its food needs enough to conclude talks with
the IMF.


3. (SBU) The IMF's initial look at economic performance is
encouraging, considering the circumstances. On account of
the poor maize crop, the IMF expects to revise its GDP
projections for 2005 down to 0-2 percent. Inflation has
edged up to 14.9 percent, mainly because food prices have not
experienced their usual seasonal drop as the harvest comes
in. Budget performance for the past quarter is on target
despite lower donor revenue than in the previous two
quarters. However, foreign reserves are very low, with about
one month of reserves on hand. GOM has cancelled its earlier
plans to sell some foreign currency to absorb Kwacha
liquidity, opting instead to maintain the meager reserves it
has.


4. (SBU) In the IMF team's view, the lack of foreign currency
should preclude any large government-funded grain
importations. But the budget drafts the GOM has shown the
team indicate plans to import 100,000 metric tons of maize,
at a cost of MK3.5 billion ($32 million),for resale during
the upcoming fiscal year (July-June). The team has not
discussed the details of the plan, nor has the GOM shared any
plans with donors.


COMMENT
--------------


5. (SBU) The PRGF discussions hinge almost entirely on the
GOM's plans for food security. Up to now, the GOM has
characterized the situation as a nationwide food shortage,
while donors think of it as local humanitarian needs
developing as the season progresses. The proposed solutions
are accordingly out of phase: GOM appears to want to import
maize for commercial sale in order to keep prices down;
donors want to let the commercial price float, creating
incentives for commercial traders to import grain into the
country.


6. (SBU) Meanwhile, there is a standoff about humanitarian
assistance. Most donors (including the USG) cannot commit
firm numbers for humanitarian assistance in advance. The GOM
would clearly like to see donors address the humanitarian
problem, leaving the GOM free to intervene with commercial
imports to hold prices down--a politically popular approach.
(A similar intervention in 2001/2 resulted in disastrously
high prices and acute shortages.) At this point, it appears
that donors cannot give the assurance the GOM is looking for
to excuse itself from humanitarian relief efforts. With the
IMF insisting on a fiscally responsible solution, the GOM may
have less than a week to redefine how it thinks about food
crises.
GILMOUR