Public Diplomacy in Kuwait -- What "Moves the Needle"?

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002694

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, NEA/PPD, R, PA, INR/NESA
STATE FOR IIP/G/NEA-SA,
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPAO OEXC PREL SCUL OIIP XF KU
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy in Kuwait -- What "Moves the Needle"?

Ref A: Kuwait 1201
Ref B: 04 Kuwait 2828
Ref C: 04 Kuwait 2797

Introduction
--------------


1. In the report "Changing Minds and Winning Peace" by the
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World,"
the authors emphasize the need for our public diplomacy programs
to be evaluated by their ability to change attitudes towards the
United States, using the metaphorical measure of "moving the
needle" in positively influencing Muslim audiences. This cable
examines our PD efforts in Kuwait in that context and offers some
suggestions on what approaches and programs work best and where
more resources could usefully be applied.

Kuwait a Special Case, for Now
--------------


2. In some ways Kuwait is a special case. Due to the role of the
United States in Kuwait's survival and the removal of Saddam
Hussein from power, Kuwaitis are perhaps the most pro-American of
any national group in the Middle East or the world. Kuwaitis are
very receptive to our messages. We have extremely easy access to
local media. Kuwaitis are eager for more contact with Americans,
with whom they feel a kinship based not only on recent history,
but also on a perception of the American character as sincere and
open. On the other hand, the current generation of high school-
age Kuwaitis was not personally scarred by the Iraqi occupation
and we cannot count on them to have the same emotional ties to the
U.S. as their parents. In addition, Kuwaitis feel less welcome to
the United States since 9/11, both in terms of visa difficulties
and the fear of a poor reception should they go to the U.S. Thus
more and more are choosing not to travel or study in the U.S.
They travel to Spain or Lebanon and they send their children to
study in local universities (some with U.S. affiliations) or to
the UK, Canada, or Australia. Thus we have no reason to believe
that our highly favorable public diplomacy positioning now will be
automatically replicated in the future. So what works?


3. Key Findings
--------------

A) There is no substitute for visits by senior USG officials.
The act of visiting a key ally is an extremely important element
of public diplomacy in itself. We urge almost every visiting
official to talk to the local press. We have very good ability to
design and place interviews. On the negative side, it does not go
unnoticed when a senior official fails to engage with the local
press.

B) "Real live Americans" from a variety of fields are easy to
program in Kuwait and have substantial impact. Independent
experts on U.S. foreign policy are welcome, and there is a
constant demand for other speakers in specialized fields. Current
budgets permit one programmed American speaker a year. It's
simply not enough to have a sustained impact.

C) American Corners are great venues. Over the last year, we
have opened corners at Kuwait University and at the American
University of Kuwait. These small investments provide a
continuing window into American subjects and can serve as the
seeds of American studies programs. The corners are also
excellent venues for speakers. Recently we have effectively used
Embassy staff members to speak on a variety of issues, from visa
rules to the history of the blues.

D) There is a continuing demand for exposure to American life.
Media contacts often ask us for more Washington File Arabic
translations of cultural, scientific and social stories.
Especially welcome are stories with an Islamic angle, such as a
recent story about a Saudi-American woman candidate for local
office in the U.S. "Hi" magazine has a strong readership in
Kuwait and is recognized as effective even by some U.S. critics
here. The magazine serves as a valuable resource to Arabs who
lack a nuanced understanding of American life, and who are
constantly exposed to violent American films and racy music
videos.

E) Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra television are gaining ground in
Kuwait. The channels record higher ratings in Kuwait than in most
other Arab states. The "Changing Minds and Winning Peace" report
questions whether Sawa's popular music/"news lite" content "moves
the needle" of public opinion. We assess that both Sawa and Al-
Hurra are growing in effectiveness, and they merit continued
strong support. A more news-intensive Arabic language VOA is not
available to Kuwaiti listeners. This could be a useful supplement
to Sawa.

F) English language programs open doors. Even anti-American
audiences suspicious of U.S. Embassy activities realize the
benefits of English-language instruction. The ACCESS
microscholarship program, which offers six-month after-school
English classes for about 100 Kuwaiti non-elite ninth- and tenth-
grade students, is in its second year and has been a resounding
success. The benefits are two-fold: First, the Kuwaiti students
are exposed to the English language and American culture in a
positive setting and second, we believe Kuwaitis exposed to
English-language instruction in this setting at this age are more
likely to pursue university education in the U.S., a crucial post
goal and a valuable tool in creating future leaders who view the
U.S. favorably(see ref A). We recommend doubling the ACCESS
program. The instruction should be doubled from one six-month
semester to two, and funding should be provided to offer
substantially more classes. Post also recommends funding for
additional after-school English language programs.

G) English-language instruction, while vital, is not enough to
reach the youth audience. As post works to expand educational
opportunities in-country for large numbers of non-elite Kuwaitis,
so too must exchange opportunities expand. Post pioneered in
summer 2004 the ChevronTexaco Summer Camp (so named because we
approached private sponsors for funding),in which 10
conservative, non-elite Kuwaiti boys, aged 12-16, traveled to an
international English-language camp in Florida. The program served
to introduce these conservative young people to other cultures and
religions, giving them a new view of the world that countered
extremist misinformation and hostility. The program also created
an enormously positive psychological impression of the U.S. and
American society both in the participants themselves, and within
their broader family and tribal structure. We strongly recommend
increased funding for such exchange programs.

H) Exchange programs such as the YES program to send high school
age students to the U.S. for one year are having a very positive
impact. Post sent six Kuwaitis in 2003, 12 in 2004, and will send
12 in 2005. In discussions with program alumni, they express a
desire to return to the U.S. for higher education and indicate
that they have become teachers of Kuwaitis, explaining the U.S.
and describing their overwhelmingly positive experiences to
family, friends and colleagues. The YES program needs to be
expanded.

I) We have had less success in Kuwait with the PLUS (Partnerships
for Learning Undergraduate Studies) program. Three Kuwaitis who
were accepted for FY2005 dropped out, saying that stipends were
too low and too many restrictions were placed on them (prohibition
on driving, little choice in schools/locations). We don't know if
these problems are specific to Kuwaitis, but we offer them to
those who are charged with managing and evaluating the program.

J) For reaching young professionals, the most effective PD tool
is the International Visitor Leadership (IV) Program. Without
exception, all post participants, including journalists,
officials, and youth leaders, return with a more favorable view of
the United States and American society and values. IV alumni share
their experiences with friends and family, and professional
methods and training gained in the U.S. are spread to professional
colleagues. More funding for additional programs, particularly
those aimed at conservative segments of society with unrealistic
impressions of the U.S., such as Islamic clerics and preachers and
religion teachers in secondary schools would have a great impact
on increased Kuwaiti understanding of American society, values,
and policy. Embassy Riyadh's pioneering program demonstrated the
multiplier effect gained from sending such individuals to the U.S.
for study visits.

K) In a separate message (ref A),post described its efforts to
break out of the deep slump in the flow of Kuwaiti students to
U.S. universities since 9/11. Progress on this strategic goal is
slow. Post believes that the USG and U.S. academic institutions
are going to need to do much more to gain back and retain market
share in a more and more competitive higher education market.
Continuing to improve visa and immigration procedures is critical,
but more attention needs to be given to systems in U.S.
universities not only to track the presence of foreign students
(SEVIS),but also to make sure the experience is a full and
positive exposure to U.S. life and culture. American institutions
also need to spend more time in the region recruiting. We can
facilitate, but we can't replicate the face-to-face contact with
prospective students and their parents.

L) U.S. universities abroad are a good idea but they are not the
same and not enough. Such institutions are proliferating in
Kuwait and other locations in the Gulf. While they do bring
positive aspects of the U.S. university experience to the region,
e.g., high standards, more dialogue, greater freedom of inquiry,
they are not an adequate substitute for a sustained period of
exposure to the United States. We need to work with these
institutions to promote summer studies in the U.S., junior years
abroad in the U.S., and graduate studies in the U.S.

Resource Implications
--------------

The most important and effective instruments in our current public
diplomacy toolkit are training and exchange programs, particularly
those focused on younger audiences. These are labor-intensive
programs both at post and in the U.S. Careful selection and
preparation of participants is critical to program success. PD
staff at Embassy Kuwait and its partners, such as AMIDEAST, are
stretched very thinly across our programming goals. They are also
heavily involved in ambitious expansion of Middle East Partnership
programming. The notion of "doing more with less" will produce
inferior results and does a disservice to the importance of the
task. We need at least one additional PD American position at
post to keep up with our own objectives. The additional officer
would have primary responsibility for educational exchanges and
English language instruction. Post PD budget should be increased
to allow up to six American speakers per year, double the number
of American corners from 2 to 4, expand the number of IV
recipients, and provide opportunities for local university
students to spend a summer or junior year in the U.S.
LEBARON