THE UDF SPLIT: SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LILONGWE 000017

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

AF/S FOR GALANEK; INR/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MI
SUBJECT: THE UDF SPLIT: SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

REF: A. A) LILONGWE 0016


B. B) LILONGWE 0015

C. C) 04 LILONGWE 1110

D. D) 04 LILONGWE 1086

1.(SBU) Summary and Introduction: After a week of high
political drama, including an alleged assassination attempt,
the dissolution of Malawi's pro-Muluzi intelligence service,
and the arrest on treason charges and subsequent pardon of
three Muluzi loyalists, Malawians now seem to believe that
the rift between President Mutharika and his predecessor, UDF
Party Chairman Bakili Muluzi, is now insurmountable (Ref. B).
While the public internecine wrangling may have damaged
Mutharika's presidential image, it has also cleared the air:
Mutharika is in charge and clearly in control of the
machinery of state. Without making predictions, this cable
describes some of the challenges Mutharika faces as he moves
forward to consolidate his presidency and advance his
pro-growth, good-government agenda, as well as outlining
possible scenarios that could play out over the coming
months.
2.(SBU) A permanent rift in the UDF now seems inevitable, as
Mutharika has declared that he can and will govern
independently of Muluzi and his political machine. Muluzi's
UDF may form a marriage of convenience with John Tembo's MCP
to support the latter's court case seeking to nullify last
year's presidential election on grounds of voter fraud.
Tembo could prevail, especially if those who perpetrated the
fraud provide evidence in court, resulting in a call for new
elections. At that point, Mutharika would have to create a
party, possibly resurrecting his defunct United Party (UP).
Muluzi would be free to run as the UDF candidate, since
Mutharika's interregnum would permit Muluzi to obviate the
constitutional prohibition against serving more than two
consecutive terms. Muluzi still enjoys strong support in the
rural areas, especially the south, and could return as
president. Mutharika's options: continue to govern without
the support of Muluzi's UDF, delay the court case as long as
possible, rebuild his own party after eventually splitting
with the UDF, and weaken the UDF machine by starving it of
its government sources of revenue. End Summary and
Introduction.

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The Rift
--------------


3. (U) Following President Mutharika's announcement last week
of an alleged assassination plot, editorials Friday and over
the weekend have largely praised the President for standing
up to Muluzi and the UDF. The Daily Times praised the
President's willingness to acknowledge in public the
widely-held truth that Muluzi does not want to relinquish
power; it was less than sanguine, however, about his
"pardons" of three UDF treason defendants before they were
tried and convicted. The Nation: "Malawians thought Bingu
was a coward. He is not."


4. (SBU) Muluzi denied any involvement in the alleged
assassination plot, and struck back by threatening to
"discipline" eight senior UDF officials loyal to Mutharika.
Mutharika claimed he now would only reenter reconciliation
talks with Muluzi if the UDF were to remove four of his
closest political confidantes and UDF co-founders: John
Chikakwiya (Mayor of Blantyre),Dumbo Lemani (ex-minister of
mines),Humphrey Mvula (ex-president of parastatal Shire bus
lines) and Friday Jumbe (ex-minister of finance). All four
have been accused of corruption and three are currently under
indictment, but few here believe that Muluzi will remove them
from the party (Ref. C). Meanwhile, National Police and
Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) officials began seizing UDF
vehicles for non-payment of duty on December 7. While the
UDF was granted a preliminary injunction over the weekend,
the MRA will likely move to lift the stay and continue the
seizures in the coming week (Ref. A). (Note: Muluzi
personally holds title to over one hundred bright-yellow UDF
four-by-four and luxury vehicles he imported duty-free while
president and never registered. They have been passed out as
political perks to UDF/Muluzi loyalists, and several have
been violently seized recently by the militant, pro-Muluzi
Young Democrats from politicians seen as too close to
Mutharika. End Note.)

--------------
What Next?
--------------


5. (SBU) The events of the past week have clearly shown that
President Mutharika is in charge, and government institutions
are following his orders. While the political situation here
is extremely fluid, significant challenges lie ahead for
President Mutharika. Most here now consider the
Muluzi/Mutharika rift in the UDF to be insurmountable. While
many in the UDF are pro-Mutharika, none here believes that
Muluzi will give up his position as party chairman
voluntarily, and few think Mutharika will be able to wrest
control of the UDF from him. Muluzi personally owns all UDF
vehicles, all of its real property and the business interests
that provide it funding--including the KEZA building which he
built and leased to the Malawi Revenue Authority while still
President. (Note: The MRA was ordered to vacate the KEZA
building in November and its director was removed. End
Note). The UDF still functions as a machine for the
distribution of wealth and political influence--even if both
have waned considerably since Mutharika's inauguration--and
Muluzi still controls it.

6.(SBU) While Mutharika has concentrated on sidelining
Muluzi's inner circle through corruption prosecutions, he has
not investigated Muluzi himself. This may become an
increasingly appealing option for Mutharika once he has
abandoned any hope for reconciling the split in the UDF,
although it is not without risk: any arrest or indictment of
Muluzi would significantly raise the ante for political
violence by Young Democrats, who in the current climate have
already begun beating and harassing pro-Mutharika
politicians, including one sitting cabinet minister (Ref. A).
Mutharika may have deferred pursuing Muluzi on corruption
charges because of the UDF complaints that his
anti-corruption efforts constitute de facto political
persecution. Short of indicting Muluzi, the President will
be able to weaken Muluzi and the UDF by cutting off their
various sources of funding. The seizing of Muluzi's UDF
vehicles is an indication that the President has already
begun that process: Muluzi will not likely be able pay the
100 percent duty and registration fees to recover the
vehicles, given their number and value. The nullification of
the lease contract between MRA and Muluzi for the KEZA
building terminated a major source of funding to the Party.
Given that Muluzi is already liquidating assets to pay
outstanding personal judgments, it is doubtful that he will
be able to continue to fund the UDF without direct inflows
from the government. Even with these measures it will not be
easy for Mutharika to sideline Muluzi from the UDF and take
over. The Party exists to promote the political and personal
fortunes of Muluzi and his cohort, and Mutharika is viewed as
an outside technocrat imposed by Muluzi on the party.

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Crossing the Floor Over You
--------------

7.(SBU) Mutharika could simply abandon the UDF. Under
Malawi's mixed presidential/parliamentary constitution,
Malawian presidents are directly elected, and theoretically
should remain president regardless of party affiliation. The
UDF would certainly contest Mutharika's ability to remain
President if he leaves the Party, since its current rhetoric
is that the Party (read Muluzi) is superior to any president
elected with its support. While this position would not
prevail legally, it would be a nuisance and another battle
for public opinion that Mutharika will need to handle
carefully. Under this scenario, Mutharika will likely form
another party, possibly reviving his United Party (UP) and
taking loyalists with him. All current UDF Ministers would
likely go with the President--if only to hold on to their
jobs--including some percentage of UDF MPs. It is impossible
to say how many would depart UDF: much will depend on the
perception of who is ascendant in the Muluzi-Mutharika
struggle. Some UDF MPs clearly support Mutharika's
good-governance and economic growth platform, while most are
watching the political winds.

8.(SBU) In a ploy to prevent parliamentary defections,
Muluzi's UDF successfully amended the Malawi Constitution to
include Section 65, which penalizes MPs with the loss of
their seats for switching parties. This rule has been
finessed to permit MPs to switch from a declared party
affiliation to independent status, or vice versa (they may
run as independents and later declare a party affiliation).
This would create for more high political drama, but would
not necessarily prevent Mutharika from cobbling together a
coalition of ex-UDF independents and existing parties
sufficient to be able to govern effectively. Malawi's system
of government is heavily weighted towards the executive, and
Mutharika can rule without legislative approval for many of
his initiatives if necessary, but he will need a block of
legislative support in order to effectively govern.

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Muluzi Back in the Saddle?
--------------

9.(SBU) Once the split with Mutharika is permanent, as many
believe it is, Muluzi would have every incentive to encourage
UDF members such as Lemani, Mvula and Jumbe to testify or
otherwise provide evidence in MCP Presidential candidate John
Tembo's legal case to nullify last year's election results
(Ref. D). They have already made claims in the media that
they were personally involved in widespread election fraud to
ensure a Mutharika victory. Tembo was Banda's heir in the
MCP, and he and Muluzi are bitter political enemies dating
back to the 1994 elections. Still, they may cooperate in the
lawsuit for the purposes of removing Mutharika and staging
new elections, which both believe they would win. There
would be a risk of prosecution for Lemani and others who
incriminate themselves, but the payoff would be worth the
risk: in a new election, Muluzi could run as the UDF
candidate and return to the presidency. Muluzi still enjoys
a broad base of support among rural Malawians, especially in
the south, and others who remember the Muluzi years of
profligate government spending with some nostalgia. Legally,
the Constitution only bars presidents from seeking more than
two consecutive terms, and Mutharika's interregnum would
effectively permit a third Muluzi term, although this would
certainly be contested. Mutharika's best defense will be the
same of any sitting Malawian President confronted by an
election-fraud case: use dilatory tactics, gentle suasion and
any other means possible to prevent the case from coming to
trial for as long as possible.


10. (SBU) Comment: Muluzi may have chosen unwisely in
selecting Mutharika as his successor. Mutharika, a
technocrat and former IMF official, has diligently set about
the work of returning fiscal discipline to government,
combating corruption and promoting economic growth in Malawi.
Mutharika's anticorruption efforts have targeted the most
powerful figures in his own party, except Muluzi, who are
also widely recognized to have been the most corrupt members
of the last government. The effort is laudable, but the
Muluzi machine will not go without a fight in the courts, the
media, and as is being proven by the return of the Young
Democrats to active thuggery--in the streets. Malawi's
neopaternalistic political structure favors the executive,
and it is difficult for either the legislative or judicial
branches to pose an effective counterweight to executive
power, as when Muluzi's bid to amend the Constitution to
permit a third term was defeated. Barring the unlikely
event of a coup or a successful assassination attempt, the
balance of power clearly rests with Mutharika, a situation
that will only become more pronounced with time. Most here
now believe the President's account that Muluzi plotted to
have him assassinated last week. Mutharika successfully
outmanouvered him, probably with the help of officials within
the disbanded National Intelligence Bureau, and this may
signal the beginning of the end of Muluzi's political
influence. The irony is that Mutharika may have to resort to
less than democratic means to consolidate his power, hold on
to the presidency and advance his agenda in the face of
continued opposition from the still-powerful UDF machine that
sponsored him, which clearly will not go without a fight.
End Comment.
GILMOUR