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05LAGOS1951 2005-12-28 12:36:00 SECRET Consulate Lagos
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					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 LAGOS 001951 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015


Classified By: Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne
for Reasons 1.4 (D, E, & G)


1. (S) Given the presence of armed militia and of oil
bunkering enterprises, the GON has difficulty maintaining
security of the oil producing Nigerian Delta region. Parts
of the region are effectively under the control of the
militia or bunkering groups than governmental authority. As
the December 21 attack against Shell's Opobo terminal
pipeline indictates, the GON is ill-prepared for sabotage or
a terrorist incident against petroleum production
infrastructure. The GON has deployed a special military task
force to the area in an attempt to restrain the militia.
Other than that, the GON has taken no specific actions to
protect against terrorist attacks. There is no clear
evidence linking militias in the Niger Delta with
international terrorist groups. There has been some contact
between some militia and Islamic groups in northern Nigeria,
but there is no evidence of collaboration in activities
against oil facilities. The most immediate threat of
disruption to Nigerian petroleum production comes from the
militias and local communities where facilities are located.
We expect the 2007 election to accelerate bunkering (illegal
oil theft), arms importation, and the growth in militias.

2. (S) Targets which would likely be of greatest interest
to terrorists include Nigeria's largest export terminals,
particularly Shell's Bonny terminal; Shell's Forcados
terminal; ExxonMobil's Qua Iboe export terminal; Chevron's
Escravos complex; Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG); and
the Onne Oil and Gas Free Zone. Domestic refineries are not
a significant potential terrorist target. A growing number
of offshore Floating, Production, Storage, and Offloading
(FPSO) vessels in Nigeria will present rich terrorist
targets. Nigeria will have one of the world's largest
collections of FPSOs in place by about 2009. Liquefied
natural gas facilities (LNG) would present significant
targets for international terrorists.

No Vulnerability Assessment


3. (S) Post provides the following answers to the
Department's questions on the vulnerability of key foreign
oil supplies in Nigeria:

-- Have host governments completed vulnerability assessments
of the facilities listed below?

The GON has undertaken no systematic vulnerability
assessments of the major petroleum facilities, including
those referenced in reftel.

GON Control is Partial in Some Areas;
Militias and Communities Most Immediate Threat



-- What actions have they taken to reinforce protection and
harden vulnerable infrastructure to prevent terrorist attacks
or other disruption?

4. (S) The GON has taken no specific action, other than
routine deployment of comparatively ill-equipped government
security forces (GSF, which includes military and police
forces), to protect petroleum installations against terrorist
attacks. The Inspector General of the Police has recently
admitted the police have problems combating crime due to
chronic neglect, and the GON alone cannot stop these
problems. The GON's ability to protect infrastructure from
militia groups has not improved.

Unmanned Facilities Vulnerable to Bunkering


5. (C) Nigeria has a decentralized and far-flung oil
production network. Many wellheads and flow stations are
unmanned, as it is less expensive for companies to suffer oil
theft than to pay personnel to stay on site. Unmanned flow
stations and other facilities are particularly vulnerable to
bunkering (illegal theft of oil). Remote sensing equipment
to detect theft is rarely used, as it is also vulnerable to

Government Security Forces Protect Larger Facilities,
but Remain Outgunned by Militias



6. (C) Facilities, such as large flow stations, tank farms
and export terminals, are typically guarded by a combination
of GSF, and private contract guards employed by the operator.
Armed protection is supplied by GSF, consisting of the
mobile police (mopol), and troops from the army and navy. In
confrontations with militias in the Delta region, GSF do not
have the superiority of numbers or of weaponry. Movement on
the water in the Delta region is typically carried out
accompanied by the Nigerian Navy. Depending on vessel
availability, the Navy may send a separate escort vessel, or
may ride in the company's vessel.

Petroleum Installations Vulnerable to
Community Groups and Militias


7. (C) Petroleum production installations, particularly
those with few security forces present, are highly vulnerable
to attack by community groups and militias. There have been
a number of successful community invasions during the last
several years at major petroleum facilities. Community
groups sometimes occupy oil facilities to express their
displeasure with company employment or community development
policies. These invasions are usually peaceful, and end
after a couple of days. Essential personnel often remain in
place and continue production during these occupations.

Militia Groups Practice Extortion;
Damage to Facilities Rare but not Unknown


8. (C) Militia groups often operate through extortion, for
example, kidnapping oil company employees for cash ransoms,
or demanding payments for "protecting" company assets. More
rarely, militia groups encroach upon facilities, compounds,
or vessels without warning. Notwithstanding the December 21
attack against a Shell pipeline in Rivers State, militia
groups more typically aim to extort money rather than destroy
oil facilities. As part of their extortionist practices,
militia groups often employ public threats that they will
destroy oil installations, often with no apparent substantive
action to carry out the threat. Threats from members of
community groups and militias are not fully distinct, as
group memberships often overlap (and continue to evolve).
For example, broad-based ethnic organizations such as the
Ijaw Congress include a range of members, from the
militia-affiliated youth group, the Ijaw Youth Council, to
respected interlocutors with national standing, such as the
Ijaw Monitoring Group.

2007 Elections will Intensify Bunkering
and Militia Activity


9. (S) Militia groups are a large problem in the Delta
region. Government officials have helped arm militias to
influence elections in their favor. Some observers implicate
governors and high-ranking Naval officials in bunkering.
Proceeds from bunkering directly or indirectly pay militia
members and finance arms purchases. We expect the 2007
election to accelerate bunkering, arms importation, and the
growth in militias.

Rogue Government Elements Pose Threat to
Daily Petroleum Operations


10. (S) Elements in the police and the Nigerian state
security service (SSS) practice extortion, including against
U.S. firms. To date, this has not affected petroleum
operations, but such malpractice's have the potential to do
so. This extortion is typically directed against oil service
companies (OSCs), many of which carry out key support
operations, such as drilling, pipelaying, and logistics
support. Rogue officials demand payments to avoid shutting
down a company's offices or operations, arresting key
employees, or seizing vehicles.

Review of Petroleum Production Facilities:
Export Terminals and other Export Facilities


11. (S) -- What would be the impact if one of these
facilities reduced or halted its output? (Posts are requested
to quantify this impact in barrels per day of output.)

Nigeria currently has five on-shore export terminals and one
Floating, Storage, and Offloading (FSO) vessel through which
it exports crude and related petroleum products. Export
facilities with their average daily exports include:

--Shell Bonny Export Terminal - 450,000-480,000 barrels per
day (bpd)
--Shell Forcados Export Terminal - 350,000-380,000 bpd
--ExxonMobil Qua Iboe Export Terminal - 650,000 bpd capacity
--Chevron Escravos Export Terminal - 200,000-250,000 bpd
--Chevron Olobiri FSO Vessel - 20,000 bpd
--AGIP Brass Export Terminal - 200,000 bpd

12. (S) Export facilities are a more likely target for
international terrorist activity than individual production
facilities, as they centralize significant amounts of

Onne Free Zone Possible Target


13. (U) The Onne Oil and Gas Free Zone (Onne) is a
duty-free export processing zone on the Bonny River, about 40
kilometers from Port Harcourt. The Onne Port Complex covers
16 square kilometers, with a majority of the land still
unused. Onne's facilities include a railway to Port
Harcourt, container and bulk terminals, a transit terminal
managed by Intels, a deep offshore support base, a
construction yard, customs offices, the Bonny Cement Factory,
tanks for drilling mud and liquid storage, and a dry dock.
Onne facilities also include the Intels-managed Federal Ocean
Terminal (FOT) and Federal Lighter Terminal (FLT). FOT's
jetty is 520 meters, with a 10-meter low water draft. FLT's
jetty is 1300 meters, with a 6-meter low water draft. The
terminals are being expanded to accommodate 70,000 tonne
vessels. The terminals also include a 200,000 square meter
bulk and container storage area. Oil and gas services in the
free zone include, amongst others, terminal operations,
provision of drilling muds and chemicals, drilling
contractors, supply boat services, wellhead services, and
project companies carrying out major fabrication and
construction tasks.

14. (S) Onne hosts the vast majority of the support
infrastructure for Nigerian oil and gas production. The
degree of centralization of support functions represents an
enormous security risk to the industry. Most of the
industry's logistics support, including such basics as food
and supplies for platform production crews, is based from
Onne. The Nigerian petroleum sector is virtually entirely
dependent on imported inputs, most of which arrive via Onne,
and without which the industry would slowly grind to halt.
Onne Free Zone also hosts virtually all of the deepwater
field construction support; damage to Onne facilities could
significantly slow construction schedules for new fields.
During periods of increased tension in the Delta, Onne is
frequently a target for gangs and rioters; some operations
shut down during September 2005 tensions. Onne is on a
narrow channel navigable only during the day for security
reasons. A terrorist or militia strike at Onne would not
cripple petroleum exports immediately, but inability to
resupply and transfer crews would cripple production within a
two to three week timeframe. While other ports in the region
could take over some port operations in the event of
operations ceasing at Onne, no other facility has the
capacity to replace the scale and breadth of Onne's
operations. Additionally, Onne is designed as a
transshipment port for West and Central African countries,
distributing inputs for oil and gas operations in Cameroon,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, Angola, and Sao Tome and

15. (S) Shell and Chevron are sufficiently concerned about
Onne's vulnerability that they are planning to build another
logistics support base in Lagos. ExxonMobil may join in this
effort. However, such a multi-billion dollar facility is in
the early planning stages, and its realization several years
in the future. President Obasanjo has appointed a commission
to work on Onne's security vulnerabilities and examine
construction of an alternate site in Lagos.

Nigerian Refineries not Significant to
International Market, Unlikely Terrorist Target



16. (U) Refineries: Existing Nigerian refineries are Port
Harcourt I and II, Kaduna and Warri. These parastatal
refineries have a combined nameplate capacity of about
439,000 bpd, while the GON declares domestic consumption to
be the equivalent of 240,000 bpd.

17. (S) Due to poor maintenance, the actual production of
the parastatal refineries careens wildly, with the average
production likely in the range of 50 percent of capacity.
The refineries cannot meet all of Nigeria's domestic demand,
and do not export any refined products. They are not of
great direct importance to world refining capacity. However,
if the refineries are targeted, Nigeria would probably seek
to force the oil companies to supply refined product to

Small-Scale Disruptions Frequent: Market Reaction
often Bigger Threat than Loss of Barrels



18. (S) Most existing on-shore and shallow water production
assets would not present an attractive target for
international terrorist groups. Each facility represents a
relatively small amount of production, usually less than
25,000 bpd. Production losses due to community unrest are
usually localized, and result in the loss of a few tens of
thousands of barrels, for a week or less. (However, Chevron
has suffered a loss of over 100,000 bpd for over 2 years.)
These small losses are not significant, but market reaction
can produce a price surge disproportionate to actual
production lost.

19. (C) Disruption in Nigerian crude is significant not
only for barrels lost, but also because Nigerian crude is
light and sweet, and easily refined (65% of Nigerian crude
has an API of 35 or higher, making it refineable for products
such as aviation fuel.)

Shell Facilities and Production Review


20. (U) Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), is
Nigeria's largest producer, producing more than a million
barrels/day. However, SPDC owns only 30% of its production,
with the rest spread between shareholders Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation's (NNPC, the national oil company),
Total, and AGIP. Of this approximately 300,000 bpd, most is
destined for U.S. refineries. The bulk of its production is
centered in Rivers, Delta, and Bayelsa states, but there are
also operations in Abia, Imo, Edo, and Ondo states. Much of
the production is on-shore or in shallow swamp areas. SPDC
has more than 6,000 kilometers of pipelines and flowlines, 87
flow stations, 8 gas plants, and more than a thousand

Shell Facilities: Bonny Island Terminal and
NLNG Possible Terrorist Targets


21. (S) Bonny Island may be the largest potential on-shore
terrorist target in Nigeria, due to its
concentration of large facilities: Bonny Export Terminal and
Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG), both undergoing
expansion, as well as ExxonMobil facilities. Community
relations on Bonny Island are peaceful compared to much of
the Niger Delta, although a community group has told us the
Ijaw Youth Council is attempting to recruit on the island.

22. (S) Shell exports its production through two export
--Bonny Export Terminal - 450,000-480,000 of Bonny light
crude, and
--Forcados Export Terminal - 350,000-380,000 bpd of Forcados
blend crude. Forcados has 2 mooring buoys with a draft of
19.8 meters and no length restriction. The terminal has a
7.3 million barrel storage capacity, and a maximum loading
rate of 86,250 barrels/hour.

Shell handles exports of its own crude, as well as production
from Chevron, Total, and other producers through these
terminals. Shell's expansion project for the Bonny Export
Terminal will allow it to handle 1.5 million bpd by 2006.
This will make the Bonny Terminal the largest export terminal
in Nigeria by several orders of magnitude, and a potentially
rich target for terrorists.

23. (U) NLNG: Nigeria is becoming a major source for
liquefied natural gas (LNG) for western markets. Shell
operates Nigerian LNG (NLNG), located on Bonny Island. NLNG
has four trains operational, with the fifth train due to come
on line this year, bringing total production to 17 metric
tons per annum (mta) for LNG and 3.4 mta of LPG. Train six
is under construction, and will bring the NLNG's capacity to
20 mta of LNG by 2007. Additionally, the Soku Gas
Transmission Pipeline is under construction and planned for a
late 2005 completion; it will transport gas from Shell's Soku
production facilities to NLNG. Currently, NLNG's major market
is in Europe, but with expansion, it will begin to export to
the US as well.

Bonga: Nigeria's First Major Deepwater Project
On-Line Soon



24. (U) Nigeria's first major deepwater project, the Bonga
field, came on line in 2005. The Bonga field is located 150
kilometers off Delta state in 1000 meters of water, in oil
mining lease block (OML) 118. Production is carried out via
the Bonga FPSO. FPSOs are supertankers which produce
petroleum products via a system of flexible hoses connected
to dozens of subsea wellheads. Bonga's initial production
from 30 seabed wells will start at 100,000 bpd, and rise to
200,000-250,000 bpd of crude within a year. Recoverable
reserves are estimated at 1.2 billion barrels. Gas
production will be 150 million standard cubic feet/day of
gas. The Bonga FPSO is a double-hulled vessel with a
single-hull bottom, and a storage capacity of 2 million
barrels. By January 2006, oil will be exported via tanker on
a 5-day cycle, with gas sent via the Offshore Gas Gathering
System (OGGS) to NLNG for processing. FPSOs remain in place
for the operational life of the field, often up to 20 years.
Shell will also operate the Bonga SW deepwater field, which
is in planning stages.

25. (S) FPSOs such as Bonga are currently beyond the reach
of traditional community groups, but would represent a
valuable target for international terrorists.

ExxonMobil Facilities and Production Review


26. (U) ExxonMobil facilities are largely based in Akwa
Ibom State. Its shallow water operations are in oil mining
lease (OML) blocks 67, 68, 69, 70, and 94, where it operates
22 fields over 810,000 acres. In Nigeria, ExxonMobil
operates 92 platforms, 67 wellheads, 5 gas compression
facilities, and 1 natural gas-to-liquids (NGL) extraction
facility. ExxonMobil produces about 580,000 barrels/day, and
pending availability of NNPC joint venture financing, plans
to increase production to 1.2-1.3 million bpd by 2010.

Shallow Water Fields


27. (C) ExxonMobil's shallow water fields include:

OML 67 - Ufeni, Ede, Isobo, Mfem, Unam A, Etoro, Eku,
Ubit, Iyak, Utue, Okwok
OML 68 - Ata, Inanga, Idoho
OML 70 - Obu, Oso, Aban, Usari, Usari EE, Enang, Udara,
Asabo, Emiang, Nkuku, Adua, Ekpe, Ekpe WW, Amenam, Asasa,
Edop, Etim, Nsung,
OML 94 - Ufan, Yoho, Awaw, Aran

The additional Oil Recovery Project (AOR) is a $1.7 billion
investment which will produce an additional 110,000 bpd of
crude, and arrest oil production decline in existing fields
through gas compression and re-injection. It is located on
the eastern edge of ExxonMobil's operations off Akwa Ibom
State, and will service the surrounding shallow water fields.
The AOR will be one of the world's largest gas compression
platforms at its March 2006 start-up.

Off-Shore Location Offers Protection
from Community Disruption


28. (S) Most of ExxonMobil's production is offshore (its
platforms range from about 11 to 75 miles offshore), so it
has significantly fewer problems with community disruption as
Shell and Chevron. However, large facilities such as the AOR
and facilities in the Oso field could be potential terrorist

Crude Export Facilities: Plausible Terrorist Targets



29. (U) ExxonMobil's major export terminal is the Qua Iboe
Terminal (QIT). The tank farm has a 650,000 bpd capacity,
and currently exports about 500,000 bpd, including
condensate. It exports crude from most of the ExxonMobil's
shallow water fields, excepting Yoho, via 2 large subsea
pipelines. There is a berthing facility a few miles offshore
from QIT.

30. (U) The Yoho and Awaw reservoirs, located in Oil
Prospecting block 94, hold 350 million barrels in
reserves. Yoho crude is not exported via Qua Iboe, but
rather via the Falcon FPSO. It currently is in place
producing about 150,000 bpd under an early production system.
The Falcon will be replaced by the Yoho FSO and 5 wellhead
platforms for full field start-up by early 2006 for this $1.2
billion project.

31. (S) The QIT, and the Falcon FPSO (to be replaced by the
Yoho FSO), should be considered potential terrorist targets,
as they are the export facilities for ExxonMobil crude.

Gas Facilities and Export


32. (U) ExxonMobil's Bonny River Terminal (BRT), located on
Bonny Island, is an NGL fractionation, storage and loading
terminal for C3, C4, and C5, producing about 50,000 bpd. The
Oso/Natural Gas to Liquids (NGL) I Recovery Complex is
located about 20 miles off-shore from BRT, in OML block 70.
Oso processes 600 million cubic feet/day of wet gas,
recovering 100,000 bpd of condensates, and extracting 50,000
bpd of NGLs, all piped to BRT for further processing. (NGL
production is not constrained by OPEC quota, so is of
particular interest for Nigeria.) The NGL II Recovery
Complex, a $ 1.2 billion investment will add an additional
42,000 bpd production capacity by 2008, but is not yet under

33. (S) The BRT and Oso NGL Recovery Complex I may be
considered potential terrorist targets, but are not as
prominent as other facilities in the country.

Deepwater Production On Line Soon,
Vulnerable to Terrorism


34. (U) ExxonMobil operates the Erha deepwater project,
located in block 209, approximately 60 miles offshore from
the mouth of the Escravos River, Delta State, in about 3000
feet of water. The Erha FPSO is currently under tow from
Singapore, and will be in place by late December 2005. The
field is scheduled to begin producing about 150,000 bpd by
March 2006, and increase production to 165,000 bpd at peak
production by 2008.

35. (S) FPSOs such as Erha would represent a valuable
target for international terrorists.

Chevron Mid-Africa; Chevron
Facilities and Production Review


36. (U) Chevron Mid-Africa is based in Nigeria. Chevron
Nigeria produces about 380,000 bpd, with production in three
major areas:

Western Area Operations and Export Facilities:
Chevron's Largest in Nigeria



37. (C) Warri area, Delta State: The Escravos complex in
Warri is Chevron Nigeria's major oil and gas production
facility, and is located at the mouth of the Escravos Rivers.
Western area operations produce about 300,000 barrels/day
crude currently, of which about one-third is sent by pipeline
to the NNPC's Warri refinery for domestic use. Escravos
hosts a network of aboveground and subsea oil and gas
pipelines in this area, including interconnecting Chevron and
Shell pipelines.

38. (S) Concern for Chevron production in Nigeria currently
centers on these facilities, which are under frequent
uncertainty due to competing Itsekiri and Ijaw communities in
the region. The terminal and related facilities should also
be considered the largest potential terrorist target among
Chevron assets. Oil exports from Chevron facilities are
largely destined for U.S. East Coast refineries.

39. (C) Warri area production facilities include:

--Escravos Oil Terminal: The Escravos terminal includes an
export terminal and tank farm. The 16 tanks, of which 12 are
currently operational, have a 3.6 million barrel storage
capacity. The terminal's capacity is 2.8 million barrels.

--North Offshore Line: The north offshore line is about 7
miles offshore, running roughly parallel to shore, and
includes 14 oil production platforms. Production platforms
include: Delta, Delta South, Tapa, Meren I, Meren WIP, Mejo,
Opolo, Malu, Mina, Parabe, West Isan, and Ewan. An FSO
(Floating, Storage, and Offloading vessel) is moored offshore
near the end of the northern line for export of LPG.

--South Offshore Line: The south offshore intersects the

north line, and runs roughly perpendicular to shore for 20
miles, hosting about 9 production platforms, including the
highly productive Okan platform. The south offshore line
includes most of the gas gathering infrastructure for the
Escravos complex, including platforms for condensate and gas
gathering. Production platforms include: Okan, Okan
Satellite I, Okan Satellite II, Delta South WIP, Mefa, Meji,
IBP, and BOP. Two loading berths (S.B.M. 2 and 3) located at
end of the south offshore line provide single point mooring
for loading of crude and LPG into tankers.

--Onshore/Northern Swamp: Chevron's northern swamp
facilities includes a pipeline and 6 production platforms
north and northwest of the Escravos compound. They include
Dibi, Olero Creek, Opuekba, Abiteye, Utonna, and Makaraba.
The first three facilities are centered along the Benin River
near Olero Creek, while the latter three are centered on the
creeks of the Escravos River north of the tank farm. These
facilities were attacked and occupied in March 2003,
resulting in losses of about 140,000 barrels/day, and over
half a billion dollars in damage to facilities. This area
remains highly volatile; seven Chevron employees, contractors
and GSF were killed in April 2004 attempting to carry out a
site assessment. Chevron has re-couped about 30,000 bpd in
recent months, and hopes to have the swamp facilities fully
back on-line within the next 1 to 1 1/2 years.

Expansion Program for Escravos


40. (S) The Escravos complex will undergo significant
expansion in the next two years. The addition of billions of
dollars in additional gas infrastructure would make the
complex an increasingly rich target for terrorist activity.
Additional current and future facilities at the Escravos
complex include:

--Escravos Gas Plant (EGP) I and II: EGP I and II handle bulk
gas separation and processing for current domestic use and
projected demand from the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP).

--Escravos Gas-to-Liquids (EGTL): Chevron has completed site
clearance and will soon begin construction of EGTL, a $1.3
billion facility, to produce 23,00 bpd of premium synthetic
fuel (high quality diesel for use in blending stock), 10,000
bpd of Naphtha, and 1000 bpd of LPG. The plant will be
operational in 2008, with exports to the U.S. and Europe
beginning in 2009. Additional berthing facilities for export
tankers are also planned to accommodate these new facilities.

Eastern Area Operations: Less Security Concerns



41. (S) Port Harcourt area, Rivers State: Chevron's Eastern
area operations produce about 40,000 bpd. However, given
Chevron's shut-in production in the Warri area, production in
the east is likely to grow in coming years, despite periodic
security problems in Port Harcourt as well. Eastern area
operations include 4 production platforms (Robertkiri,
located on the Egoribiri Creek, San Bartholomeo River; Idama
and Jokka located on the Sambriero River; and the Inda
platform, located at the mouth of the New Calabar River.)
Chevron crude is exported via pipeline, predominantly through
Shell's Bonny export terminal, under crude handling

--TOPCON facilities: Chevron holds four legacy production
platforms from now-merged Texaco Production Company of
Nigeria (TOPCON), located offshore Bayelsa State. They range
offshore from the mouth of the Pennington River south towards
the Sengana River, and include the Pennington, Middleton,
Apoi, and Funiwa platforms. Chevron produces about 20,000
bpd from these platforms.

New Deepwater, WAGP, and LNG Projects
Possible Terrorist Targets


42. (S) Chevron is leading a number of large projects which
represent significant terrorist targets:

--Agbami Deepwater Field: Chevron is operator for a major
deepwater field, Agbami, which has 800 million barrel
reserves, and at peak will produce 250,000 barrels/day of
crude. The field is currently under construction. The
Agbami Floating, Production, Storage, and Offloading vessel
(FPSO), with a storage capacity of 2 million barrels, will be
put in position in 2006 about 70 miles offshore of Bayelsa
near the border with Rivers state, in 4800 feet of water.
Agbami could be a potential terrorist target.

--West African Gas Pipeline: Chevron Nigeria is the leader
of the West African Gas Pipeline Consortium, and has started
construction of various pieces of the 450-mile pipeline,
which will run from Lagos, Nigeria to Ghana. As a highly
visible transnational project, with USG financial backing via
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the project
might have potential to be a terrorist target.

--OK LNG: This 2-train $6 billion LNG facility is planned for
construction on the coastline border of Ogun and Ondo states
in the Olokola Free Trade Zone. An initial capacity of 10
million metric tons per annum (mmta) would later grow to 30
mmta. Final investment decision has not been made; if
positive, operations are planned about 2009.

--Brass LNG: The Brass LNG project will be a 2-train, 10
million ton/annum facility to be located in Brass, Bayelsa
State. A final investment decision has not been made; if
positive, operations are planned for 2009.



43. (C) Total does not operate export facilities. Total
crude is exported via Shell facilities, predominantly the
Forcados export terminal, but also through the Bonny export



44. (C) AGIP produces about 200,000 bpd largely in on-shore
and shallow water facilities in Rivers and Bayelsa states.
AGIP's crude is largely exported to European markets via its
Brass Export Terminal, in Brass, Bayelsa State.

Nigeria's Changing Risk Profile: Deepwater FPSOs
and LNG Present Complex New Risks



-- Are there other facilities which are particularly

45. (S) Major deepwater petroleum fields will come on line
from late 2005 onwards; new and expanded LNG facilities will
come on line from now until 2009. Deepwater operations and
LNG will centralize and scale up petroleum production systems
which have been predominantly de-centralized. To date,
failure of any one component of the production system has had
a low impact on overall production. However, the shift to
larger, centralized facilities will present an attractive
target to terrorists. The risk of a security system failure
may be less in a well-secured large facility, but any such
failure could critically damage Nigerian petroleum exports.

FPSO Security in Nigeria


46. (S) Nigeria is entering the era of the FPSO. An FPSO
represents a significant terrorist target, albeit one which
would require significant organization and sophistication to
carry out. By 2009-2010, Nigeria will have one of the
world's largest collection of FSOs and FPSOs in place,
including Yoho, Bonga, Bonga SW, Agbami, Erha, and Bosi,
amongst others. Each of these vessels will produce
100,000-250,000 bpd of crude and other petroleum products.
If only current arrangements remain in place, companies will
continue to rely on the thin Nigerian Navy and their own
unarmed security guards to protect these facilities.

LNG Security in Nigeria: Not Any Better


47. (S) Another emerging vulnerability is Nigeria's growing
number of LNG projects, as well as an expanded NLNG. LNG
facilities have several components, any of which could be
vulnerable to terrorist, militia, or community attack. These
include an on-shore processing plant; pipelines, trestles,
and jetties; and ship berthing facilities. Finally,
expansion of the LNG trade will introduce growing numbers of
LNG tankers into poorly-secured Nigerian waters. LNG tankers
are typically converted supertankers with capacities over
100,000 square metric tonnes, and would present an attractive
terrorist target.



48. (S) The GON has not systematically addressed the
potential of its petroleum production system from domestic or
international terrorists. For the GON to handle this
potentiality, it will likely require encouragement from the
countries whose companies participate in oil production here,
and also some degree of assistance to improve security around
key oil facilities.