(C) DIYALA ELECTION PREP: MINOR LOGISTICAL AND SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000290

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: (C) DIYALA ELECTION PREP: MINOR LOGISTICAL AND SECURITY
ISSUES REMAIN, COMPLAINTS LIKELY

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Bell, Regional Coordinator, REO Kirkuk,
Department Of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a SET Ba'quba cable.


2. SUMMARY: Three days before the election, the IECI and ISF
appear to be well prepared for the polling on December 15. With
CF support, the involved organizations have repeatedly drilled
for the election day operations, and a December 10 "dress
rehearsal" went well. Potential problem areas remain: the
Diyala IECI Director, whose lack of organizational ability and
questionable decision-making made the ultimate success of the
referendum in Diyala more difficult, has not shown improvement
so far in the preparations for this election. AIF intent to
disrupt the election has been demonstrated in the assassination
of a local IECI director, and ongoing conflict in the
northwestern al-Udhaim area may lead to increased targeting of
polling stations and complaints by residents about how
operations are run. Finally, allegations from all corners of
lack of balance in the IECI have begun, likely prefiguring
complaints of electoral malfeasance in several areas of Diyala.
END SUMMARY.

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(U) PREPARATIONS IN PLACE
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3. (SBU) The December 15 National Assembly elections in Diyala
will be conducted at 268 polling centers, consolidated into 246
sites due to lack of suitable structures for conducting of
polling. The numbers of centers and of sites match the numbers
achieved during the referendum; a last-minute attempt on
December 11 to add eleven new sites to the original number has
been shelved after CF and ISF objections to the additional
burden that would be placed upon security resources and the
increased potential for operational mistakes given the lack of
preparation by the IECI or ISF for the new sites. Some
municipal governments in eastern Diyala may make bus
transportation available for rural voters.


4. (SBU) Ballots arrived at the Diyala Public Distribution
System (PDS) warehouse on December 9, where they were secured
and placed under observation by personnel of the Aegis security
company - a procedure matching that of the referendum. On
December 12, IECI personnel (guarded by Iraqi army units) moved
ballot materials bound for the two eastern qadaas (districts) of
Diyala to a secured warehouse in Kirkush, the headquarters of
the Iraqi 5th Division. On December 13-14, ballots will be
moved in the same manner both from the PDS warehouse and from
Kirkush to the individual polling stations in western and
eastern Diyala, respectively. IECI workers, guarded by Iraqi
police, will secure the polling stations upon arrival of the
ballots.


5. (C) As during the referendum, the Iraqi police forces are
planning to provide static security forces of 8-10 personnel to
most polling sites; those considered to particularly at risk
will receive 15-man forces. In all of the qadaas, the police
will remain in place until the evening of December 16, longer if
the retrograde movement of the ballot materials is delayed. The
increased number of police in the province since the referendum
has allowed some areas to hold back reserves of police to act as
a quick reaction force.


6. (SBU) Unlike the procedure during the referendum, ballots
will be counted once at the Diyala PDS warehouse, where they
will be stored, rather than at the polling stations. The
retrograde movement of the ballots from the polling stations to
the PDS warehouse will be extended over a period of around 24
hours, rather than the 12-hour retrograde that occurred during
the referendum.


7. (C) A December 10 dress rehearsal of initial ballot movement,
polling station setup, and retrograde movement demonstrated
Iraqi preparedness for the upcoming elections. With rare
exceptions, polling stations were secured by IP and occupied by
IECI workers at the predetermined times. (Among the exceptions
to this rule were two polling centers in al-Udhaim, where IA
reportedly detained IECI workers traveling to staff the posts
and charged them with breaking the ban on vehicular movement.
Udhaim will likely be a problematic area during the election;
see para 13.) Many polling stations did not have female workers
to perform searches on female voters and a miscommunication
between IECI and ISF in Ba'quba led to a premature departure
from polling stations by IECI workers and IPs; these
deficiencies will hopefully be remedied prior to the election.

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(U) POTENTIAL LOGISTICAL ISSUES
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8. (C) The limitations of Diyala IECI Director Amer Lateef
Majeed's organizational capabilities, clearly displayed at the
chaotic conclusion of the October 15 referendum, have already
been evident during the runup to the elections. CF have worked
more closely this time with the IECI District Election Office
(DEO) directors in an attempt to build capacity at that level,
with the hope of being able to take a backseat role on election
day; they have repeatedly found instances in which Majeed failed
to communicate clearly (or at all) his decisions on logistical
matters to the first tier of his subordinates.


9. (C) While this propensity to make decisions without
communicating them to his subordinates is troubling, the content
of Majeed's choices has been problematic as well. In one
example, after completing the December 12 early balloting of
ISF, detainee, and hospitalized voters (approximately 4,000 were
polled) Majeed chose (against CF advice to which he had earlier
agreed) to store the ballots in his unguarded personal office
rather than the Aegis- and ISF-guarded PDS warehouse, five miles
to the north. The ballots will be watched by IECI employees
until they are moved to the PDS warehouse for the final count.


10. (C) CF work with the IECI to ensure that the mistakes of the
referendum (which culminated in a massive retrograde drop-off of
ballot materials at the PDS warehouse without any
accountability) are not repeated, has led to some friction with
the Aegis contractors guarding the PDS warehouse. The eight
Aegis personnel (UK nationals who do not speak Arabic and have
not been provided with a translator) have contacted UN Regional
Observer Timothy Bomberg to request his guidance about CF
presence at the PDS warehouse while ballots are present.
Bomberg has taken the position that CF assistance to IECI
preparations is acceptable as long as CF is not present in the
warehouse when the actual counting of the ballots begins.

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(U) POTENTIAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
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11. (C) The assassination of Ammar Kamil, the IECI director of
the Hibhib DEO (east of Ba'quba),and the wounding of his deputy
in the same drive-by shooting on December 5 have reminded IECI
employees of the dangers of their profession. Initial pleas for
better protection have been referred by CF to the ISF; however,
most IECI employees appear to have accepted the risks that they
run and are operating as usual. As the attack has put the top
two men in the DEO out of action, however, there may be negative
consequences for the smooth operation of the Hibhib DEO.


12. (C) Heavy ongoing fighting between AIF elements and an Iraqi
army battalion dispatched at the end of November to secure the
al-Udhaim area of northwestern Diyala (a particularly dangerous
section of Iraqi Highway 2, the primary route between Baghdad
and the Kurdish region) presents a different kind of security
problem for the elections. The police chief for Khalis (under
whose jurisdiction al-Udhaim falls) told the participants in the
December 7 drill that his forces would be unable to spare the
manpower necessary to secure five of the ten polling sites in
the area given the heightened risk profile.

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(U) POTENTIAL PERCEPTIONS OF MALFEASANCE
--------------


13. (C) As during the referendum, various Iraqi Islamic Party
officials have given us dire advance warnings of vague electoral
abuses by all other groups (principally the Kurds),along with
specific examples of intimidation of Sunni Arabs living in
Kurdish-dominated areas during the election campaign so far.
Several areas of Diyala seem disproportionately likely to
produce allegations of electoral malfeasance. Jalula, in the
northeastern qadaa of Khanaqin, is a mixed town of Kurds and
Arabs, but its government, IECI director, and security forces
are almost exclusively Kurdish; it featured in Saleh al-Mutlaq's
vague accusations of fraud following the October referendum. In
the Shi'a-run central town of Wajihiya, Sunnis have already
begun to complain about the composition of the IECI and hint
that the fix is in. Based on the examples of past elections,
the mixed-ethnicity neighborhoods in Ba'quba will likely bring
allegations of fraud as well, but no allegations have emerged as
yet. Al-Udhaim, of course, will likely face complaints of
unfair treatment no matter how cleanly the election is run.


16. (C) Ironically, given IIP complaints, the primary concern of
the national IECI regarding the elections in Diyala seems to be
the number of IIP partisans working in the Diyala IECI - so much
so that it called (Kurdish) IECI Director Amer Lateef Majeed to
Baghdad for a meeting about the "problem." Majeed says that the
information the national IECI presented him on the subject was
significantly flawed; many of the names that the IECI had
received as IIP members were in fact unaffiliated Sunnis and
some were actually Shi'as. (NOTE: The IIP's supposed control of
the Diyala IECI is a recurring Shi'a story originally used to
explain the good showing of the IIP in the January elections.
Given the high margin of "no" votes in Diyala on a Constitution
that the IIP leadership supported, the validity of the story
seems dubious, but many believe it. END NOTE.) While a serious
clearing of the IECI does not appear imminent, two Sunni DEO
directors were fired after the referendum for "influencing
voting" and the Sunni Deputy Director of the Diyala IECI
predicted in early December that he would be fired because of
his ethnicity.


17. (C) Separately, we have heard complaints from the
KDP-affiliated Assistant Governor of Diyala for Technical
Affairs that Abduljalil Mudhaffar Ali, the IECI Director in
PUK-controlled Khanaqin qadaa, has worked to minimize the number
of KDP employees in the Khanaqin IECI. According to the
Assistant Governor, Ali withheld the applications of many KDP
partisans applying for the IECI's September lottery for
temporary pollworkers, leaving PUK partisans dominating the
ranks of the temporary pollworkers. (NOTE: The Assistant
Governor did not know the number of Arab or Turcoman or
Kurdistan Islamic Union employees working in the Khanaqin IECI.
END NOTE.)

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(U) COMMENT
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18. (C) It seems likely that the December 15 elections will be
at least as well-run as the October 15 referendum, which was an
overall success despite some hiccups in the retrograde movement
of balloting material. Unlike in the referendum, however, the
interests of the major political organizations in the province
will be diametrically opposed to each other; challenges to the
vote on the basis of perceived electoral malfeasance should be
expected.
BELL