MONUC DIVISIONAL COMMANDER COMMENTS ON NORTH KIVU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001854

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO MOPS CG
SUBJECT: MONUC DIVISIONAL COMMANDER COMMENTS ON NORTH KIVU
OPERATION

REF: KIN 1814

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROGER MEECE. REASON 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Ambassador hosted for lunch on Saturday, November 5
MONUC,s eastern division commander, MG Patrick Cammaert.
The Ambassador asked for Cammaert,s observations regarding
the recently-launched FARDC/MONUC operation in North Kivu
province targeting FDLR and Mai Mai elements in the Virunga
area.


2. (C) Cammaert reaffirmed that the operation represented a
new element in the area. The ostensible lead role of FARDC
troops, the use of an integrated FARDC brigade, and a
coordinated operation in North Kivu are all new and welcome
developments in the Kivu provinces. Responding to questions,
Cammaert also affirmed that the operation has the support of
North Kivu Governor Serufuli and FARDC 8th Military District
Commander Amisi, also both important elements. (Comment:
Amisi and Serufuli in essence represent rival centers of
power in the province, with Serufuli in particular seeking to
establish himself as the primary authority for the province.
End comment). Cammaert noted that the MONUC Indian brigade
commander in North Kivu had played a key role to obtain a
FARDC decision to move out of the operational area
"unhelpful" non-integrated FARDC units that had been
stationed there, including units associated with Serufuli,s
former "self-defense" force who presumably still feel a
primary loyalty to Serufuli rather than the FARDC chain of
command. Cammaert noted, however, that these units might
return to the area as follow-on operations continue over a
longer period of time, or expand their geographic scope. The
Ambassador asked if all the elements of the 5th Brigade,
including ex-MLC, so-called ex-Government, and ex-RCD troops,
were all fully participating and working reasonably well
together. Cammaert affirmed that to be the case.


3. (C) While encouraged by the development, Cammaert also
expressed caution. He underscored that the FARDC brigade,
having received additional training from MONUC in addition to
that offered during the integration process, is a step above
most FARDC units, but it still has severe limitations. MONUC
is obliged to lead much of the operational planning. FARDC
logistical support is all but non-existent, and as elsewhere
MONUC is obliged to provide food, water, and other supplies
to the FARDC troops, a function for which MONUC is not
budgeted. MONUC is also providing medevac and other
services, all of which are frequently over the reserves or
opposition of MONUC and DPKO administrators. MONUC is also
providing all air support and much if not all of the ground
transportation being utilized for the troops. Cammaert
reported that the 5th Integrated Brigade seemed to be better
equipped than the 3rd Integrated Brigade now being deployed
to South Kivu, but basic equipment remains a problem. (Note:
Belgium is in the process of transferring large quantities of
material to the DRC to equip the 3rd Integrated Brigade. End
note). Salary payments to the FARDC troops involved in this
operation, as elsewhere, is another major problem.


4. (C) Contrary to initial information, Cammaert also
confirmed that some FDLR combatants had been killed by FARDC
troops in early action in Virunga Park. He did not have a
figure, but believed the FDLR casualties to be relatively
small. The FDLR combatants killed were in addition to the
Mai Mai killed in nearby operations to free Election
Commission personnel that were being held. The Ambassador
noted that FDLR troops in South Kivu to-date had avoided open
confrontation with FARDC/MONUC forces operating in
combination. Cammaert speculated that the FDLR in question
had been caught by surprise and therefore chose to resist,
acknowledging that the FDLR normally chooses to retreat.


5. (C) Cammaert also highlighted a problem with FDLR
prisoners. A group of FDLR prisoners captured the previous
week in South Kivu had refused repatriation to Rwanda, and UN
DDRRR personnel had therefore returned the prisoners to the
FARDC. FDLR prisoners caught in the North Kivu operation
were being similarly transferred to DDRRR authorities, but if
they too refused repatriation, they also presumably would be
given back to the FARDC. It is not clear what will happen
over the long-term to these FDLR prisoners who refuse
repatriation.


6. (C) In northeastern DRC, Cammaert confirmed that MONUC
companies and helicopter refueling facilities were being
established at a working base in Aba to deal with any Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) troops returning to the area. Cammaert
said that he would welcome any information available,
particularly if actionable, regarding potential LRA presence
or operations in the DRC.
MEECE