ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF A GROWING,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUWAIT 000656

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, INR, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KISL KU ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF A GROWING,
INFLUENTIAL FORCE

REF: 03 KUWAIT 03536

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Introduction: The Islamist movement in Kuwait reaches
into every aspect and sector of Kuwaiti society. From
grass-roots businesses to senior positions in government,
Islamists have a strong voice throughout this country.
Paradoxically, Islamists lead the national dialogue in
calling for democratic reforms and political parties while at
the same time calling for limiting the freedom of social
expression and speech when they consider an issue to have
infringed upon their interpretation of Islam. They hold
influential political positions on the future of women's
political rights, human rights practices, and educational
reform. Through the medium of the rural tribes, their
numbers and influence are growing in government and
throughout the society. The mainstream Islamist rhetoric and
ideology link them with more extremist Islamic elements,
however their public rejection of extremist violence allows
them to continue to operate and thrive in this already
conservative Islamic society. Islamists are the most
organized, well-funded, and aggressive political movement in
Kuwait and appear to be growing in strength and influence.
This overview cable on Kuwait's Islamists is an introduction
to the many facets of Islamists and political Islam in Kuwait
and is meant to highlight issues that will be researched and
covered in greater detail in future reports. Post intends to
investigate the role and influence of Islamists in Kuwaiti
society and illuminate the key issues and complexities
surrounding this social, ideological, and political movement.
End Introduction

A Nation of Muslims or A Muslim Nation?
--------------


2. (C) Kuwait is unquestionably a nation of Muslims, but is
it a Muslim nation? Even if this is answered in the
affirmative, the definition must be made clear. What
consensus is reached on the definition will in large part
determine the direction of Kuwait's social, political, and
economic development. While almost all Kuwaitis profess to
be Muslims, there is a significant and growing number of
Kuwaiti Islamists who are socially, ideologically, and
politically motivated to proactively subjugate all Kuwaiti
laws and customs to Qur'anic interpretation. They do this
primarily through an open political process in the National
Assembly, GOK ministries, and a wide-ranging cultural
dialogue. Although not a monolithic group, Islamists also
effect social change through conservative tribal influence
and cultural strong-arming. Their influence has grown
tremendously over the last three decades as Islamists have
become prominent in Parliament and throughout government
ministries. Many Kuwaitis blame the Al-Sabah ruling family
for continuing to support the Islamists as a balanace against
"liberals" claiming the regime feels threatened by liberal
calls for reform. Some members of the ruling Al-Sabah family
are politically and personally close to influential
Islamists. (Note: Energy Minister Shaykh Ahmad Al-Fahd is
known to be close to some Islamist MPs like hard-line
conservative Dr. Awad Barad. His brother, Kuwait State
Security (KSS) head Athbi Al-Fahd, is known to be sympathetic
to Islamist issues and to have close contacts with some
notoriously anti-Western Islamists, and speculation is strong
that Shaykh Salem Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, chairman of the
body responsible for Gulf War POWs and brother of FM Shaykh
Dr. Mohammed, financed Islamist MP Faisal Mislim's successful
2003 campaign for the National Assembly. However, these
personal ties are outweighed by the general tendency of the
Al-Sabah leadership to avoid internal conflicts with the
Islamists. End Note.) As Islamists continue to advance
their conservative agenda in Kuwaiti society, there is an
ongoing public debate on whether their success is a result of
the political support and permissiveness of the GOK or
represents a successful political and social strategy that
ranges from the grass-roots elements of local neighborhoods
to the senior levels of government.

The Political Islamists: Who are They?
--------------


3. (U) There are many shades of Islamists in Kuwait (reftel).
An Islamist is generically characterized as one who
practices, or appears to practice, Islam in a very
conservative and pious manner and who favors political or
cultural initiatives to ensure that society is in line with
proper Qur'anic interpretation. This definition, however,
still leaves Islamists with plenty of room for political
self-definition. The issues that dominate Kuwait's Islamist
political platform are often social ones. They are
highlighted by an overwhelming effort to legislate morality
in all sectors of life including education and human rights,
and a general support for ensuring all legislation is in
accordance with Shari'a interpretations. Foreign affairs
issues are viewed through an anti-Israeli optic, and
increasingly, an anti-Western and anti-U.S. one, particularly
with respect to Western social and cultural practices.


4. (C) There are several active and influential Islamist
political organizations in Kuwait:

-- The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) "al-haraka
al-dostoriyah al-Islamiya" is the political arm of the Sunni
Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, is represented by 2 MPs and
constitutes part of the Sunni Islamist Bloc.

-- The Traditional Salafis (a.k.a. the Salafi Call) "al-da'wa
al-salafiya" are strict Sunnis influenced by the Saudi
Wahhabi brand of Islam. It is represented by 2 MPs and is
part of the Sunni Islamist Bloc.

-- The Salafi Movement (a.k.a. the Scientific Salafis)
"al-haraka al-salafiya" is a hard-line offshoot of the
Traditional Salafis, is represented by 3 MPs and is part of
the Sunni Islamist Bloc.

-- The National Islamic Alliance (NIA) "al-tahalof al-Islami
al-wantani" is a pro-Iranian Shi'a group that some affiliate
with Kuwaiti Hizballah, however, it has no representation in
Parliament.

-- The Shi'a Clerics Congregation "tajam'u ulama' al-shi'a"
is a Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani-influenced moderate
Islamist group and has no representation in Parliament.

-- Lesser known Shi'a groups with no Parliamentary
representaion are the non-violent Peace and Justice group and
the Consensus group (see reftel for a 2003 description of
the groups.)


5. (U) Although there are officially only 13 Sunni Islamist
MPs in the National Assembly, post places the number of
Islamists in the 50-member elected Parliament at around
18-19, if four of the five Shi,a MPs and a few independent
tribal MPs with heavy Islamist leanings are included. The
Shi'a Islamists rarely work with the Sunni Islamists in
support of public policy. Beyond this, several other MPs
have varying degrees of Islamist political leanings and vote
with known Islamists in support of issues such as educational
segregation, legislating Islamic morality, and opposing
women's suffrage. The reach of the Islamists on these and
other political issues is great and allows them to wield more
influence than their raw numbers would suggest. Even
conservative members of the vocal anti-GOK Popular Action
Bloc support, on some issues, the political agenda of the
Islamists. Islamists hold influential sway in Parliament and
wield a strong social veto against liberal and GOK policies
that run counter to their political goals. Additionally, the
GOK periodically permits Islamists to gain ground on heated
political issues. Islamist influence also extends to the
parliamentary committees as Sunni Bloc MPs chair five out of
ten of the National Assembly standing committees and three
out of nine ad hoc committees. The ad hoc Human Rights
Committee is comprised completely of Islamists.


6. (U) Recent Islamist victories include several religiously
motivated political "grillings" in the National Assembly, the
gender segregation of Kuwait University, official fatwas
placing restrictions on music concerts, legal leniency for
suspected Islamist extremists, and the closing of movie
theaters during the last ten days of Ramadan to "encourage
people to spend more time reflecting on their faith." Other
Islamist political initiatives include efforts, thus far
unsuccessful, to amend Article II of Kuwait's constitution to
make Islamic Shari'a law "the only" source of legislation for
Kuwait and some fringe campaigns to ban all music in Kuwait.


7. (U) Post hears from many of its liberal and conservative
contacts that Islamists succeed politically because they are
better organized and better funded from the grass-roots
level. The opposite appears to be true for the more liberal
secular groups -- they are known to be poorly funded and
organized and some liberal interlocutors have admitted
candidly that liberals are politically lazy, whereas their
Islamist counterparts are very vocal, organized, and active.
(Note: A Kuwaiti "liberal" is a progressive and relatively
secular individual who typically espouses more Western-style
conventions of equality and liberty whereas a Kuwaiti
"conservative" tends to support a strict application of
Islamic law and conservative bedouin traditions. End Note.)

Democracy As Islamists' Best Friend
--------------

8. (U) Many Kuwaiti Islamists see democracy as their sure
path to power. Islamists are leading the calls for further
democratization in Kuwait and are calling for full GOK
transparency and political parties, which are currently
unauthorized. (Note: In January, Salafis held a press
conference to announce the establishment of the Hizb Al-Ummah
political party. Liberals and the GOK criticized the party's
ideology and the GOK was outraged at its call for the legal
establishment of political parties. Both were also critical
of Embassy attendance at this public event. End Note.) For
the more conservative, religious Kuwaiti in the political
minority or outside of the ruling regime, democratic reforms
hold the promise of a fair and internationally accepted means
by which to rise to power. Many liberal commentators
theorize pessimistically that were Kuwait to become a fully
functioning democracy, Islamists would undoubtedly rise to
power with some speculating that women's suffrage would help
the Islamists disproportionately. Some further speculate
that Islamists might use the democratic process only to
subvert it in order to prolong their power.

The Shi'a
--------------


9. (U) Not all of Kuwait's Islamists are Sunni. One third of
Kuwait's citizens are Shi'a and among those are a large
number of religiously conservative Muslims who advocate for
more religion-based policies. Nonetheless, there are only
five Shi'a MPs and no current Shi'a ministers. The Shi'a are
politically fragmented and not nearly as organized as the
Sunni, and because they are the minority, they must
constantly jockey for political rights and mainstream
religious acceptance. Speculation fuels some suspicion that
Kuwaiti Shi'a hold loyalties toward Iran. This appears to be
mostly unfounded as Kuwaiti Shi'a generally consider
themselves Kuwaitis first and Shi'as second and thus enjoy
great economic and social benefits, almost certainly
minimizing any meaningful question of allegiance.


10. (C) The National Islamic Alliance (NIA) is the best-known
Shi'a political grouping and is believed to be affiliated
with pro-Iranian Kuwaiti Hizballah, an organization many
claim doesn't exist. There has been speculation that Iran
intends to finance future NIA and Shi'a parliamentary
candidates -- a claim refuted by current Shi'a MPs. One
liberal columnist claimed that the Kuwaiti Hizballah was very
active and actually uses the NIA as cover. As an example of
this, he pointed to the NIA's spring 2004 meeting at the
Iranian Embassy in Kuwait, a story widely reported in local
dailies. He added that Shi'a from other political factions
ousted all NIA-affiliated MPs in the 2003 National Assembly
elections and remarked that Hassan Jowhar is the only current
MP who is close to the NIA. Although Jowhar's brother has
been linked to Hizballah, MP Jowhar is not "publicly"
affiliated with NIA, and is known as a moderate MP. In
addition to the NIA there is the Shi'a Clerics Congregation,
a Sistani-influenced moderate Islamist group; Sayed Mohammed
Baqr Al-Mohri, a prominent Shi'a political figure, leads the
group. Other lesser known groups are the non-violent Peace
and Justice group, founded in 2003, and the Consensus group,
which formerly had ties to the NIA. None of the Shi'a
members of Parliament are affiliated with these groups.

Islamists in Government
--------------


11. (C) Islamists are prevalent throughout the ministries,
the military, the police, and all other sectors of the
government. They are advancing in prominence throughout the
ranks of mid-level bureaucrats and even to some senior
positions. (Note: There are three Islamist Cabinet members:
Justice Minister Ahmed Baqer, Awqaf Minister Dr. Abdullah
Al-Maatouq, and Health Minister Dr. Mohammed Al-Jarallah. End
Note.) Liberal Kuwaitis claim that to get ahead in the
ministries one must grow a beard and speak the language of
Islamists. Some point out that most of their managers,
whether in a ministry or in the National Assembly, are
Islamists, or at the very least, tend to favor Islamists.
Others claim that junior, less qualified employees often
bypass more seasoned, politically moderate employees because
of their ideology. (Comment: While there are still a great
many politically moderate, non-Islamist Kuwaitis throughout
the GOK bureaucracy, PolOffs have noted that many mid-level
ministry and parliamentary interlocutors are Islamists or
appear to be sympathetic to Islamist politics. End Comment.)


12. (C) Islamists and rural conservative bedouin are also in
the military in significant numbers -- perhaps one quarter or
more are at least culturally Islamist or bedouin. (Note: Not
all bedouin are Islamist, although many are. While bedouin
and Islamists share many of the same cultural beliefs, tribal
ties, and conservative mores, bedouin do not necessarily
always subscribe to a fundamentalist Islamic political
agenda. End Note.) Liberal contacts claim that in some units
there is professional and peer pressure to behave more
piously and adopt conservative attitudes. Some units are
populated more heavily by bedouin than others. Two members
of an artillery unit believed to be predominantly "bedouin"
were arrested in early January 2005 for planning to attack
U.S. military forces during an exercise. It is also
popularly believed that the Islamists "control" the police
and the prisons -- conservative bedouin are known to be
heavily employed in both government sectors.


13. (U) Despite assurances from Salafi Justice Minister Ahmed
Baqer that the judicial process is wedded to the rule of law
and not influenced by political forces, many liberals claim
it is run by Islamists. All judges are subject to GOK
approval and many judges in Kuwait's court system are
non-citizens who serve out 1-3 year renewable contracts,
which almost certainly undermines their independence. Many
non-citizen judges are Egyptians trained in Shari'a law and
not Kuwaiti civil code, thereby increasing the likelihood of
rulings based on religious interpretation. Lenient
sentencing of Kuwaiti extremists has also raised questions
about the objectivity of the judicial system.

It's A Tribal Thing
--------------


14. (C) The tribes in Kuwait make up a sizable and
influential portion of the society. They are not necessarily
Islamist, but because of a combination of their conservative
bedouin mentality and strong emphasis on cultural Islam, the
message of the tribal Islamist parliamentary candidates
resonates more convincingly among this growing segment of
society. The increase of rural Kuwaitis is an important
political demographic development because few urban Kuwaitis
have more than one wife and typically have smaller families,
while many among the rural bedouin are known to have several
wives and numerous children. The growth of conservative
Islamic culture in Kuwait owes much to the influence of the
tribes -- even urban Kuwaitis are still very "tribal" in
their understanding of politics, culture, and society. Among
more than fifty prominant tribes in Kuwait, the Utaibi, Ajmi,
Enezi, Mutairi, Mulaifi, Hajiri, and Kandari are some of the
largest and some extend from Saudi Arabia to Iraq.


15. (U) Islamist parliamentary candidates are elected to
serve their rural constituents, not primarily to debate and
address national policy. They are chosen from within the
tribes and put forward with the near-certain backing of many
families. This is partly attributed to the small electoral
district system. Tribes are influential because they are
chains of families that support and defend the interests of
one another. As a member of a tribe, who your spouse is,
where you work, and what your position in life is are all
matters often arranged or guided by the tribe. Familial
relationships often trump rule of law throughout Kuwaiti
society, but especially among the rural bedouin tribes. The
tribes have a provincial, almost sheltered, quality to them
that also make them a potential breeding ground for the
growth of intolerant ideologies. (Note: Many interlocutors
have raised concerns that the cross-border tribal ties with
Saudi Arabia allow for easy exchange of radical ideology and
indeed even militants. End Note.)


16. (C) Kuwait University Sociology professor Dr. Khaldoun
Al-Naqeeb calls tribalism the "disease of the soul." Because
the average Kuwaiti will put his tribe first before all
outsiders, he ends up treating people differently. This
element adds immeasurably to the filter through which many
Kuwaitis view the world: favoring local identity over
outsiders. Although the culture as a whole remains
conservative, strong blends of liberalism and conservative
thought, which might conventionally be seen as contradictory,
appear to coexist within the mindset of many Kuwaitis. At
base, Dr. Khaldoun explained, there is a fear of the unknown
that pervades the region. This fear leads most people
invariably back to their roots, back to the known, and
therefore back to a conservative Islamic worldview.

Not All Al-Qaeda
--------------


17. (U) The perception that the majority of Muslims support
violent extremism, particularly Arab Muslims who proclaim a
less tolerant version of Islam and who dress the part --
wearing the shorter dishdasha and a longer beard -- is wrong
in most cases. Further, those who align themselves with
conservative religious groups such as the Salafis and the
Muslim Brotherhood should not be assumed to be intolerant to
all things Western. While a clear majority of those in these
ideological camps oppose many elements of U.S. Middle East
policy, especially where support for Israel is concerned,
many in these groups can also be pragmatic on broader issues
such as Iraqi reconstruction and Iranian proclivities in the
region.


18. (U) An example of mainstream Kuwaiti Islamist moderation
is the local political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
ICM. The ICM is not necessarily always in step with the
international Muslim Brotherhood and differs significantly,
for example, on the use of force in Iraq. The ICM, although
upholding the anti-Israeli position of the international
Muslim Brotherhood, strongly supported the U.S.-led
coalition's liberation of Iraq and supports U.S. post-war
Iraqi reconstruction and development efforts. (Note: The
ICM's support for U.S.-led military actions is most likely a
result of their experience under Iraqi occupation. End Note.)
Most Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood members in Kuwait reject
publicly any support for terrorist activities. While there
is apparently a growing number, however small, of those who
are actively supporting terror cells in Kuwait, few, if any,
will publicly announce such support.

Kuwaiti Jihadist Movement Not So Small
--------------


19. (C) In light of the string of shoot-outs and unearthed
terror plots, many are now considering that the growth of an
extreme jihadist ideology in Kuwait is not isolated among a
few dozen "misguided" citizens. While extremists still make
up only a small fraction of Kuwaitis, their numbers are
almost certainly rising. The recent January 2005 shoot-outs
with Kuwait security forces coupled with extensive
investigations and media coverage, beginning last summer, of
known terrorist supporters and Kuwaiti jihadis has revealed a
disturbing trend in Kuwaiti membership in these
organizations. Many Kuwaitis contend that the numbers are
still small, but post suspects that the numbers of
militant-minded Kuwaitis willing to support or conduct terror
operations in Iraq or Kuwait could be above the thousand
person estimate to which only the most liberal in this
society will admit. However our intelligence and insight
into the militant wing of political Islam is limited, so any
estimate should be viewed with skepticism. So far, the
number of Kuwaitis who are ready to die for their Islamist
beliefs appears quite small.


20. (U) After the recent terror events in Kuwait, mainstream
Islamists are scrambling to launch awareness campaigns
against violence and extremism. They are desperate to show
they are not the same as those extremists who not only
advocate violence but carry it out. Islamist groups are
expected to meet to develop a mechanism to fight radicalism.
A campaign is growing containing fatwas from scholars and
verses from the Qur'an, which call for tolerance and reject
terror and violence. The new attitude might prevent such
episodes as that in late 2004, when Saudi preacher and known
jihad advocate Nasser Al-Omar was permitted to enter Kuwait
-- despite a GOK decision to prevent him from lecturing or
participating in seminars or political activity in Kuwait --
and to speak at the diwaniyas of Islamist MPs. All
mainstream Islamists officially deny that they support or
sympathize with violent extremism. While most are probably
honest in characterizing their ideology, some clearly limit
their comments, or actually lie, to hide their true beliefs.
Amer Khlaif Al-Enezi -- the captured militant imam involved
in the January shoot-outs with security forces who recently
died of "heart failure" while in custody -- when questioned
last year, maintained that he was against terrorism and
extremist ideologies. An Awqaf Ministry official said, "It
is surprising Amer always spoke ill of terrorists and
terrorism, but surprisingly he himself indulged in these
activities."


21. (U) Most of the Kuwaiti jihadists come from rural tribes
in western and southeastern Kuwait. Islamist spring youth
camps and summer clubs, most affiliated with either the
Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafis, are known to inculcate
young Kuwaitis in religious ideology -- viewed by many
non-Islamists to be an intolerant ideology. These camps have
no GOK oversight or regulation. Further, there are fringe
Kuwaiti Islamists who run secret camps known to teach violent
jihad. Kuwaitis who have attended both mainstream and jihadi
camps are known to have supported, recruited, and facilitated
jihadis inside Kuwait -- and some have even taken part in
militant jihad in Iraq. (Note: A September 11, 2004
Washington Post article noted that Khalid Sheik Mohammed
confessed that "he was drawn to violent jihad after joining
the Brotherhood in Kuwait at age 16 and attending its desert
youth camps." End Note.)


22. (U) Some liberals and moderates blame mainstream
Islamists for the growth of jihadism in Kuwait. Until
recently, all considered this mentality to be a foreign one;
however, that assessment is changing. The intolerant
political message of the mainstream Islamists has been
allowed to spread without restraint, and some would argue
with GOK acquiescence. Many believe that these "mainstream"
messages have fueled the hatred and intolerance now driving
the extremists. After the mid-January shoot-outs, MP Walid
Al-Tabtabaei was criticized by moderates for his
too-little-too-late criticism of the spreading violence after
he was a chief purveyor of anti-Western rumor-mongering and
intolerant rhetoric.

Liberals Critical of Growing Islamism
--------------


23. (C) Some liberals claim that the Islamist movement has
been permitted by the GOK to grow unchecked for several
decades. One liberal columnist remarked that since Shaykh
Jabir became Amir in the late 1970s, the GOK has played a key
role in pursuing "backward" policies. He pointed out the
growth of the Kuwait Finance House, an "Islamic bank" which
is financially supported by the GOK, the rising influence of
the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, and the
segregation of the sexes at Kuwait University. He said that
the problem is that people are in a state of confusion. If
PM Shaykh Sabah had his way, he explained, there would be a
noticeable move to more liberal policies, but, he explained,
Shaykh Sabah must still work within the conservative system
established by his brother the Amir. In contrast, many
contacts claim that Islamism grew tremendously in Kuwait
after large numbers of Kuwaitis returned in 1991 from exile
in Saudi Arabia while waiting out the Iraqi occupation. Many
of the returnees brought with them elements of the Saudi
Wahhabi ideology. Some Kuwaiti Islamists own date farms in
Saudi Arabia -- some in the Qaseem area where Saudi
extremists are prevalent -- and travel there regularly.


24. (C) Another liberal columnist said he is concerned that
democratic freedoms in the Middle East will bring Islamists
to power. While he supports democratic freedoms,
"Islamists," he remarked, "choke society's political and
social life." He alluded to the Taliban as the ultimate
example of a dysfunctional Islamic society. He also claimed
that there is a dearth of intelligentsia in the Arab world
and this is hurting the region. No one, because of his
affiliation with one group or another, he explained, is free
to speak his mind about real reform. They all carry heavy
biases, he stated, and will not oppose the ideas of their own
group even if such opposition would benefit their country.


25. (C) A liberal professor and former cabinet minister
offered to PolOff some examples of how Islamists take
ownership of religion to suit their actions and causes. He
explained that during the 2003 general elections Islamist
campaign banners were posted in unauthorized locations, but
authorities were hesitant to take them down because the name
of God was printed on the banner -- removing the name of God
from a public venue could be seen as anti-Islamic. He also
recalled when an Islamist student walked in late to a class
he was teaching at Kuwait University. He scolded the student
for arriving late and interrupting the class. The student
justified his tardiness by claiming that he was coming from
afternoon prayers. The professor responded that study was
valued more than prayer in the Qur'an. He explained to the
student that the very first word in the Qur'an is the command
to read. The student, he recounted, was indignant that a
liberal professor would instruct him about Islam.

Kuwait Historically Conservative
--------------


26. (U) Kuwaiti society has always been conservative relative
to much of the Middle East -- although it is seen as somewhat
moderate in the Gulf -- and while some argue convincingly
that conservatism has gained momentum over the last three
decades, it should surprise no one that many Kuwaitis, at the
very least, want to portray themselves as pious Muslims.
Kuwait's constitution, adopted in 1962, identifies Islam as
the state religion and Islamic Shari'a law as "a main source
of legislation." Some Sunni Islamists argue that Kuwait
moved away from its natural conservatism during the
nationalist movement in the 1950s and 1960s and is only now
moving back to its "cultural norms." While most Islamists
are accurately characterized as supporting more conservative
social policies and are often outspoken about any issue
regarding Israel and increasingly the U.S., the overwhelming
majority publicly reject the politics and violence of Islamic
extremism.


27. (U) Islamists see themselves not as intolerant or
narrow-minded, but as champions of a noble and moral cause.
By definition, they claim a religious and moral high ground
that infuses them with a great sense of confidence in their
mission. They, in turn, often see liberals as agents of the
West and licentious purveyors of immorality and ideas that
are not in-line with the tenets of Islam. They argue that
many liberal goals undermine society and that they must fight
to defend their faith and culture, albeit in non-violent
ways, against immoral or alien influences.

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