REDUCED ITURI MILITIAS SHOWING RENEWED LIFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001013

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2015
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV CG
SUBJECT: REDUCED ITURI MILITIAS SHOWING RENEWED LIFE

Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason 1.4 (b/d).


1. (U) During his recent visit to the DRC (septel),UN DPKO
Africa Chief Dmitry Titov spoke at some length regarding
continuing security concerns in Ituri District. These
comments echo those of MONUC, GDRC, and international
community representatives of renewed dangers in the key
northeastern DRC district.

Substantial Progress
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2. (C) For the past several months, MONUC has adopted a much
more aggressive posture in Ituri District, actively using its
mandate to protect the civilian population and Chapter 7
authorities, and with active cooperation to the extent
possible with the FARDC First Integrated Brigade. The risks
in Ituri, and MONUC,s new aggressive posture, are reflected
in the deaths of 12 MONUC soldiers in Ituri District thus far
this year as a result of combat operations. Nonetheless, the
effort has won broad endorsement by international community
representatives, GDRC officials and, by all apparent
accounts, the great majority of the Ituri population.
Combined with arrests by the GDRC of many of the most
notorious former warlord leaders, substantial progress in
Ituri has been recorded. Roughly 14,000 former militia
combatants have submitted to disarmament programs. The
former unchallenged control of most of the district by
various armed militias has begun to crack, along with the
solid control of militias of the DRC/Uganda border with its
lucrative customs revenues. MONUC officials in Kinshasa
estimate that there are only about 1,000 - 1,500 armed
militia still operating in the district.

But All is Reversible
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3. (C) Recent reporting from Ituri unfortunately suggests
renewed threats. Most notably, Titov reported extensive
evidence that remaining Ituri militia are clearly showing new
signs of consolidation, better operational control, and
improved weaponry. This echoes very recent comments from
many MONUC officials that Ituri militia are better organized
and better armed, including weapons never previously seen in
Ituri militia stocks. The prevailing clear conclusion is
that Ugandans have been actively involved responding to the
threat to militia control in the District, and to entrenched
mining and other economic interests. MONUC points to
apparent free movement of militia leaders and troops across
the Uganda border, and reported meetings of militia leaders
in Kampala with Ugandan officials, ongoing suspicious
activity on the military side of the Entebbe airport, and the
clear continuing Ugandan involvement in illegal resource
exploitation in the district.


4. (C) In addition, MONUC notes that the weapons collected
from the militia undergoing disarmament appear old and not
particularly serviceable, and do not include heavier weapons.
In general, the implication is that extensive weapons caches
have been established, likely as a contingency for future
options. Very few of the former militia have opted for
integration into the new national army, with the deployment
to other parts of the country that would entail, and instead
are being processed for demobilization staying close to their
Ituri homes. As well, there has been little progress
extending GDRC authority to the district, evidenced by the
continuing struggle of the Bunia local government to maintain
even basic operations and the lack of GDRC border control
personnel. While MONUC and the FARDC First Integrated
Brigade are maintaining a robust pattern of &search and
disarm8 activities, militias appear increasingly willing to
actively resist through combat engagement, and even to launch
their own attacks.

Solutions
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5. (C) The impressive progress realized in the first half of
this year in Ituri presents the best opportunity available in
many years to establish reasonably secure political and
security conditions in this large district. The resident
population is tired of ongoing conflict and exhibits little
popular support for the militias who have preyed on them.
Emerging from various discussions within the International
Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT),senior GDRC
officials, and MONUC, there is a general sense that the
following three areas represent key areas to realize future
progress to stabilize northeastern DRC.

a) Limit Ugandan Involvement: MONUC officials are convinced
that Ugandan individuals or groups have stepped up their
support to militia groups through the supply of arms, and
likely in other ways possibly including military operational
advice or organizational support. There is, however, little
available at this point in the way of hard evidence.
Nonetheless, MONUC and GDRC officials are convinced that
increased pressure must be brought to bear to put an end to
what is seen as continuing Ugandan destabilizing involvement
in Ituri. Related, the UN Arms Trafficking experts panel is
in the region now, and it is clear that cross-border arms
trafficking in Ituri is a significant focus of their
interest, along with trafficking in the Kivus. It is quite
possible that the panel report will bring out further details
regarding international support for Ituri militia activity.

b) Extend State Authority: Kinshasa has been slow to get
necessary funds to the Bunia government and begin to
establish government authority along the DRC/Uganda border.
The CIAT pressed the Espace Presidentiel on this issue in a
June 10 meeting. Vice Presidents Bemba and Ruberwa both
indicated that there are proposals in process for imminent
action, including the ability of Ituri officials to retain
for local government operations a portion of the tax revenues
now being collected. These funds now flow into a central
revenue account, and little finds its way back to the region.
For example, the Bunia government reportedly received less
than $6,000 from January 1 - April 30 for operational costs,
while collecting in excess of $500,000 in tax revenues.
Local revenue retention would have a potential major impact
in Ituri.

c) Increase military operational effectiveness: There are
two major issues. The continuing inadequate equipment
available to the FARDC First Integrated Brigade (e.g.,
communications equipment) and general weak ongoing logistics
support clearly limits its effectiveness. Indeed, salary
payments, while generally better than for most FARDC troops,
is a continuing problem. These issues fall within the
general category of endemic FARDC problems, but their effects
are particularly damaging in sensitive areas such as the Kivu
provinces and Ituri District. Concerning UN forces, there is
poorly disguised widespread frustration by MONUC forces
regarding New York-imposed regulations that de facto preclude
night operations, even though there are forces in Ituri
capable of carrying them out fully consistent with their home
nations, rules and procedures. Lifting the regulations
would give MONUC forces a substantial tactical advantage
against militia forces. MONUC Divisional Commander Cammaert
also continues to emphasize the need for intelligence to
support military operations.

Comment
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6. (C) Comment: The UN is breaking some new peacekeeping
operations ground in Ituri with a very aggressive military
strategy, operating under the general label of ongoing
"cordon and search" operations that put the militias on the
run. The operations have worked, and a lot has been
accomplished. Certainly, few would have predicted six months
ago that 14,000 Ituri militia members would be in the
demobilization process. Nonetheless, it is clear that there
are some major tasks ahead, and insofar as the remaining
militia forces are being re-equipped or retrained to be more
effective military units, the effort to stabilize the region
is being set back. Even if the measures outlined in para 5
move forward, it is clear that a fair amount of time will
still be required to establish fully durable security
conditions and stability in the district. End comment.

MEECE