Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KINSHASA1104
2005-07-07 15:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

FDLR REPATRIATION INITIATIVE UPDATE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO CG 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001104 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO CG
SUBJECT: FDLR REPATRIATION INITIATIVE UPDATE

REF: A) KINSHASA 1100 B) KINSHASA 1099 C) KINSHASA 1078

Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001104

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO CG
SUBJECT: FDLR REPATRIATION INITIATIVE UPDATE

REF: A) KINSHASA 1100 B) KINSHASA 1099 C) KINSHASA 1078

Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Several ambassadors met with Presidency
Special Advisor for Security Kaputo July 6 for an update
regarding GDRC activities to achieve repatriation of FDLR
members to Rwanda. Kaputo attributed the delay of a GDRC
statement on the subject to an extended GDRC &assessment8
seminar, and acknowledged that the FDLR statement issued June
25 was more conditional that had been earlier hoped.
Nonetheless, he indicated that the GDRC has been proceeding
with talks focused on FDLR field commanders Amani and Omega,
and believes they are ready and able to deliver significant
returnees. Indeed, he indicated, hard-liners are attempting
to isolate Amani through overt military attacks, as reflected
in intra-FDLR fighting (ref a). The ambassadors again urged
a strong GDRC statement as soon as possible, and continued
work toward a GDRC capability for meaningful military
pressure. We may wish to consider a USG statement to
encourage repatriation, pending the timing and contents of
the promised GDRC communique. End summary.


2. (C) The ambassadors and charges of the U.S., Belgium,
Holland, and the U.K., and UN SRSG Swing met with Presidency
Special Advisor for Security Samba Kaputo late afternoon of
July 6 to discuss the current situation regarding the FDLR.
Kaputo was accompanied by several other GDRC officials. SRSG
Swing opened the substantive discussion by noting that the
GDRC statement that Kaputo had earlier promised (ref c) had
not been issued, and inquired about its status.


3. (C) Kaputo reiterated that the GDRC intends to issue a
statement, and attributed the delay to a much-prolonged GDRC
transition &assessment8 seminar which involved all
government ministers for over a week. Nonetheless, he
reported that the Supreme Defense Council had met earlier
this week to discuss and approve a new draft text, and that
Defense Minister Onusumba had been charged with presenting a
revised draft to the Council of Ministers for approval.
Kaputo indicated that could happen as early as this Friday,
July 15.


4. (C) In the meantime, Kaputo indicated that the GDRC has

been pursuing contacts with FDLR field commanders to promote
repatriation. Having concluded that FDLR President Ignace
Murwanashyaka could not or would not produce any positive
results, the government had identified FDLR South Division
commander Amani as a potentially useful interlocutor. Kaputo
said that the GDRC had conducted an assessment as to whether
Amani could be relied upon to take serious action, and
whether he had any apparent support. Their conclusion was
that Amani had the support of the great majority of southern
division FDLR members, and that he was serious about pursuing
repatriation. Through Amani, contact was also made with FDLR
North Division commander Omega, who indicated sympathy with
Amani,s position. Initial plans were being formulated to
regroup scattered FDLR elements prior to going to
MONUC-supervised transition centers, and then on to Rwanda.
The June 25 FDLR statement was a part of this process.


5. (C) Seeing real progress toward repatriation, Kaputo said
that FDLR hard-liners, particularly those in the FDLR general
headquarters under the direction of General Mudakumura, had
been alarmed. Armed FDLR groups under their direction
apparently attacked Col. Amani and his forces the afternoon
of July 5 (as reported ref b) in an attempt to forestall
further action. Should Amani win that engagement, Kaputo
added, his hand whould be even further strengthened, and the
GDRC would pursue repatriation with him and his allies.
Kaputo reported that GDRC information suggested Amani had the
upper hand in the ongoing clash as of July 6.


6. (C) Several ambassadors noted that the June 25 FDLR
statement was more conditional than Kaputo had indicated
would be the case. Kaputo acknowledged the fact, attributing
it to Amani,s sense that he could not convey a sense of
total &capitulation8 and retain credibility with the FDLR
troops or fellow officers. All the ambassadors urged the
GDRC to issue its promised communique in as strong terms as
possible, and as quickly as possible. The reported fighting
on the ground only underscored the need for an immediate
public GDRC statement. Kaputo accepted the suggestion
without comment.


7. (C) Responding to other questions, Kaputo said that there
has been no recent direct Congo/Rwanda government contact
regarding the FDLR. He indicated that he believed that such
contact should go through &the international community.8
The ambassadors collectively pushed back, emphasizing the
need for direct Kinshasa/Kigali communication. Kaputo also
reiterated his view of the importance of the Pilotage and
Monitoring Committees, the former to consist of two
representatives each from the GDRC, GOR, and FDLR, and the
latter composed of members of the international community, as
agreed in the last Tripartite meeting in Lubumbashi.


8. (C) SRSG Swing noted that MONUC had launched Operation
Falcon Sweep (ref b),an initial probing action to gain
information, provide experience, and increase pressure on the
FDLR. Kaputo confirmed that the GDRC continues to pursue a
plan for coordinated FARDC/MONUC military operations directed
against the FDLR, but noted that FDRC forces are not yet
ready to initiate offensive operations. The ambassadors
encouraged planning and preparations to move forward as
quickly as possible.


9. (C) Comment: While the GDRC assessment seminar did indeed
delay many things, possibly including the GDRC statement, the
real story more likely was GDRC indecision or lack of
internal agreement regarding the specifics or form of the
statement. The project still seems to be on the table,
however, despite the fact that the overall sequence and form
is no longer that which Kaputo earlier described. The
intra-FDLR fighting is a new element that bears monitoring as
to its significance and outcome. If it appears that FDLR
commanders are emerging from that, however, with an interest
in repatriation, and if the GDRC issues quickly a
sufficiently useful statement, we may wish to consider a USG
statement that could support further repatriation movement.
The Belgian and British representatives at the July 6
meetings indicated that their respective governments might be
interested in similar statements as well. The International
Committee to Support the Transition (CIAT) is another
potential mechanism for a supportive statement. End comment.

MEECE