THE WAY FORWARD ON FDLR REPATRIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000646

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREF PREL KPKO KAWC CG
SUBJECT: THE WAY FORWARD ON FDLR REPATRIATION

REF: A. (A) STATE 66187


B. (B) KIGALI 405

Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Embassy Kinshasa shares view expressed ref a that it
would be a tragedy to miss the opportunity provided by the
Sant' Egidio process to energize the voluntary return of a
large number of non-genocidaire FDLR elements and their
dependents. This initiative offers the best chance in over
ten years to begin to address a neuralgic problem which has
contributed significantly to regional instability and
particularly to continuing mistrust and conflict between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. We appreciate
being given the opportunity to share our thoughts.


2. (C) As requested, Embassy will explore with GDRC (Antoine
Ghonda is the point person on the issue but has been
traveling virtually constantly since the conclusion of the
Rome talks and the Pope's funeral) their thinking on the
proposed "comite de suivi." What we know at the moment is
that Ghonda's initial explanation was that this international
commission would serve as a confidence-building measure to
encourage the FDLR to proceed with disarmament, and
specifically would address FDLR concerns that they would
return to Rwanda, unarmed, and either be imprisoned or harmed
in some manner. When PolCouns asked whether the commission
would also somehow be responsible for developing (or forcing)
"political space" in Rwanda for the returnees, Ghonda said
that the Congolese had categorically rejected any such role.
(Comment: This commission potentially could be a useful way
to defuse a potential roadblock to progress. We and the U.K.
-- which has informally been asked to chair the group -- will
be well-positioned to help shape its mission and structure in
our talks with the Congolese. Assuming that we can reach a
satisfactory conclusion on these issues, we should be
prepared to support and take part in the commission. End
Comment.)


3. (C) Ref b recounting of the Monuc briefing provided to
Embassy Kigali generally captures well Monuc's preparations
to expeditiously facilitate the process. We spoke to Peter
Swarbrick, head of DDR/DDRRR for Monuc in Kinshasa, who was
in Rome for the logistical negotiations, and to Monuc's
DDR/DDRRR chief in Bukavu, Tim Reed. Swarbrick said that in
his opinion, Rwandan Foreign Minister Murigande's public
statement on March 31 had substantially altered the dynamic
of the Rome negotiations and had had the effect of causing
the FDLR to pull back from their initial readiness to commit
to a logistical process and timetable (elements which were to
have been announced on April 2). As originally envisioned,
the process should have officially begun April 15 and would
have run for 90 days. Instead, the program launch is now on
hold, pending further discussions to "reassure" the FDLR that
they can safely return. Swarbrick hopes that the process now
could begin on/about the first week of May and end in the
first week of August. He emphasized that Monuc's education
campaign, working through Radio Okapi broadcasts and leaflets
dropped near known FDLR sites by Monuc helicopters, is
on-track and, beginning April 15, will be augmented by FDLR
"sensitizers" who have arrived in both Kivus and are
coordinating with Monuc liaison offices there.


4. (C) In South Kivu, the Bukavu Monuc office is planning to
build three major disarmament camps -- in Hombo,
Kaziba/Burhinyi, and Kamanyola, all three of which can be
completed in about one week once work begins. In addition,
smaller "collection points" will be established in Sange
(Ruzizi plain),Uvira and Adikivu (near the Bukavu airport).
Responding to a GDRC request for assistance, some NGOs, as
well as UNHCR, are also preparing support sites for the
Rwandan refugee repatriation program, which will be located
in the same areas as the Monuc sites. In addition to the
actual camps, NGOs will also establish "food and water
stations" along the routes which the FDLR will travel to
reach the processing zones, to ensure that all arrive in
adequate health.


5. (C) Neither we, Monuc nor the Congolese, however, have
any illusions. Even if the Sant' Egidio process is one
hundred percent successful, there still will be a need for
action of some sort to address the problem of the remaining
hard-core elements in eastern Congo. The real genocidaires,
together with the Rastas (a savage criminalized element of
the FDLR) have no intention of going anywhere voluntarily.
Rather, they prefer to remain and prey on the Congolese and
disrupt regional stability. This group, which Monuc
estimates could comprise 3,000-5,000 combatants, will need to
be confronted. The Congolese, with Angolan assistance, are
working to train a small group of Congolese military who
could cooperate with Monuc in attacking this problem, with or
without accompanying AU forces.

What More Can We Do?
--------------


6. (C) The above is what we know about what already is
underway, but that begs the key question of ref a, what more
can we propose (creatively) doing?

-- we can and should pass a clear message to the GOR that now
is the time to honor the pledge it has repeatedly made for
the last ten years that it will welcome the return of
non-genocidaire FDLR members. Unfortunately, Foreign
Minister Murigande's statement -- and other, more recent
statements, such as the one in which Rwanda deplores the UN
and the international community for "sitting at the same
table with" the FDLR (to negotiate their return to Rwanda) --
strongly suggest that confronted with the real possibility of
such a return, Rwanda has mixed feelings.

-- likewise, working through the GDRC and our European
Embassies and our EU confreres, we need to keep reiterating a
clear and simple message to the FDLR, it is time to go home
or face the consequences.

-- we should encourage the AU and the EU to continue to
explore the possibility of AU military assistance to the
Monuc-Congolese effort, while keeping in mind that given the
significant military obligations already undertaken by the AU
it may not be able to compose a force quickly enough to be of
assistance.

-- we have an opportunity, through the Tripartite Agreement,
to ensure that Rwanda and the DRC continue to talk directly
to each other about the FDLR process. (Ghonda and Kaputo
visited Kigali at least twice during the negotiations to
speak directly to President Kagame.) We should adhere to the
Tripartite meeting schedule which we ourselves outlined, to
keep open these channels of communication. We should ensure
that the FDLR question is the central issue on the agenda of
the April 21-22 Tripartite meeting in Lubumbashi.

-- likewise, we should move ahead as expeditiously as
possible in establishing the fusion cell. If functional
within the next three months it could provide a useful tool
for any post-August military operation against remaining
genocidaire elements.

-- we are considering a Congolese request to provide
brigade-level command training to the element which would
combat the FDLR. We should move expeditiously on that
request, and also look seriously for any communications
equipment which might be available for this discrete element,
possibly through the excess defense articles program.

Seizing the Moment
--------------


7. (C) In short, we have an unprecedented opportunity to
significantly reduce, if not eliminate, one of the largest
and thorniest of the regional security flashpoints. Doing so
will be a major step as well in our efforts to encourage
Rwanda and the DRC to resume diplomatic relations at the
proper moment. Finally, but far from insignificantly, the
return of the FDLR to Rwanda could greatly diminish the
degree of human suffering which currently characterizes the
life of average Congolese in the two Kivus, who are
victimized daily by the FDLR elements. We need to do
everything we can to ensure that this process is not stalled,
but rather moves quickly ahead.
MEECE