SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: MOVING - WITH DIFFICULTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001447

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: MOVING - WITH DIFFICULTY

Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Several meetings in the past week have
featured significant discussions at senior levels regarding
critically important Security Sector Reform programs. The
Ambassador and President Kabila reviewed the subject
September 2, a long September 6 CIAT/Espace Presidential
underscored the need for further progress, and a Joint
Security Commission meeting September 7 included detailed
discussion of all major sector areas. Five integrated FARDC
brigades have now been formed, but support is still a
problem. Delays have been encountered in starting the next
training cycle. The EU Security Mission has prepared an
extensive plan to ensure salary payments and other support to
integrated brigades; Kabila has given orders for expedited
review and, hopefully, approval and implementation. South
African-led military census efforts are advancing, and
predictably showing greatly reduced number of actual soldiers
from earlier estimates. The U.K. has promised to finance
completion of the exercise, which ideally can be finished by
the end of November. Large-scale DDR programs finally seem
to be moving forward in something approaching the original
plan, although major challenges remain. Disarmament and
repatriation of foreign combatants remains a major concern.
End summary.

Security Sector on Numerous Agendas
--------------


2. (C) The security sector and elections are the center
points of the Congolese transition. This cables summarizes
discussions of key security sector issues that were discussed
in several meetings over the past week, including a
one-on-one Ambassador/President Kabila meeting September 2, a
four and a half hour September 6 meeting involving the
sixteen Ambassadors/Charges of the International Committee to
Accompany the Transition (CIAT) and the Espace Presidentiel
(President Kabila and the four GDRC Vice Presidents),and a
GDRC/international community Joint Security Sector Commission
meeting September 7. The major areas covered in these
discussions included the effort underway to form integrated
brigades and a national army; the associated disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program; Congolese
Armed Forces (FARDC) pay and support issues, including
substantial European Security Mission findings and proposals;
military census programs; and military deployment problems
and constraints.


3. (C) The weakness of FARDC capacity and the central
importance to the DRC transition process of effective reform
are universally recognized in Kinshasa. More difficult is
finding timely and effective solutions. The Ambassador
discussed the problem with President Kabila in their
September 2 meeting. The Ambassador emphasized that FARDC
Chief of Staff General Kisempia shows no signs of interest in
addressing serious support issues, but rather throws up a
screen of excuses why progress has not been recorded. Kabila
took note, commenting that the problems have been entrenched
in the Zaire/Congo army for years and that a "new breed" of
officers has to be developed to change the overall mindset.
Separately, EmbOffs have been told by Presidency staff that
Kabila has been ready for some time to get rid of Kisempia,
but is not happy about the logical successor, current Air
Force Commander John Numbi. In recent days, Presidency staff
have contacted the U.S. and other embassies seeking evidence
of Kisempia,s direct involvement in salary skimming or other
corrupt practices, and have also indicated that Kabila is
looking at options that are politically viable to appoint a
better prospect as FARDC Chief of Staff. (Comment: Kabila,s
reservations about Numbi are well-founded. Numbi has been
busy trying to build his own rival power base, and his name
has been suggested by the U.K. for inclusion in a potential
arms-trafficking sanctions list, although we are not aware of
any evidence at this point of Numbi,s active involvement in
arms trafficking. Given the unsteady nature of the GDRC
Transition Government, changing the FARDC Chief of Staff can
provoke major tensions and possibly disruption within the
GDRC. That said, while Kisempia,s removal would not
automatically translate into a solution of FARDC corruption
problems, it would represent a positive step. End comment.)

Creating an Integrated Army
--------------


4. (C) The military integration process is at the heart of
security sector reforms, and it deservedly received
substantial discussion in recent meetings. Five FARDC
integrated brigades have now been formally trained and put in
place, working toward a goal of 18 integrated brigades to be
formed and deployed before 2006 elections. (Note: This does
not include the 2,500 FARDC troops that de facto have been
trained by the MONUC Pakistani brigade in South Kivu province
and are not part of any integrated FARDC brigades. End
note.) The integrated brigades are urgently needed in Ituri
District and North and South Kivu to conduct operations, but
significant - and familiar - deployment and support problems
have been encountered. The Fourth Brigade, recently
completing training at the Mushaki integration center, for
example, was struck with a cholera epidemic while being
deployed to Ituri District. Compounding the problem, troops
and dependents not hospitalized in Beni (North Kivu) were
taken to a site near Bunia (Ituri District, Orientale
Province) and placed there in quarantine, but without food,
shelter or other essentials. At the September 6 CIAT/Espace
Presidentiel meeting, Vice President Z,Ahidi Ngoma charged
that up to 1,000 ex-RCD troops had deserted this brigade, a
charge vehemently denied by Vice President Ruberwa and
Defense Minister Onusumba. Defense Minister Onusumba was
also put on the spot in the September 7 Joint Commission
meeting, seeking to explain measures being taken to
investigate what went wrong with this deployment and the
steps underway to address the problems. MONUC has been
attempting to help to the degree it can in the interim, at
least with food.


5. (C) The Angolan-trained Third Brigade from the Kitona
center has still not been deployed to its designated station
in South Kivu. Security officials asserted at the September
7 meeting that the problem continues to be a lack of air
transport for the troops and equipment, a problem also
affecting the Belgium/South Africa-trained Second Brigade
trained in Kamina, destined for North Kivu. (Note: Given the
distances involved and lack of roads, surface movements for
these deployments are not feasible.) The Kamina brigade is
also still lacking some equipment which is being supplied and
is en route from Belgium. Both brigades are urgently needed,
as neither North nor South Kivu as of yet have any FARDC
integrated brigades in place. In both the September 6 and 7
meetings, the need to find rapid answers to the deployment
problems was strongly reiterated.


6. (C) Vice President Ruberwa also initiated discussion at
the Joint Commission regarding roadblocks to getting
combatants into place to start the next cycle of integration
training. Only a relative handful of the combatants
designated to report are yet in the training centers.
Problems identified as delaying progress include delays in
assigning personnel (primarily EU and MONUC) to oversee the
collection and processing of weapons, although all teams are
as of this week reportedly now in place. There also appears
to be confusion in some areas as to who is to report and how.
Some units not designated for this cycle are reportedly
waiting to be processed, while soldiers in other units which
are designated do not seem to have all needed information.
Ruberwa directed, and Defense Minister Onusumba and the FARDC
Military Integration Service (SMI) commander undertook, to
resolve the problem quickly. Previous problems of how to
ensure the transport of soldiers to processing centers for
sorting into those being demobilized and those being
integrated have now also been solved, in an agreement struck
with the World Bank which is heavily involved in the
demobilization effort.


7. (SBU) On a more positive note, the SMI Commander reported
that all integration centers have now been provisioned with
food and other supplies, a major improvement over the
previously existing situation. The organization in charge of
DDR, CONADER, also reported that its corresponding DDR sites
are ready to proceed. SMI also reported that a Dutch General
(being financed by Holland) has also just arrived on detail
to SMI to assist with organization and operations.

DDR - Starting to Get On Track
--------------


8. (C) CONADER indicates that it has at this point in excess
of 20,000 people involved in DDR activities, plus another
roughly 6,000 former child soldiers involved in community
reintegration. The bulk of this figure, however, comes from
former Ituri militia members who submitted to DDR programs as
a result of MONUC/FARDC First Integrated Brigade operations
in recent months. CONADER reported that it has largely
solved payment issues and is now able to supply at least most
promised payments to those being demobilized, except in Ituri
District. Ruberwa pointedly noted that Ituri arguably
represents the most urgent location where payments are needed
to ensure the former militiamen do not revert to armed
activity. CONADER noted that agreements are nearing
completion with the World Bank and implementing partners that
will enable Ituri programs to go forward. The Ambassador
noted in the September 7 meeting that USAID is strongly
engaged in this effort, with a substantial commitment of USD
2 million to supplement a World Bank USD 4 million to
implement effective Ituri reintegration activities as quickly
as possible.


9. (SBU) CONADER also reported that it is now ready to begin
receiving soldiers who are designated for demobilization from
the integration "orientation centers", in accordance with the
original integration/DDR model. That model had been severely
distorted in recent months by multiple "emergency plans"
largely put in place following Rwanda,s threats in late 2004
to stage cross-border unilateral military action. The South
Africans reported at the September 7 meeting that their
military census activity has already indentified 25,693
soldiers in active duty ranks in seven military districts as
preferring, or being selected for, disarmament.

Salaries and Support - EU Report
--------------


10. (U) The familiar topic of salary payments and needed
support for FARDC troops was discussed in all three meetings.
There has been little to no improvement to-date in this
area; troops, including those in integrated brigades, are not
receiving regular salary payments, nor ongoing essential
support (e.g., food, supplies, etc). All key players
recognize this as a major problem for FARDC effectiveness,
and indeed a threat to Transition progress.


11. (C) Minister of Defense Onusumba in the CIAT/Espace
Presidentiel meeting reported that the EU Security Mission in
the DRC has completed a report on support questions, with
extensive recommendations. Apparently equipped with a copy
which was several inches thick, the Minister indicated that
he intended to bring the report to the Government as soon as
possible. President Kabila asked Onusumba to skip the usual
step of discussing it in the Political Committee, and to save
time instead by bringing it directly to the High Defense
Council, which met the afternoon of September 7.


12. (C) Onusumuba and EUSec head General Joanna briefed the
Joint Security Commission September 7 on key elements of the
report. In particular, they noted that pay reform proposals
are keyed to separating FARDC line command functions from
"chain of expenditure" responsibilities. In other words,
control of salary and other payments is to be vested with
individuals specifically charged with, and presumably trained
for, ensuring disbursements are made as intended, taking
control of the funds away from line commanders. This would,
of course, preclude the traditional practice of
Zairian/Congolese commanders skimming funds from the payroll,
leaving little or no money to actually pay the troops. EUSec
also has personnel to detail to the FARDC to help train and
oversee implementation of its recommendations. Joanna noted
that there are specific recommendations as to how funds
should flow directly to brigades or affected units, as well
as other aspects of financial controls to ensure support is
provided.


13. (C) Both the Minister and EUSec chief emphasized that
implementation of the pay and other changes should start with
the integrated brigades. There is already a firm base line
of how many soldiers are in these brigades and where they are
deployed. In addition, there is a clear advantage to
underscoring the advantage to soldiers of participation in an
integrated FARDC brigade vice the former belligerent
factional units.

Military Census - South African Progress
--------------


14. (U) At the September 7 meeting, a South African officer
delivered a summary report of progress and findings to-date
of the South African-supported military census program. This
effort was launched to determine for the first time a firm
base-line figure of the number of active duty combatants, as
opposed to the inflated claimed figures that have long
existed in all Congolese forces.


15. (C) The census has largely been completed in seven
military districts, with four left to cover. A total of
95,052 soldiers have been identified to-date and equipped
with I.D. badges. Of these, as noted in para 9, over 25,000
have been designated for the disarmament program, with
roughly 69,350 tentatively scheduled for integration (Note:
All soldiers will still be subject to processing through the
orientation centers for a determination of selection for
integration or demobilization). The South Africans did not
report how many soldiers had been claimed in the units
reviewed. Other reports, however, suggest that typically,
between 30% and 50% of the claimed forces cannot be found.
In the September 7 meeting, Vice President Ruberwa noted that
even relatively high estimates for the remaining four
military districts would bring the total number of soldiers
to fewer than 150,000, with a significant portion of these to
be demobilized. Other commentary during the discussion noted
that the Presidential Guard (GSSP) is not included in the
inventory figures to-date. GSSP numbers are estimated to
total between 12,000 - 15,000 soldiers, but these are not
attached to specific military districts. Ruberwa expressed
concern about the wide variance in the GSSP estimates.


16. (C) Defense Minister Onusumba also reported that an
in-house FARDC inventory was coming up with significantly
higher numbers of soldiers, likely totaling well in excess of
200,000. He noted that the Defense budget is continuing to
bear the burden of payments to widows and children out of
what amounts to active-duty pay allocations. Vice President
Ruberwa suggested that the South African numbers are likely
to be more accurate than the in-house numbers. He also
noted that survivor payments should be transferred to other
ministries.


17. (SBU) The outcome of the census will have a major impact
on GDRC military pay allocations and systems. In theory, the
greatly reduced number of supposed soldiers can permit a
general increase in pay levels without raising the overall
defense budget. Currently, enlisted soldiers are only
scheduled to receive $10/month, an amount that is clearly
insufficient for a soldier and family. President Kabila told
the Ambassador that the IMF has already been saying it wants
the Defense budget reduced to correspond to the lower number
of soldiers. The Ambassador told Kabila that he, and other
colleagues in the CIAT, favor using the ostensible "savings"
to increase soldiers, pay to more acceptable levels.


18. (C) Responding to a question, the South African officer
reported that he hopes that the inventory exercise can be
completed by the end of November. The UK Ambassador reported
that the British government, responding to concerns about
inadequate funds, is ready to finance completion of the South
Africa-supported exercise.

USG Activities
--------------


19. (SBU) The Ambassador briefed President Kabila regarding
planned USG military cooperation efforts. Notably this
includes training for between 100 and 300 battalion and
brigade staff officers (Note: using Mobutu-era leftover FMF
funds) hopefully to be implemented no later than January

2005. Kabila welcomed the planned training, and indeed
anything more the U.S. could provide. In addition, the U.S.
is planning a Defense Institute for Legal Studies (DIILS)
counterterrorism seminar September 19-23 which will involve
security and law enforcement personnel, as well as civil
society representatives, to be financed by available
counterterrorism funds the DATT identified. Some HIV/AIDS
activities targeting the military are also in the pipeline.

Comment
--------------


20. (SBU) Security sector reform in the DRC is an immense
undertaking. The various components including training, DDR,
census, pay and support reform, and redeployments all
represent moving parts that must work to some degree in
tandem to avoid the general machinery grinding to a halt.
With very major investments from the Europeans, Angolans, and
South Africans, the process is moving forward, albeit
haltingly, and some measurable progress is being recorded.
It is of critical importance to accelerate the reform
activities, however, to ensure domestic security and
operational effectiveness against various Congolese and
foreign armed groups in eastern Congo, and to preclude a
return to armed conflict by any party who might decide that
the transition process and elections no longer serves his
purpose.

MEECE