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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KINSHASA1731
2005-10-17 12:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

RAMAZANI WILL NOT ATTEND TRIPARTITE MEETING; DRC

Tags:   PGOV  PREL  KPKO  CG 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171257Z Oct 05
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001731 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: RAMAZANI WILL NOT ATTEND TRIPARTITE MEETING; DRC
STILL WORRIED OVER FDLR

REF: A. KINSHASA 1711


B. KINSHASA 1690

Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.



1. (C) During his October 13 meeting with the Ambassador
regarding the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention (reftel
A), Minister of Foreign Affairs Raymond Ramazani spoke about
the upcoming Tripartite meeting and the security situation in
the eastern part of the country, particularly in South Kivu
province with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR).



--------------------------


TRIPARTITE MEETING


--------------------------





2. (C) Ramazani said he was not planning on attending the
upcoming Tripartite meeting scheduled for October 20-21 in
Kampala. He added that he also gathered from Rwanda's Foreign
Minister, Charles Murigande, that he would not be attending
the meeting, either. The DRC delegation likely will be headed
by Minister for Regional Cooperation Mbusa Nyamwisi.



--------------------------


ACTING AGAINST THE FDLR


--------------------------





3. (C) Ramazani said he worried about the recent massacre of
civilians in South Kivu by RASTA/FDLR forces (reftel B),
indicating that such events reflect the continuing obstacles
to establishing peace and security posed by FDLR elements.
Ramazani also said that the presence and activities of the
FDLR are the biggest difficulties in establishing normal
relations with Rwanda.



4. (C) Ramazani told Ambassador he was disappointed that the
US and European Union proposed package of sanctions against
the FDLR had not been enacted following the September 30
deadline.



5. (C) Ramazani further said the Armed Forces of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) were unable to fight the
FDLR alone. He complained that MONUC, which has troops in the
province, is not in a hurry to resolve the situation and
disarm the FDLR soldiers. He said that MONUC should have the
capacity to stop FDLR activities, but as of yet has not done
so.



6. (C) The Ambassador concurred that a package of measures or
sanctions targeting FDLR leaders outside of Africa is needed
following the September 30 deadline, and noted that efforts
are in progress to put such measures in place. He also noted
that MONUC's mandate and capability have limits, but that
MONUC has been actively conducting for some time cordon and
search operations to establish arms-free zones in South Kivu
province. Indeed, 2,500 FARDC troops have essentially been
trained by the MONUC brigade there to assist in these
operations, although there is no explicit MONUC mandate for
such training. What is missing is a capable FARDC force, such
as the Angolan-trained Kitona Second Integrated Brigade to
provide the needed Congolese military capacity and authority
to go after FDLR and other destabilizing forces in the area.
Likewise, when equipped, the Kamina Belgian/South African
trained brigade needs to be deployed as soon as possible to
North Kivu to provide a similar capability there. Ramazani
acknowledged the point that the FARDC deployments are needed.



7. (C) Comment: While even the integrated FARDC brigades'
capabilities are open to question, deployment of the newly
trained integrated brigades is essential to provide a
national component to operations against the FDLR and other
disruptive forces in eastern Congo. Such a component is
needed not only for additional military capability, but as
well for the sovereign authority that the FARDC represents.
While various factors, including arrival and distribution of
equipment promised by various donors, has slowed the process,
deployments are lagging far behind schedule, we suspect to a
significant degree due to foot-dragging or outright
opposition within the senior FARDC officer corps. With
proposals on the table for far-reaching reforms regarding
FARDC pay, support and general administration, vested
interests of these officers are being threatened. Deployments
to active operational areas of the integrated brigades
focuses even more attention on these issues. These
deployments are high on the agenda for the next meetings of
the CIAT with the Espace Presidentiel, and the Security
Sector Mixed Commission, and we will continue to press the
issue bilaterally as well. End Comment.
MEECE