UDPS TORPEDOS INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INITIATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 002055

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: UDPS TORPEDOS INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INITIATIVE


Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) During the November visit of the U.N. Security Council
to the DRC, members of Etienne Tshisekedi,s UDPS party
approached the French Ambassador indicating that the party
realized the need to modify the party,s rejection of the
Transition and election process. In other words, the UDPS
was interested in finding a way to participate in elections.
Arrangements were made for party representatives to present a
paper to the head of the UNSC delegation, French PermRep de
la Sabliere. Ultimately Tshisekedi himself showed up, but
delivered a paper and verbal position well short of the
earlier promises, reiterating a series of unrealistic
preconditions, and there was no direct positive movement
forward.


2. (C) Despite the disappointing Tshisekedi performance, UDPS
members continued to indicate privately that a more
fundamental shift in the party position could be had, leading
the British Ambassador in particular to undertake what was
hoped to be discreet negotiations among the main political
parties to see if a formula could be found to bring the UDPS
into the process. The International Committee to Accompany
the Transition (CIAT) endorsed the attempt, and contacts got
underway at the level of party Secretaries General. While
news (predictably) leaked out of the talks, and President
Kabila,s PPRD party never formally participated, the
outlines of a potential deal appeared to be shaping up. The
fourth in a series of formal "discussion" meetings took place
last week, with a request for the UDPS representatives to at
minimum ensure the party would implicitly allow the December
15 constitution referendum to go forward without a problem,
and for CIAT representatives to pressure the Transition
government to solve the problem of multiple competing
supposed UDPS factions being recognized as legitimate
separate UDPS parties.


3. (U) The apparent definitive UDPS response came in the form
of a strong public statement delivered personally by
Tshisekedi (as reported in septel regarding the run-up to

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Sunday,s referendum) delivered yesterday, December 15. The
statement asserts that the referendum is being conducted in
the context of an "electoral and political process that is
exclusive, defective, unjust, and manifestly
counter-productive." Tshisekedi called on Congolese to stay
at home and not endorse this "betrayal" by their
participation in voting. The statement was accompanied by a
printed list of six reasons to boycott, including ambiguous
morality (apparently regarding a lack of a Constitutional ban
of homosexual marriage),the imposition of a text prepared
"in a foreign land, by foreigners, for foreigners" (perhaps a
reference to the Sun City Accord, which Tshisekedi in fact
did sign at the time, or perhaps an incorrect charge that the
draft Constitution was prepared abroad),and the circulation
of several contradictory versions of the draft Constitution
as proof of the treachery of those seeking to promote it.


4. (SBU) At the weekly CIAT meeting on December 15, the
British Ambassador acknowledged that the UDPS statement
pretty much killed any further hope for bringing Tshisekedi
into the process. At least, however, the effort made it
clear that the CIAT and international community in general
had sought to go the extra mile to get the UDPS engaged in
next year,s elections.


5. (C) Comment: It is very likely that the UDPS
representatives were misrepresenting Tshisekedi,s position
in their talks with foreign Ambassadors. Indeed, there is a
past history of party "moderates
" seeking to leverage international influence to obtain
change from Tshisekedi. Rarely will party members challenge
Tshisekedi directly, as he does not tolerate significant

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dissent within the party. A number of party leaders are not
happy with the rigid party stance opposing the electoral
process, recognizing that such a policy inevitably
contributes to declining influence. At this point, however,
it appears that well-known Tshisekedi obstinacy is prevailing
over any more nuanced position, and time is quickly running
out for the party to become a part of the electoral process.
End comment.
MEECE