Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KIRKUK285
2005-12-13 18:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Kirkuk
Cable title:  

(U) KURDS ANTICIPATE AGAIN FIELDING SECOND-LARGEST BLOC IN

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KISL IZ KDP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000285 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL IZ KDP
SUBJECT: (U) KURDS ANTICIPATE AGAIN FIELDING SECOND-LARGEST BLOC IN
NEXT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

REF: KIRKUK 280

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard K. Bell, Regional Coordinator, Exec,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000285

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL IZ KDP
SUBJECT: (U) KURDS ANTICIPATE AGAIN FIELDING SECOND-LARGEST BLOC IN
NEXT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

REF: KIRKUK 280

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard K. Bell, Regional Coordinator, Exec,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Khalilzad met December 2-3 with
KRG Regional President Masud Barzani and then with Iraqi
President Talabani. The KDP is trying to woo Faili Kurds to
drop their support for their own lists or the Shia Islamist
lists and support the Kurdish Alliance slate instead. Barzani
and Talabani predicted the following totals in the National
Assembly: about 100-115 seats for the Shia alliance; 50-60 for
the Kurdish Alliance as the second largest bloc; 30-35 (Talabani
says) or 40-45 (Barzani says) for the Sunnis; 25-30 for Allawi;
1-5 for Chalabi; 2-4 for the Kurdistan Islamic Union. The PUK
is asking for quiet U.S. intervention in the KDP-PUK talks on
unifying the KRG governments. (END SUMMARY.

(U) Barzani
--------------


2. (C) Barzani told Amb. Khalilzad that the KDP election
preparations were well underway in the KRG. The KDP was trying
to woo Faili Kurds (who, in contrast to most Iraqi Kurds, are
Shia and are concentrated in Baghdad and eastern Iraq) away from
Iranian influence; 160 had come to Erbil for a pre-election
conference, Barzani aide Fuad Hussein told us. Commenting on
the campaign itself, Barzani said Allawi had the best
advertisements, but many voters were confused by the abundance
of competing lists and messages.


3. (C) Barzani predicted the following totals in the National
Assembly:

-- about 100 seats for the Shia alliance;
-- about 55-60 seats for the Kurdish Alliance (KDP-PUK list);
-- 40-45 seats for the Sunnis;
-- 30 seats at most for Allawi (Barzani commented that, if he
could give more seats to Allawi, he would);
-- Chalabi 1-2 seats; and
-- Jaburi 1-2 seats near Hawijah.

Barzani said that, with this result, he could support Allawi for
Prime Minister. The Ambassador urged Barzani to help move the
government formation process forward quickly after the election.


4. (C) Barzani said Mosul looked very good for the Kurdish
Alliance, but had "not yet reached fever pitch." The Kurds
hoped to win 6-8 of Ninawa's 19 seats. He said 40 percent of

Ninawa's population was Kurdish and another 10 percent non-Arab.
(Comment: we expect Ninawa to be one of the most hotly
contested election races, with the Sunni Arab Consensus List
(List 618),Allawi's National List (List 731) and the Kurdish
Alliance (List 730) all looking to pick up seats there. End
Comment.)

(U) Talabani
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad stressed the importance of letting
people vote their conscience free of intimidation. Talabani
told the Ambassador that the election campaign was going well,
though debates needed to be more frequent. Talabani hoped for a
larger turnout than in January or October. He and PUK Deputy
GenSec Noshirwan Mustafa had been meeting with PUK members to
explain the election's importance and to push them to turn out
the vote. Talabani conceded that, while he saw campaign
enthusiasm in Kirkuk, there was less in the KRG. He thought
Kurdish Alliance preparations were better in rural areas, such
as Dahuk, Diyala and Kirkuk, than in heavily urban areas like
Baghdad.


7. (C) Talabani predicted the following totals in the National
Assembly:

-- 100-115 seats for the Shia Coalition (List 555),though he
said some people predicted only 90-110;
-- 50-60 seats for the Kurdish Alliance (List 730),which would
be the second largest bloc;
-- 30-35 seats for the Islamic Alliance Tawafaq (List 618),
making it the third largest bloc. (Talabani thought 618's
leaders were wrong to expect not less than 40 seats.)
-- 25-30 seats for Allawi's list 731 that was expecting 70; and
-- 4 for Chalabi's National Conference slate (List 569),who
Talabani claimed was "dreaming" to think he would get 15 seats.


8. (C) Joining the Talabani meeting was Iraq's Ambassador to
Britain, Dr. Salah Al-Shaikhly, who expected Allawi to win 40
seats. Talabani responded that Allawi's focussed appeal to
Sunni votes had angered Shiite voters; he pointed to Allawi's
ties to the Baath and statements about violations of Sunni Arab
prisoners' rights. Al-Shaikhly agreed Chalabi would win 3-5
seats, perhaps in Qadaniya and Thawra. He expected Saleh
Mutlaq's National Dialog Front (List 667) to win 5-10 seats.
Talabani anticipated that with the second-largest bloc of votes,
the Kurds would be the kingmakers in the formation of the new,
permanent government.

9. (C) Talabani explained that the Kurdistan Islamic Union
(List 561) had separated from the Kurdish Alliance because it
wanted 6 seats on the list but the Alliance only would give it

2. He predicted the KIU would win 2 seats in Sulaymaniyah and
none in Erbil or Dahuk. Talabani, appearing nonchalant about
the KIU's running against the Kurdish Alliance, predicted that
after the elections the KIU planned to ally with the Alliance in
the next national assembly. Talabani described the KIU as part
of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement. (Comment: By
contrast, Noshirwan Mustafa told the Acting Regional Coordinator
November 30 that he thought the KIU would win 4 seats on its own
(reftel). End Comment.)

(U) KRG Unification
--------------


10. (C) Talabani said he had proposed to the KDP that it could
keep the KRG premiership for one year and two months, then the
PUK would get it for a year. The KDP had originally said yes,
but now proposed 2 years first to the KDP and then 2 years to
the PUK. Noshiwan Mustafa said the PUK would not accept the
KDP's having both the KRG Presidency and premiership; this was
why the PUK wanted frequent rotation. The KDP also wanted both
the premiership and interior ministry. (Comment: In the fall,
REO Kirkuk's interlocutors had suggested unification could come
before December 15, but now estimates trail off to after the
elections. End Comment.) Mustafa and Talabani asked for U.S.
help in the negotiation. Talabani said it would be to the
Kurds' electoral advantage to announce a KDP-PUK agreement
before elections.
BELL