KUWAIT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP: GOK TAKING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003835

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR NEA/ARPI AND S/CT; NSC FOR TOWNSEND; LONDON FOR TSOU;
PARIS FOR ZEYA;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MARR PBTS EFIN ASEC CVIS KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: KUWAIT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP: GOK TAKING
STEPS TO IMPLEMENT CT STRATEGY TRAINING COMPONENT

REF: A. KUWAIT -- 3755 GOK OFFICIALS SAY IRAQ BORDER
DISPUTE RESOLVED

B. KUWAIT 3407 -- POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY RE
EMBASSY KUWAIT REFUSAL OF NIV
APPLICATION OF NUBA M. R. A. B. ALENEZI

C. KUWAIT 3403 -- SENIOR KUWAITI MFA OFFICIAL'S
VIEWS ON GITMO

D. KUWAIT 3059 -- CWG: SLOW BUT RELATIVELY STEADY
PROGRESS ON CT

E. KUWAIT 2928 -- GITMO DETAINEE NASSER AL-MUTAIRI
ACQUITTED

F. KUWAIT 2438 -- REQUEST FOR EVALUATION OF
SECURITY INFORMATION: JIHADIST
PERPETRATORS TRIAL

G. KUWAIT 2265 -- CWG: SOME PROGRESS ON TERROR
FINANCE

H. KUWAIT 2118 -- (S/NF) REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE
REVIEW OF VISA HITS: MP HASSAN JOWHAR

I. KUWAIT 1159 -- CWG: GOK TO USE TRAINING AS PART
OF ITS CT STRATEGY

J. KUWAIT 730 -- CWG MEETING

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron


1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador chaired on August 22 the
monthly meeting of post's Counterterrorism Working Group
(CWG). He reviewed his August 20 discussions with senior
representatives of the GOK on the need to maintain a sharp
focus on CT and recommendations that the arrests of wanted
individuals would signal to the international community that
Kuwait remained vigilant in the Global War on Terror. The
officials stressed that CT was a government-wide priority and
that Kuwait was looking at the big picture and not just
individuals. Other sections reported that the GOK has not
relaxed its focus on the need for more training and has
turned to private companies and local experts for assistance.
While post seeks to assist the GOK through FMS, ATA, and
in-house training, we are encouraged that the GOK has
identified and pursued other training opportunities. (Post's
CWG is composed of the Ambassador, DCM, and section heads
from CONS, ECON, DATT, RSO, OMC-K, POL, and SIMO.) End
Summary.

Ambassador Stresses Need for Sustained Focus on CT
-------------- --------------


2. (C) During separate meetings on August 20 with First
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Shaykh Nawaf
Al-Sabah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Acting Under Secretary
and International Organizations Department Director
Ambassador Abdullah Al-Murad, and Council of Ministers
Secretary General Abdullatif Al-Rodan, the Ambassador

SIPDIS
acknowledged Kuwait's continuing cooperation with the U.S. on
counterterrorism efforts and stressed the importance of a
government-wide, sustained focus on CT. Noting that terror
financier Mohsen Al-Fadhli remained at large, the Ambassador
told Shaykh Nawaf that his capture would send a strong
message about Kuwait's commitment to the Global War on
Terror. The Minister responded that the GOK was working hard
to bring to justice both Al-Fadhli and Khaled Al-Dosari, and
was optimistic that coordination within the GOK and with the
U.S. would yield positive results. He cautioned, however,
that the terror problem was greater than these two
individuals and it was important to attack all fronts.


3. (C) Al-Murad informed the Ambassador that the steel
pipeline barrier being installed along the border with Iraq
(ref A) was one of the GOK's CT tools. There was serious
concern about the possibility of insurgents crossing into
Kuwait from Iraq and the GOK hoped a more secure border would
help to stem their flow. He added that reforming the
educational system to promote tolerance was a priority.
(Note: The pipe barrier stands about three feet off the
ground and will prevent vehicles from crossing. It is
complemented by technical and physical surveillance of the
border. End note.)


4. (C) Al-Rodan advised the Ambassador that the Council of
Ministers (COM) was considering approval of three treaties on
terror: an Arab League agreement, a GCC pact, and the UN
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
Additionally, the COM was reviewing as a model the terror
legislation adopted 28 July 2004 in the UAE. Al-Rodan said
it was a "very good law" and could help the GOK to address
terror finance and other types of support. He said the GOK
also wanted to strengthen existing legislation to address
conspiracy and intent. (Note: The UAE law defines terror
and clearly outlines the penalties for terror finance, arms
trafficking and training, and fomenting violence, issues not
sufficiently addressed by Kuwaiti laws. Post would
appreciate an assessment of the UAE laws and their
enforcement in order to better engage the GOK on improvements
to existing laws. End Note.)

Weak Laws Undermine State Security Efforts
--------------


5. (S/NF) Recently arrived SIMO Chief briefed the CWG on
his initial calls on Kuwait State Security (KSS) officials.
He reported that KSS indicated it would take a more
aggressive approach to finding Al-Fadhli and Al-Dosari, but
that its efforts were hampered by inadequate legislation.
SIMO recently discussed current legal improvements with
National Security Bureau President Shaykh Sabah Al-Khaled
Al-Sabah, who critiqued existing laws as insufficient, but
did not respond to an offer of assistance from SIMO. Despite
the legal limitations, KSS was working hard to identify
extremists in Kuwait and was conducting name checks for the
Ministry of Defense in an attempt to root out hardliners from
the military. SIMO Chief further noted that expanded
cooperation with Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
elements in Iraq had revealed the possible presence of
additional undesirable CT-related targets in Kuwait.
Coordination between SIMO and JSOC in the region is
excellent, and further targeting efforts will be pursued in
this regard.

Promises of Detention and Prosecution of GITMO Detainees
-------------- --------------


6. (S/NF) PolChief briefed the CWG on the approved transfer
of one Kuwaiti detained at Guantanamo and the review of four
others for transfer. Post has asked the GOK for written
assurances that the detainees would be incarcerated upon
return, treated humanely, and prosecuted under Kuwaiti law.
The GOK has given oral assurances that Kuwait will abide by
all transfer conditions and repeated its request that all 11
detained Kuwaitis be returned (ref C). GOK officials added
that Nasser Al-Mutairi, returned to Kuwait in January and
acquitted in June, could still be retried, and remained under
observation (ref E).

Terror Finance
--------------


7. (S/NF) EconChief advised the CWG that the GOK continued
to make progress in dealing with money-laundering and terror
finance. He a welcomed planned visit by a team from
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, commenting the
visit would provide valuable opportunities to engage Foreign
Ministry and Central Bank personnel on measures to eliminate
funding for terror activities. In order to have a more
focused dialogue with the GOK, SIMO will seek to identify
specific cases where the GOK did not take the exact action
requested by the U.S. in order to isolate the source of any
failure and take corrective action. EconChief added that the
arrival of a new U.S. Customs Law Enforcement Advisor, who
has extensive experience in anti-money-laundering programs,
would also help to bolster GOK anti-terror finance efforts.

Training Tops All
--------------


8. (C) RSO reported that Kuwait remained stable, but there
was the possibility for terror incidents. GOK security staff
wanted to do a good job, but had limited resources and
training. The GOK has solicited special operations training
from Blackwater for its SWAT and black operations teams, and
welcomed continued Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training
from the U.S. (Note: Post has proposed the following ATA
training programs for Kuwait: in FY 2006, Interdicting
Terror Organizations-Advanced and VIP Protection MATT and in
FY 2007, Critical Incident Management, Cyber-Consultation on
Cyber Terrorism, Cyber-Incident Response Course,
Cyber-Investigating Cyber Terrorism, Integrating CT
Strategies at the National Level - Implementation,
Integration CT Strategies at the National level - Polity,
Interdicting Terrorism Organization - Advanced, Port and
Harbor Security, Task Force Organization and Operations, and
WMD Awareness. End Note.) RSO added that he has raised with
GOK security officials the importance of protecting their
critical infrastructure.


9. (S) OMC-K informed the group of its work with the
Preventative Security Directorate (PSD) -- a branch of the
Ministry of Defense's J2 tasked to address counterterrorism,
extremist groups, and external threats -- to identify
training requirements. Courses under consideration include
basic and advanced Foreign Military Sales (FMS) courses for
intelligence officers and military police, and specialized
courses available through FMS such as Intel Support to
Counterterrorism and Security Officer Basic. Working with
other agencies at post, OMC-K also hopes to provide
specialized Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and specialized
analysis training. The GOK was also being proactive
regarding training and invited Kuwait Center for Strategic
Studies President Dr. Sami Al-Faraj to lecture about the
spread of terrorism and the need for a sustained, coordinated
approach to fight terrorist organizations. He stressed the
need for Kuwait's security and intelligence organs to work
together, a message post has often delivered. His comments
were well received and re-ignited interest in CT work,
building on J2 plans to launch a campaign against extremism
in the military. OMC-K is working with CENTCOM on the visit
of a Mobile Training Team to assist with the campaign.



10. (S) In addition to training needs identified by RSO and
OMC-K, the DATT recommended additional force protection
training and a strengthening of the military's intelligence
services. Not all training would need to be provided by the
U.S.; Kuwait could also benefit from regional expertise.
(Note: The UK has a long-standing training relationship with
the Ministry of Interior. End note.)

Keeping Suspected Terrorists Out of the U.S.
--------------


11. (S/NF) The Consul updated the CWG on efforts to secure
NIVs for Kuwaiti Members of Parliament suspected of having
ties to violent organizations. MPs Waleed Al-Tabtabei and
Awad Barrad Al-Enezi were recently approved for G visas to
attend a UN parliamentary conference. MP Hassan Al-Jowhar's
NIV application is still pending (ref H). He noted the
complexity in having a name removed from the look-out system
and advised the group that Shaykha Hessa Al-Sabah, daughter
of the Crown Prince, had to be fingerprinted because of the
presence of derogatory information. Nonetheless, the
look-out system is an extremely useful tool and recently
helped to identify a Kuwaiti applicant who, although she
faces several charges for supporting terror activities, was
approved by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Health for medical travel
to the U.S. (refs B and F). Her medical history referred to
vague traumatic experiences, omitting that her husband died
after being captured by the police for being part of a terror
cell that planned attacks on U.S. and Kuwaiti interests.
Based on the contradictory information provided in her
application, CONS has asked SIMO to brief interviewing
officers on how to spot information that may link a visa
applicant to a terrorist organization.

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