WHAT WE NEED TO GET TO ELECTIONS IN THE DRC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000807

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG
SUBJECT: WHAT WE NEED TO GET TO ELECTIONS IN THE DRC

Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Now that the Congolese have completed work on the
constitution, they and we can focus on realizing the DRC's
first democratic elections in almost 50 years. This
monumental undertaking -- a model not only for the Great
Lakes region but Africa as a whole -- is an avowed policy
priority that will require sustained commitment, both
politically and materially. What is needed to realize this
objective is a realistic electoral calendar, a plan to ensure
the security of elections, greatly enhanced logistical
support -- and a lot of focus and a smattering of luck.


2. (C) Already, however, blockages and delays posed by
technical experts at the UNDP and elsewhere, who seem to be
in search of a perfect election, threaten to make the
international community one of the potential electoral
spoilers. It will be important for the international
community, through the CIAT, to speak with one voice in
pushing for progress and for all of us to ensure that the
necessary financial and logistical resources are available.
These first elections will not be perfect by any means, but
the DRC will have five years before its next round of
elections to make improvements to the process. Our
responsibility is to ensure that the Congolese people have
elections which will be accepted as free and fair within the
timeframe provided for by the Sun City Accords, i.e., by June
30, 2006. End Summary.

Getting The Calendar Right
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3. (C) The Independent Electoral Commission, donor country
Ambassadors (or their representatives),UNDP and
international experts met twice the week of May 9, and will
continue meeting this week, to try to establish a realistic
electoral calendar reflecting both political realities and
technical difficulties in a country the size of the US east
of the Mississippi with essentially no infrastructure.
Technical challenges include ensuring the timely arrival and
distribution of voter registration machines, training
sufficient Congolese staff to man the 9,000 voter
registration centers and the 40,000 polling stations, and
obtaining sufficient air transport to ensure timely
distribution and collection of ballot boxes, among others.
Daunting as these obstacles are, the real challenge lies in
the political arena.


4. (C) The transition must officially and legally end by
June 30, 2006 (not/not June 30, 2005 as the UDPS and some
opposition parties claim),and national elections must be
completed before that date. The Congolese and others
currently envision four elections -- local (governors and
provincial legislatures),Parliamentary (National Assembly)
and two rounds of Presidential elections to ensure the victor
has a clear majority. What all this means is that, working
backwards from the end point of June 30, 2006, we have the
following reality (which is in a sense a worst-case scenario,
since ideally elections would be completed before June of
next year):

June 30, 2006 - transition culminates and elections end with
the final round of Presidential elections

May 2006 -- the mandated 30-day pause between rounds in the
Presidential elections

April 2006 - the first Presidential election

March 2006 -- Parliamentary elections

February 2006 - local elections

December 2005/January 2006 - elections campaigning

November 2005 - electoral law proposed to and approved by
Parliament, signed by the President and promulgated
(constitutional referendum required first to be complete)

October 2005 - national referendum on the constitution
(required by the Sun City Accords and the transitional
constitution)

June - September 2005 - national voter registration (required
before the constitutional referendum)

(Note: Technical experts recently have proposed a variation
of their original calendar, in which time would be saved by
combining the local, Parliamentary and first Presidential
elections and cutting back the campaign time to one month.
Unfortunately, this unwieldy suggestion has some fatal flaws.
For instance, in a country with no/no national
communications infrastructure such as television or radio,
parties clearly will not be able to conduct campaigns in only
thirty days. Likewise, trying to combine the large numbers
of candidates involved in the three proposed elections to be
combined would be a receipe for widescale fraud, carrying
with it the risk of delegitimizing the elections. We would
be better served to search for creative ways to save time
now, such as accelerating and compressing the voter
registration process in order to have the referendum more
quickly. End Note.)


5. (C) As the above outline illustrates, there is no time to
indulge technical qualms. International experts (sometimes
including our own) risk losing the possible in search of the
perfect. Some, particularly within the UNDP, continue
blindly to insist on the need to adhere to, and completely
verify, a rigid calendar of steps, beginning with voter
registration, which, when carried to its logical conclusion,
would not allow elections to be completed by next June.


6. (C) For instance, the experts argue that the referendum
cannot take place before November at the earliest because a
month to a month-and-a-half will be needed to
double-and-triple check voter registration lists. While of
course desirable, doing so is one among many examples of
spending time that simply does not exist. Such verification
could, for instance, be completed after the referendum and
before the elections, a suggestion which the technicians
resist because it could pose problems for verifying voters
for the referendum. Ultimately, however, they fail to
realize that it will be easier to sustain problems with the
referendum than with the elections themselves, and that the
priority should be getting things right for elections.


7. (C) There apparently is also an attempt by some experts to
portray the political reality as literally too expensive to
achieve. The UNDP experts, for instance, insist that
realizing even a slightly accelerated schedule from the one
currently proposed (a schedule which still would not meet the
political realities outlined above) will require additional
financial resources over and above those already pledged,
possibly another $30m -- a request which the EU and others
seem prepared to entertain, given the importance of the
political exigencies.

Securing the Elections
--------------


8. (C) The necessary Congolese legislative and structural
framework already is in place to provide for security for the
elections. The Interior Ministry has developed a plan,
utilizing Congolese and MONUC resources; a coordinating
committee (including the international community) will hold
its first meeting this week; and the President has signed the
decree which assigns primary responsibility to the police,
with the military in a supporting capacity.


9. (C) Monuc is preparing to present formally to the UNSC a
request for the necessary additional resources to ensure
secure elections, including new military elements to be
stationed in Katanga and the two Kasai provinces (all three
high-risk electoral flashpoints),additional civilian
personnel to help set up and monitor elections sites, and
logistical support, particularly aircraft which will be
needed to deliver and collect ballot boxes for the referendum
and the elections. The French-supported training program for
the Congolese police is well underway and should result in at
least 9,000 police specifically trained for elections
security support, although both the French and the Minister
of Interior hope to actually have over 25,000 by the time
they are needed, if the training continues apace.

Supporting the Process -- What Can We Do?
--------------


10. (C) The U.S. has a vital role to play in ensuring that
free and fair elections in the DRC actually take place.
These elections are a costly but essential component of
stabilizing the region and providing a role model for other
fragile states. We suggest three focus areas requiring
immediate attention from Washington.

-- We need to contribute significant elections funding and
support, sooner rather than later. At present, thanks largely
to our complete financial absence from the pre-electoral
scene, we do not even merit a seat at the decision-making
table. Even non-CIAT members (such as Sweden, Japan, Germany
and Ireland) are making substantial contributions to support
elections, and therefore speak with more authority than we.

-- Support MONUC's request for additional, elections-related
resources. MONUC is the logistical backbone of the elections
and it needs to receive the necessary means to fulfill this
responsibility.

-- Ensure coordination among key international players, such
as the UNSC and the Contact Group, echoing the strong
coordination already present in Kinshasa through the CIAT.
We have to ensure that messages from capitals -- and the UNSC
-- enforce those being delivered on the ground.

Can These Elections Happen? Absolutely
--------------


11. (C) The National Assembly is scheduled to formally
consider this week the request from the Independent Electoral
Commission to approve the first six-month extension of the
transition, based on the logistical impossibility (as shown
above) of organizing and conducting elections before June

2006. The request is expected to be approved, as is the
second request (which cannot be advanced until December).
Working together, with a realistic calendar and the necessary
resources, we believe that the Congolese people can have
their first elected, democratic government since independence.
DOUGHERTY