Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KINSHASA1969
2005-11-30 13:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

FOREIGN MINISTER COMPLAINS ABOUT CIAT COMMUNIQUE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO CG 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

301349Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001969 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO CG
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER COMPLAINS ABOUT CIAT COMMUNIQUE

REF: KINSHASA 1954

Classified By: DCM TDougherty for reasons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001969

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO CG
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER COMPLAINS ABOUT CIAT COMMUNIQUE

REF: KINSHASA 1954

Classified By: DCM TDougherty for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (SBU) Foreign Minister Ramazani convoked the Kinshasa
diplomatic corps the morning of November 30 to express the
GDRC's unhappiness with CIAT's November 25 communique that
took transition leaders to task for inaction on security
sector reform, non-payment of salaries to the military,
delays in enacting essential legislation, not holding
regularly scheduled meetings of joint commissions and the
Espace Presidentiel, and other issues central to the
successful completion of the DRC's transition (reftel).
CIAT's communique was issued after the 16 members of CIAT
agreed that a clear message needed to be sent to transition
leaders that urgent action and strong leadership on their
part are needed. With the Ambassador in the east for a
Congressional visit, DCM attended Ramazani's meeting.


2. (C) Ramazani said that his comments were not intended to
be the official response of the GDRC, which he said would be
forthcoming from the government's spokesman. He added that
he had decided to meet with the entire diplomatic corps (and
not just with CIAT) so that all would know what is being
discussed. Quoting sections of the communique that he found
objectionable, Ramazani said the communique had given the
impression that transition leaders were indifferent to the
needs of the military, that leaders were betraying the
people, and the parliament was incapable of adopting
legislation. He noted that the Amnesty Bill had been passed
by parliament just the previous evening (septel to follow),
and that the Electoral Law would be adopted immediately after
the constitutional referendum. He made no specific
references to military pay or security sector reform. As an
aside about scheduled meetings not taking place, he said they
had not been cancelled but only postponed. He pointed out
that the meetings couldn't take place with various leaders
and ministers not being available (comment: which of course
was exactly CIAT's point).


3. (C) On several occasions, he admitted that the transition
had problems, delays, and difficulties. While acknowledging
that CIAT has a role in the transition as mandated in the Sun
City Accord, he said that its recent communique reflected
neither "solidarity" nor "collaboration." Noting that the
transition's various factions have been working well together
and have "come a long way," he asked rhetorically if it was
now the time for CIAT to criticize. He repeatedly said that
a communique released to the media was not the proper way to
convey information, and said that CIAT and others could
always pass messages through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(comment: which prompted some muted chuckling in the room
since the Ministry is not known for efficiency or
responsiveness). Ramazani stressed that any action that
could erode confidence in the transition should be avoided,
and that it was not right for CIAT "to go over the heads" of
transition leaders by appealing to public opinion.


4. (C) Ramazani concluded by saying he would take three
questions, "but no debate." Only the South African
Ambassador responded, both in the absence of the dean and as
a member of CIAT. In short remarks, he said that CIAT would
continue to play a constructive role and was willing to meet
as a group with the Foreign Minister. Ramazani then
acknowledged that while CIAT's "intentions" might have been
good, the "form" of the communique wasn't. The twenty-minute
session then ended.


5. (C) Comment: The communique obviously stung many in the
government, and Ramazani clearly had been instructed to
convey displeasure. More of the same will no doubt be
included in the official government response. Ramazani's
concerns about the communique being released to the press
need to be put in context, however. CIAT regularly issues
communiques which are always reported by the press. The issue
this time was that the communique was critical of the
government.


6. (C) Comment continued: The intent of the communique was
to send a clear message, and on that score it succeeded very
well. In general the media welcomed CIAT's communique and
concurred that the issues raised by CIAT urgently need to be
addressed. With the exception of Ramazani's remark about
some progress on the legislative front, it is telling that no
one in the government up to this point has yet said anything
about the substance of the concerns raised by CIAT, nor taken
any new action to allay those concerns. End comment.
MEECE