TRANSITION ASSESSMENT COMPLETE -- NOW WHAT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001066

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: TRANSITION ASSESSMENT COMPLETE -- NOW WHAT?

REF: KINSHASA 964

Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: The government officially ended its
assessment of the transition's accomplishments and failings
June 28. The assessment, heralded in President Kabila's May
16 public remarks, has been officially billed as designed to
provide a blueprint for improvement in the last year of the
transition. The process -- which took much longer than
originally foreseen -- has been excruciating for those
involved and its actual usefulness, vice potentially
politically advantegous PPRD tool, remains to be seen. End
Summary.

A Valid Concept
--------------


2. (C) As described by both the Ministers of Interior and
Defense, the transitional assessment was actually a
surprisingly useful process, at least internally. All
Ministers were required to provide a summary of the
transition goals which fell within their area of
responsibility; identify resources they had been given with
which to accomplish those goals (whether domestic or
international funds, international training and equipment,
etc); account for how they had used those resources;
delineate areas undone or needing further effort, with
associated resource demands; provide recommendations on how
they intend to address the outstanding tasks; and respond to
questions following their presentations. For instance, both
the above-mentioned Ministers are part of the Security
Commission chaired by Vice President Ruberwa. Therefore,
both had to prepare and present their reports to the
assembled membership of that commission. The ministers of
Economy and Finance, for instance, went through a similar
process for Vice President Bemba's Finance Commission. The
unexpectedly complex but apparently well-conceived definition
of the individual reports seems largely to explain why the
entire process took as long as it did, particularly given the
number of questions posed following the reports (38 in the
case of the Minister of Interior, 32 in the case of the
Minister of Defense). In most cases, lack of appropriate
resources seems to have been identified as among major
obstacles to fully meeting the original transition goals,
although the Defense Minister also highlighted political
roadblocks to military integration.

What Now?
--------------


3. (C) If the process itself was potentially useful, the big
question remains what the government -- and particularly
President Kabila, whose initiative this was -- intends to do
with the results. Before the assessment actually began,
senior presidential advisor Augustin Katumba described it to
PolCouns as a political win-win for Kabila. The results will
give the President the opportunity to replace some PPRD
cabinet ministers should he decide to do so (a useful gesture
to appease public sentiment that no one in the government
does anything),while also putting other components of the
government such as the RCD and MLC under pressure to do
likewise or risk appearing indifferent to apparent public
desire for change. National Security Advisor Samba Kaputo
echoed this sentiment June 27, hinting that Kabila might
include some sort of announcement about a PPRD cabinet
shuffle in his anticipated June 30 remarks. VP Ruberwa told
Ambassador during a June 11 meeting that it would be
difficult for him to replace RCD cabinet ministers at this
time, given that he has only recently survived, with
difficulty, his internal party political evaluation. The
same essentially holds true for VP Bemba, who is increasingly
alienated from his MLC party base and is unlikely to want to
provoke an internal confrontation.

Comment
--------------


4. (C) While some presidential advisors may be taking the
view that this is a no-lose proposition for Kabila, that is
not necessarily the case. Changing key ministers (such as
interior or defense) at this point could actually slow
progress on major elections-related issues while new
appointees try to learn the ropes, and also risks playing
into UDPS leader Tshishekedi's hands by "acknowledging" that
some ministers should go. A better strategy could be to keep
most of the incumbents and instead actually demand that they
address the shortcomings they themselves have identified.
Judging from the official remarks June 28 at the closing of
the assessment process, however, little real change may
result from the evaluation, since the message at yesterday's
meeting was mainly that more resources (mostly from the
international community) are what is needed to address most
issues. While true that obviously more resources could, in
an ideal world, mean more progress, much could be done,
especially in the crucial social arena, with what already is
available.
MEECE