Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KUWAIT1400
2005-04-06 13:14:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

GWOT ASSESSMENT: KUWAIT

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV KU TERRORISM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001400 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR NEA/FO, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: KUWAIT

REF: A. STATE 60749

B. KUWAIT 1159

C. KUWAIT 1104

D. KUWAIT 730

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001400

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR NEA/FO, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: KUWAIT

REF: A. STATE 60749

B. KUWAIT 1159

C. KUWAIT 1104

D. KUWAIT 730

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Counterterrorism remains at the top of
our bilateral agenda and post has experienced increased
cooperation from the Government of Kuwait (GOK) in the Global
War on Terror (GWOT) since January when a series of security
incidents revealed to the GOK a home-grown threat. There is
better information-sharing, the GOK is generally responsive
to action requests, and the Government has taken steps to
strengthen domestic laws, better train and equip security
personnel, and come into compliance with international CT
agreements. Nevertheless, there is still much to be done and
the U.S. can make a positive and lasting contribution,
especially in the areas of terrorist financing and training.
The Ambassador chairs monthly meetings of the post's
Counterterrorism Working Group (group members include the DCM
and section heads from POL, ECON, RMAS, RSO, CONS, DIALO, and
OMC-K) to asses terrorism threats to U.S. interests in
Kuwait, evaluate the GOK's progress on CT measures, and to
identify areas for U.S. influence (refs b and d). The CWG
recommends a refined CT strategy for Kuwait address terrorist
financing, increased training, and public diplomacy. End
Summary.

Terrorist Financing
--------------


2. (C) The GOK recently signed the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
agreement is pending parliamentary ratification. Despite
this positive step, there remain holes in the system: there
is no means to track cash flows out of the country and the
Central Bank's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) cannot share
information with other FIUs without prior approval from the
Public Prosecutor for each instance. Kuwait needs, and post
has requested, the Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG)
provide expert assistance to the GOK for devising appropriate
to criminalize terrorism-related finance, thereby further
strengthening current money laundering legislation.



3. (C) In addition to the need for strengthened
legislation, there is a real need to enhance the judicial
branch's counterterrorism capacity. GOK officials readily
admit that expertise in financial crimes investigations
within both the Public Prosecutor,s Office and the judiciary
is quite thin and officials do not know what to look for when
presented with a suspicious transaction report. During an
April 2004 visit by Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) Director William Fox, Public Prosecutor Riyadh
Al-Hajeri responded eagerly to FinCEN,s offer of technical
assistance (ref c) which post strongly believes should be
on-site training in Kuwait. Training should be preceded by
an OPDAT team visit for an in-depth needs assessment of the
judicial system's ability to combat money laundering and
terrorist finance operations.

Specialized Training
--------------


4. (C) Kuwait lost several security officers in the January
and February raids on terror cells and has since placed an
emphasis on the need for better training. Hundreds of
Kuwaitis have participated in the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) courses and post has requested, at GOK expense,
security operations center training for mid-level managers.
Kuwaitis also participate in CENTCOM consequence management
training and post has invited Kuwaitis to take part in the
mid-April "NESA Center Seminar on Combating Terrorism in the
New International Security Environment." Kuwait recognizes
U.S. expertise in raining and post recommends increased
funding for training opportunities, especially in financial
crime investigation, computer crimes, crime scene
investigation, and CT analysis. Refresher courses should
also be offered so that skills do not erode. Post further
recommends the establishment of an International Law
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) for the Gulf states.


5. (S/NF) DIA is considering allocating resources for
increased engagement with Kuwaiti Military Intelligence
through the new Force Protection Directorate. The
Directorate has a special need for organizational
development, equipment recommendations, staffing, and
training. This is a unique opportunity to influence the GOK
tactical approach to CT and the U.S. should take advantage of
it. RMAS is also providing training and seeking
opportunities to expand it.

High-Level and Public Engagement
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador regularly raises GWOT issues with
Kuwaiti leadership, but visits by senior USG officials would
reinforce to decision-makers that CT is a U.S. priority. If
still offered, the International Counterterrorism Policy
Workshop, would provide a useful forum to discuss CT
strategies and responses, bringing together representatives
from different ministries. Although the National Security
Bureau was recently tasked to coordinate GOK CT efforts, a
stovepipe structure persists and hampers real progress. Not
only would the presence of a U.S. interagency team send a
strong message about the importance of intra-government
cooperation, but also signal to GOK leaders, who claim an
imbalance in the relationship, that the U.S. considers Kuwait
an important partner in the GWOT.


7. (C) Post also recommends a continued aggressive public
diplomacy campaign. Kuwaiti officials have often said that
public relations is our biggest weakness in the GWOT.
Newspapers and satellite stations repeatedly ran pictures of
Iraqis reportedly injured by U.S. and coalition forces , but
there were few, if any, images of insurgent arms caches or
torture chambers. Kuwaitis wanted to see these pictures.
Post has excellent relations with the local media and could
easily place op-eds and photos on the destructiveness of
terrorists and their actions. This is an effective and
low-cost approach. We also need to do everything possible to
make sure that we respond quickly and transparently to
allegations related to treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo
and elsewhere.

*********************************************
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http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/

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*********************************************
LEBARON