FM AND SENIOR MP TELL U/S BOLTON IRANIAN NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000481

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV PTER KU
SUBJECT: FM AND SENIOR MP TELL U/S BOLTON IRANIAN NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION A CONCERN; SAY ARTICLE 98 WILL PASS

REF: 04 USUN 2176

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During a January 29 visit to Kuwait, Under
Secretary Bolton shared with FM Shaykh Dr. Mohammed and MP

SIPDIS
Mohammed Al-Sager U.S. concerns about Iran's nuclear
activities and the firm belief that UNSC involvement is
necessary. Bolton said the U.S. was following the European
negotiations with Iran, but was skeptical that any agreement
could be reached when the two sides have opposing goals. The
U.S. continues to believe that the IAEA Board, when in meets
in June, should recommend the matter to the UNSC, and
welcomed assistance from the GOK with the board member
countries that also belong to the OIC. Dr. Mohammed and
Al-Sager agreed that Iran poses a threat to the Gulf and said
GCC members have been very blunt with the GOI about its
nuclear aspirations. Dr. Mohammed recommended exhausting all
diplomatic channels, while Al-Sager favored "power and
force." Both, however, believed it was useful to continue
U.S.-GOK consultations on Iran. On other issues, Dr.
Mohammed and Al-Sager promised passage of the Article 98
Agreement, although Al-Sager called for a more active GOK
role in advocating the agreement in Parliament. They also
expressed concern about recent security incidents in Kuwait
and hoped for a peaceful election in Iraq. End Summary.

There's Nothing Civil About Iran's Nuclear Program
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Referring to their September meeting on the margins
of the UNGA, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security John R. Bolton told Kuwaiti Foreign
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah on
January 29 that he was in Kuwait to follow up Dr. Mohammed's
suggestion to talk about the threats posed by Iran's nuclear
weapon and ballistic missile programs (reftel). Bolton
explained that Iran's nuclear aspirations are cause for
concern, and equally troubling are measures to develop the
capacity to deliver such weapons. There is no need for such
a high level of activity for purely civilian uses. Moreover,
reports that Iran is trying to fit a warhead into the nose of
a Shahad III suggests a sophisticated interest in
weaponization. It is important that the international
community address this threat and Iran's violation of
obligations under the NPT. Bolton added that the U.S.
believes the time is right for UNSC involvement and left with
Dr. Mohammed a non-paper on options for dealing with Iran's
nuclear program in the UNSC. He further stated there are
no/no plans for military action against Iran and that the
U.S. does not support an attack by Israel.


UNSC Involvement Will Put Security Ahead of Commerce
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Bolton told Dr. Mohammed that although the U.S. and
its European partners had the same goals regarding Iran's
nuclear program -- that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons --,
we differed on approach. Europe believes continued
negotiation with the GOI will succeed. The U.S. sees no
reconciliation between Europe's insistence that Iran abandon
its uranium enrichment program and Iran's clear refusal to do
so. As long as negotiations continue between the EU-3 and
Iran, the IAEA will not refer the matter to the UNSC. The
June meeting of the IAEA Board may be crucial. He welcomed
the GOK's recommendations on how to approach the June meeting
and how best to interact with the four OIC members on the
board -- Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, and Pakistan. In the
interim, the U.S. would continue to encourage Russia not to
ship fuel to the Bushehr reactor and China not to provide
technical assistance. Bolton reported that Russia is aware
of Iran's activities, but is reluctant to cease all nuclear
cooperation absent additional proof. There has been some
success with China through the enforcement of unilateral
sanctions. Nevertheless, UNSC involvement would be more
effective given the authority vested in the body and the need
for Council members to make decisions based on security and
not their commercial interests. Bolton also noted concerns
about DRPK cooperation with Iran on missile development.

Libya Can Be a Model for Iran
--------------


4. (C) Responding to Dr. Mohammed's questions about Libya's
former capabilities, Bolton reported Libya had asked
Pakistani national A. Q. Khan to provide all the technology
and equipment to construct a weapon. Nevertheless, since
Qadhafi's December 2003 decision, the Libyan program was
stopped at an early stage. Libya's nuclear program now rests
in the U.S. and the GOL has agreed not to purchase missiles
outside of the MCTR constraints. As a result, there has been
increasing bilateral coordination. Bolton noted that Iran
could learn from the Libyan example.

GOK and GCC Do Not Support Iran's Nuclear Goals
-------------- --


5. (C) Dr. Mohammed welcomed the Under Secretary's comments
and said the Gulf countries are extremely concerned about
Iran's nuclear technology program and ambitions. Iran's
activities, according to the Foreign Minister, "present an
uncertainty that we cannot live with." This concern was
expressed at the last GCC meeting. He added that Kuwait's
National Assembly recently questioned the GOK about the
Bushehr plant and plans to protect Kuwait from a
Chernobyl-like event. Kuwait also fears Iranian development
of chemical and biological weapons. Additionally, Kuwait is
deeply worried that Israel might launch a preemptive strike
against Iran's nuclear facilities. Despite these concerns,
Dr. Mohammed reported that Gulf states want to give the
Europeans time to reach a deal with Iran before resorting to
the UNSC. They believe diplomacy can succeed and have
encouraged Iran to act responsibly. Dr. Mohammed added that
during FM Kharazzai's October 2004 visit to Kuwait, he
cautioned Kharazzai that Iran is alone with regard to nuclear
issues and there would be no support from the GOK or GCC.
Dr. Mohammed opined that a large part of the problem is the
Iranian psyche: Iran is surrounded by neighbors that possess
nuclear technology and developing such technology is a matter
of national pride that transcends political, economic, or
social schisms. He added that press reports on possible
military action against Iran muddied the issue and caused the
GOI to dig in its heels. Dr. Mohammed hoped a successful
election in Iraq would exert pressure on Iran -- and others
in the region -- on the need for reform, and may afford
opportunities for "creative diplomacy".


Kuwait to Focus on Home-Grown Terror
--------------


6. (C) Turning to other security issues, Dr. Mohammed
asserted Kuwait's determination to confront terrorists and
prevent militants from crossing the borders. He said Kuwait
is focusing more attention on domestic threats, including
financiers of terror activities, and working closely with its
neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia. He added the GOK
followed with great interest news reports of a possible dirty
bomb in Boston and was concerned about domestic use of a
similar tactic.

Skip Diplomacy; Iran Only Understands "Force and Power"
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The Under Secretary relayed the same concerns on
Iran to Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee Mohammed Al-Sager. Al-Sager shared Dr.
Mohammed's views about Iran's nuclear program, but said the
GOI only understands "force and power." He too was critical
of articles in the U.S. press about military action against
Iran and explained that the Arab world interprets these
articles as U.S. support for Israeli interests.

Article 98 Will Pass....Eventually
--------------


8. (C) Commenting on the status of the Article 98
Agreement, Al-Sager said the agreement was still with his
committee and he anticipated members would approve it and
send it to the full Parliament within the month.
Nonetheless, he criticized the GOK, saying it did not push
hard enough for speedy ratification. He predicted that
fundamentalists and Islamists would have a "field day"
attacking the U.S. when the agreement goes to the floor, but
that with pressure from the GOK, it would easily pass. He
encouraged Ambassador LeBaron to press Dr. Mohammed, who
earlier told Bolton the Agreement was on the fast-track, on
the need for the prompt and decisive action.

U.S. Too Soft on Fundamentalists
--------------


9. (C) Turning to security developments, he said post-9/11,
the U.S. did not place ample pressure on Islamist and
fundamentalist groups. He said there was too much pressure
in other sectors, but recommend the U.S. press the GOK and
other governments to respond more swiftly and firmly against
political Islam. He was particularly critical of Islamist
universities, arguing that the Arab world needed doctors,
lawyers, engineers, and computer programmers, not PhDs in
Shari'a.

Iraqi Elections: A Learning Experience
--------------

10. (C) Responding to Bolton's question about Iraqi
elections, Al-Sager said he was opposed to the timing of the
elections and did not believe the Iraqi people were ready.
He, however, agreed with the Under Secretary that elections
were a learning opportunity for the Iraqi people and would
give them a greater stake in the future of the country. He
supported a significant Sunni presence in the elected
government, hoped PM Allawi would be the one to form the new
government, and recommended an increased focus on rebuilding
the oil and gas sectors.


11. (U) Under Secretary Bolton has cleared this message.


12. (U) Baghdad: Minimize considered.

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