COMBATING EXTREMISM IN KUWAIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 004209

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR R, P, NEA/ARPI, NEA/PPD, ECA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO EAID PHUM KMPI KISL ASEC KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: COMBATING EXTREMISM IN KUWAIT

REF: A. STATE 159129 - COMBATING EXTREMISM

B. KUWAIT 4056 - KUWAIT SEEKING INDEPENDENT AUDITOR
FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

C. KUWAIT 3583 - ANTI-WEST ANTI-ISRAEL AD MAKES
ROUND OF LOCAL PAPERS

D. KUWAIT 3266 - READING WRITING AND QUR'ANIC
RECITATION

E. KUWAIT 3552 - ISLAMISTS OFFER CRITIQUE OF U.S.
POLICY ADVICE ON PROMOTING MODERATION

F. KUWAIT 2694 - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN KUWAIT - WHAT
"MOVES THE NEEDLE"?

G. KUWAIT 1201 - GETTING FOREIGN STUDENTS BACK TO
U.S. UNIVERSITIES

H. KUWAIT 1071 - SECURITY BUREAU REPORTS
COUNTERTERRORISM SUCCESSES

I. 2004 KUWAIT 2828 - KUWAIT YOUTH TARGETED BY
EXTREMISTS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary and Introduction: This report responds to the
request (ref A) for information on programs for combating
extremism. Embassy Kuwait actively engages the Government of
Kuwait at every opportunity on every level on ways to combat
extremism. Although the GOK has previously discounted the
domestic influence of extremist groups, January terrorist
shoot-outs have heightened the GOK's focus on home-grown
extremism and the GOK's willingness to combat it. All
agencies and all mission elements are engaged in tracking and
assisting, where possible, the GOK in its fight against
extremist ideology. Post activities include: education and
international visitors programs; regular engagement with the
media; targeted use of representational activities; economic
reform; increased outreach to vulnerable groups, and
judicious use of intelligence, security, and military
channels. As we have reported in the past, we find that the
most effective instrument to counter extremism over the long
term is exposure to life in the United States through study
or exchange visits. We need to match the build up of
resources of intelligence and military assets combating
terrorism with a comparable increase in our exchanges,
scholarships, and speaker programs to combat extremism.
(End Summary/Introduction)

Education Programs
--------------


2. (SBU) Post's Public Affairs (PA) office has implemented
the ACCESS microscholarship program for male and female
non-elite ninth- and tenth-graders from conservative areas
such as Jahra, Farwaniya, and Ahmadi which are targeted by
Islamist extremists. One hundred and five children were
enrolled in 2004-2005 and 180 students are scheduled to be
enrolled in 2005-2006. The students represent all walks of
life and include those who favor traditional dress (the
dishdasha for boys and the hijabs and abayas for girls) as
well as western styles and jeans. (ACCESS is a Bureau of
Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) program which will be
funded by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) for
the 2005-2006 year.)


3. (SBU) The PA office also implemented the Partnerships for
Learning YES program, which sent 16 male and female Kuwaiti
students to the U.S. for their third year of high school.
These students were from diverse socio-economic backgrounds.
The purpose of the program is to give them a wide and diverse
view of American society. Several students met with NEA PDAS
Cheney during her June visit to Kuwait, and in August the
Ambassador hosted a reception for program alumni, departing
students, and their parents. The event reinforced the U.S.
goal of building bridges between our societies, and program
graduates were able to address the concerns of departing
students and their parents. Both the Cheney visit and the
reception received ample press coverage in the Arabic and
English dailies.


4. (C) The PA office arranged in September 2005, for a
senior English Language Fellow to work with the Ministry of
Education to assist it in revising its English language
curriculum and textbooks. The Fellow's work will ultimately
reach all Kuwaiti students through Kuwait's English teaching
curriculum, with the aim of stemming inaccurate pictures of
American society and values through English-language
teaching. PA also sent the Chair of the English teaching
department of the Public Authority for Applied Education and
Training (PAAET) on an International Visitors Leadership
Program (IVLP) on "Teaching English as a Second Language."
PAAET trains Kuwait's teachers and PAAET has a very
conservative student population.

International Visitors Programs
--------------


5. (SBU) The PA office arranged for a special,
first-of-its-kind in Kuwait, International Visitors
Leadership Program (IVLP) with the Bureau of Education and
Cultural Affairs (ECA) for Kuwaiti imams to visit the United
States on a "Religion in the U.S." program. Two Imams
traveled to the U.S. September 7-24 to launch a dialog with
U.S. religious leaders. Intolerance and religious diversity
were the topics as they visited diverse regions of the U.S.
and met with various American religious communities. Post
intends to continue and expand this program during FY-06.


6. (SBU) The PA office also sent two student leaders, a
conservative Islamist and a moderate Muslim, on a highly
effective IVLP "Young Leaders: Effecting Social, Political
and Economic Change." Feedback from both suggested the
program was eye-opening, particularly in regard to the
standing and vitality of the Muslim communities in the U.S.


7. (SBU) The PA office is in the early planning stages of
organizing a dialogue series to be held between Kuwaiti imams
and officials from the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs
and U.S. Military chaplains at Camp Arifjan with the
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) with the goal
of both sides broadening their knowledge and overcoming
preconceived ideas about one another. One of the chaplains
spoke at Post's 9/11 memorial and his comments were well
received by the invited Muslim audience.

American Corners
--------------


8. (SBU) The PA office established two American Corners in
Kuwait, at Kuwait University and at the American University
of Kuwait. One goal of installing American corners at local
universities is to create the foundation for and promote
interest in the establishment of an American Studies major at
the universities. In addition to serving as a resource
center for information on the U.S., the corners offer Embassy
officers and other visiting Americans venues through which
they can directly engage Kuwaiti students, conservative and
liberal. The programming at the American Corners has been
successful in presenting unique aspects of American culture
to Kuwaiti students in an open forum while offering Embassy
staff the opportunity to speak directly with non-elite
Kuwaitis.

MEPI
--------------


9. (SBU) Post's MEPI committee encouraged a local
organization, Cinemagic, to apply for a MEPI Small Grant to
allow non-elite Kuwaiti boys and girls to participate in the
film school. Film-making gives the youth a means to express
themselves by promoting freedom of expression as a democratic
ideal. Learning entrepreneurial skills allows the youth
access to a vocation not normally available to them.
Moreover, throughout the process, they are introduced to new
ideas and Cinemagic's multicultural and multinational staff.


10. (SBU) Post secured a small MEPI grant for Lothan Youth
Achievement Center's (LoYAC's) in-country entrepreneurial
training summer programs. The PA office also provided a
grant for a summer internship program to the LoYAC to support
its plans to send several Kuwaiti students to the U.S. over
the summer of 2006 to intern at various governments and
business offices in the U.S. LoYAC's mission is to instill
in Kuwaiti youth, including conservative Islamic Kuwaitis, an
understanding of tolerance and civic participation.


11. (C) Youth programs (such as LoYAC's and ACCESS) are
extremely important and relevant because these programs share
the same target audience as extremist Islamists (ref I).
Post considers it essential that we compete for the "hearts
and minds" of this non-elite youth audience and engage them
before they are co-opted by extremists.

The Press
--------------


12. (C) The PA office actively monitors the Arabic media and
acts quickly to counter columns, articles, and other
statements which are inciteful and/or dangerously inaccurate.
In June, a noted Kuwaiti cleric, Shaykh Dr. Jassem bin
Muhalhal Al-Yassin, wrote a full-page article in the Arabic
daily Al Watan, entitled, "The History of Aggression Against
the Koran," in which he falsely criticized U.S. attitudes
towards the Koran and Islam as being antagonistic. The PA
office immediately responded with a letter, signed by the
press officer, denying the Shaykh's assertions and
reiterating the values Americans and the U.S. government
place on religious plurality and the respect we have for
Islam and all religions. The letter was printed in full the
next day by the daily.


13. (SBU) The Minister of Information opened a case in
August against two Arabic dailies which printed a full back
page ad depicting an Islamic warrior holding the Koran in one
hand and a banner in the other with anti-American statements
printed on it (ref C). The warrior is also stepping on the
U.S. and Israeli flags while an inset box in the lower corner
of the ad depicts both flags and flagpoles shoved into a
toilet. The case was based on Kuwait's press law which
states that the press cannot harm relations with friendly
nations. One liberal columnist in Al-Watan absolved the
newspapers for blame but excoriated the Kuwaiti who paid for
the ads.


14. (SBU) In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, a few extreme
Islamist columnists opined that the storm was divine
punishment for American transgressions against Islam. The
Ambassador responded with a strongly worded letter addressed
to one of the more vociferous advocates of the idea, Mohammed
Al-Mulaifi, a columnist with Al-Seyassah newspaper and a
Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs employee. Al-Sayassah
prominently printed the Ambassador's letter in full the next
day. PA office contacts widely praised the strong response,
which provoked a host of columnists to criticize Al-Mulaifi's
remarks in their own columns and stirred the Ministry of
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs to make a public statement
condemning the article and disassociating the Ministry from
the writer.


15. (SBU) Finally, all PA officers conduct frequent informal
meetings with Islamist interlocutors in the media to promote
U.S. policy perspectives while exchanging views and sharing
perceptions. Interlocutors include Islamist columnists,
publishers and officials in the major Islamic streams.

Political Engagement
--------------


16. (C) The Political Section continually engages all
sectors of Kuwaiti society, including the more conservative
element, in order to ensure an open and full dialogue. The
PA office, in cooperation with Political, organized Post's
inaugural "Islamists' Tea" on July 26 hosted by the Charge
(ref E),with a guest list including conservative and
moderate Islamists. Post plans on continual engagement of
Islamists in this setting, with the hope of creating an
informal outreach program with this group. Traditional as
well as Scientific Salafis attended, both conservative
Islamist groups known to be often highly critical of U.S.
policies in the region. In holding this type of event, Post
is working to engage the more conservative elements in
dialogue and discussion with the aim of broadening their
understanding of the U.S. and its policies. Several invitees
later thanked Post for the event and we gained new
interlocutors on the issues of women's political rights,
environmental protection, and studying in the U.S.


17. (C) The Political Section has hosted a series of
receptions on democracy and human rights, in order to develop
new contacts and introduce contacts to each other. The events
serve as a forum to assess common problems in Kuwait society
and evaluate public reaction to the GOK's response. In
addition, Political Section officers regularly meet with
religious figures (Sunni, Shi'a, and various Christian) and
NGOs to identify problems they face in dealing with extremism
within a society which treats many of them as foreigners and
outsiders.

Economic Engagement
--------------


18. (C) Strengthening charity oversight remains an integral
part of Post,s broader efforts to combat extremism in
Kuwait. Working with key GOK ministries, the Economic and
Executive sections remain fully engaged, with all levels of
the GOK, to ensure that the positive contributions of
legitimate Kuwaiti charities are monitored closely to prevent
exploitation by extremist elements and that illegal
operations are closed.


19. (S) The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, serving as
the Government's main charity oversight body, continues to
implement new measures to further strengthen its oversight
and control of Kuwaiti charities (ref B). The Ministry has
successfully removed unregulated kiosks and donation boxes
from mosques and other public spaces and is in the process of
implementing an accountability program for Ramadan donations.
In addition, charities are required to report all financial
transactions on a monthly basis to the Government for
reconciliation. Additional new measures will include the
appointment by the Government of an independent external
auditing firm to review charity activities.

Countering Extremism in the Military
--------------


20. (C) In April 2005, the Office of Military Cooperation
Kuwait (OMC-K) reported that the Kuwait Ministry of Defense
(KMOD),was planning to identify and weed out extremists
within its ranks based on their dress and length of facial
hair. Kuwaiti military regulations stipulate that beards had
to be clipped so that they did not exceed three inches in
length. Customarily, dishdashas (male robes) are worn at
ankle length. More conservative individuals and
fundamentalists keep their dishdashas short, up to mid-calf,
while their beards may grow to six-to-eight inches in length.
KMOD identified those individuals whose dress was not in
keeping with regulations and separated them into groups for
"re-education." Exact figures on how many military were so
identified are not available and the plan itself was not
publicized in the press until months after it began. KMOD
reportedly sent the identified individuals to classes on
"moderate Islam" and they were lectured on the errors of
following those who would conduct violent operations in Iraq
and elsewhere. (Note: KMOD's focus and concern were
individuals who might use their military training to
participate in jihad in Iraq against Coalition Forces.
Although there have been only two instances that we know of
where KMOD Forces have been found either in Iraq or on their
way there, concern remains that some might empathize with
foreign fighters. End Note.)


21. (C) In November 2004, Chief of Staff of the Kuwait Armed
Forces (KAF),LTG Fahed Al-Amir, requested assistance from
OMC-K in obtaining media and materials for use in the support
of internal counter-extremism education programs. OMC-K
requested assistance from CENTCOM in establishing means for
such support. Subsequently, the KAF became aware of a number
of military members allegedly plotting attacks on U.S.
targets. Additionally, a number of military members were
reportedly caught in the Ministry of Interior (MOI)
anti-terrorist operations conducted in early-2005. As a
result, the KAF began to develop and implement several
programs under the J2, designed to reduce the threat of
extremism in their ranks. These programs included efforts to
eliminate non-Kuwaiti or stateless Arabs (bidoons) from
military service, to develop clandestine programs to identify
potential extremists within KMOD, and to develop
counter-extremism information/education programs. The intent
of the information programs would be to demonstrate the
proper role of moderate Islam vis-a-vis military service, as
well as highlight the criminal/terrorist nature of extremist
groups operating in the region, including Iraq. The aim was
to establish informational programs designed to reduce
extremist sympathies and activities among military members.


22. (S) A May 28-30 assessment by CENTCOM in Kuwait proposed
that KMOD send staffers to the U.S Army psychological
operations (PSYOPS) course. Following that training, KMOD
would establish its own capability to eliminate extremist
elements in the Kuwait military; identify radical and
extremist Islamic ideologies and teachings; and decrease
support to extremist organizations and causes in order to
convince others not to join extremist organizations and
causes and to convince others to report extremist activity to
proper authorities. This program would be developed and
implemented internally by the Kuwait Armed Forces.
Mitigating and countering extremist tendencies in the KAF
will help ensure U.S. freedom of action and reduce the threat
of hostile action by Kuwaiti military members. CENTCOM has
approved the training but is currently waiting for funding in
order to enroll the first KMOD staffers into the course.
Participation is expected to last one year with indefinite
follow-on self-sustaining programs in Kuwait.


23. (S/NF) According to SIMO, the GOK has adopted an
approach of co-optation and reeducation as a means to combat
radical extremism and promote tolerance. SIMO assesses that
this approach has only been partially effective. Kuwait
State Security (KSS) argues that some former extremist
figures have changed their tone in recent years and months,
and no longer engage in extremist activity. Other
individuals, however, including Mohsen Al-Fadhli and Khalid
Al-Dosari, despite several dealings with Kuwait's legal
system, continue to plan and facilitate terrorist activities
with little evidence of active pursuit by Kuwaiti law
enforcement. The GOK policy may indeed have some merit for
this small society, but it is clearly not a cure-all. In
some instances, including the cases of Al-Fadhli and
Al-Dosari, it appears that the KSS is lacking in drive and
ability to seriously pursue violent extremists, and that the
Kuwait legal system is ill-equipped to deal more harshly with
those who cannot be co-opted or reeducated. SIMO assesses
that the GOK is working to achieve an appearance of calm and
stability, however this has not translated into an effective,
sustained campaign to root out extremist elements working
inside Kuwait, nor has it halted the involvement of Kuwaiti
citizens in jihadist activities outside Kuwait.

The GOK's Plan
--------------


24. (C) Since the January 2005 police shoot-outs, the GOK
has made the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs the lead
ministry to combat extremism, specifically among Kuwaiti
youth. The National Security Bureau which oversees the GOK's
counterterrorism plan, has developed a 3-year plan against
terrorism, of which elements address extremism (ref H). The
Ministry began by opening an information center in February
to monitor and investigate extremist books, articles, groups,
and internet sites. The Ministry also recently released its
strategy to "reinforce moderation" and combat extremist
thought and action through emphasizing public discussion of
Islamic thought in order to "achieve moderation." Using
imams and religious figures, the Ministry says that it would
engage youth in discussions that would spread moderation and
focus on the dangers of misunderstanding religion. Working
with the Ministries of Education, Information, and Social
Affairs and Labor, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs
plans on launching a number of social activities with the
goal of redirecting and protecting Kuwaiti youth from
extremist thought. Included in the activities will be
teaching Arabic, holding Islamic lectures and seminars,
promoting national unity, and preserving Kuwaiti culture and
history in order to "correct" misunderstandings about the
role of Islam in Kuwait and the region.

The Family Factor
--------------


25. (C) Kuwait has a vigorous and vibrant media, especially
print media. The January shoot-outs spurred a vigorous debate
in these papers' editorial pages on the roots of extremism in
Kuwait. While liberals blamed Islamist influence on the
curriculum and in mosques, and Islamists argued that the
violence was a deviant aberration, most editorials and
articles went beyond fingerpointing to arrive at the same
conclusion: extremist thought had to be countered within the
home, by the family. Even in the conservative dailies, the
role of family was continually raised as the most important
link for those who chose extremism. Family members of the
leaders of January's shoot-outs were interviewed and most
denounced the actions of their sons and brothers while some
remained silent. All press gave front-page coverage to a
statement by the cell leaders' father condemning acts of
terror and extremism, even after both his sons died as a
result of the shoot-outs and a third was held for twelve days
in detention.


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