JAMAICA - DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR WHA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINGSTON 002346

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, WHA/CAR AND WHA/PPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/15
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PREL JM
SUBJECT: JAMAICA - DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR WHA
FOCUS COUNTRIES

REF: A. STATE 169581

B. STATE 187264

C. STATE 156961

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas C. Tighe. Reasons 1.4(b) and (
d).

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Introduction
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1. (C) P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister since 1992, has
announced his intention to step down no later than March
2006, and possibly as early as late 2005. Four senior
members of his ruling Peoples National Party (PNP) will
contest an internal PNP election to succeed Patterson as
party president and prime minister. General elections must
be held by October 2007, but under the Westminster system
Patterson (or his successor) need not wait until then to call
early elections. On the other side of the political aisle,
Leader of the Opposition Bruce Golding, who replaced former
PM Edward Seaga at the helm of the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP)
only in May 2005 following Seaga's 30-year run as party
leader, is attempting to position the JLP to win the next
elections and form the national government for the first time
since 1989.


2. (C) Other important developments in the near term include
the arrival at Post of our newly confirmed COM, Ambassador
Brenda Johnson, in November, and the February 2006 scheduled
transition from the IGOH to a new Haitian government. A
successful democratic transfer of power in Haiti will remove
an issue that became a major bilateral irritant due to the
Patterson government's suspicion of USG complicity in
Aristide's departure from Haiti in February 2004.


3. (C) Paragraphs 4 through 12 contain Post's responses to
the questions set forth Ref raised Ref A.

Key areas of democratic deficit and the 3-5 most important
desired outcomes over next 6-8 months:


4. (C) Though justly proud of its unbroken run of legitimate,
democratic transfers of power since independence in 1962,
Jamaica today faces serious problems that do not (yet)
necessarily constitute a democratic deficit, but could lead
to one. Rampant corruption - from barely concealed
interaction between PNP and JLP politicians at all levels
with "businessmen", "community leaders" or "political allies"
known or suspected to be involved in narcotics trafficking or
other criminal activities, to the involvement in or
toleration of illicit behavior by members of the Jamaica
Constabulary Force - sustains a widespread perception among
the electorate that both parties are bereft of real ideas and
unable to take meaningful steps to address corruption.
Violent crime is a major problem, and Jamaica currently
boasts one of the top three per-capita murder rates in the
world. Public concern about violent crime, coupled with a
widespread perception that the JCF and GOJ are unable to
contain it, opens a "credibility gap" between government and
governed. Meanwhile, economic stagnation, rising oil prices,
a decline in the agricultural sector due to the end of
long-standing European sugar quotas, high levels of debt, and
high unemployment/underemployment rate. A sustained decline
in Jamaica's all-important tourism sector due to a U.S.
economic downturn could further exacerbate the situation.

Six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy:


5. (C) Anticipating a change in the governing party's
political leadership in early-to-mid 2006, as well as a
simultaneous increase in political posturing in the run-up to
the national elections due by late 2007, Post recommends:

- more visible USG efforts to reinforce/support appropriate
GOJ crime-fighting initiatives, with an emphasis on crime
that directly or indirectly impacts U.S. society or
interests, such as narcotics trafficking (with its attendant
violence) and official corruption;

- increasing our efforts to ostracize those engaged in
official corruption by using INA 212(f) and other appropriate
consular tools to cancel non-immigrant visas of corrupt
police, businesspersons, and politicians. The ability to
travel to the U.S. for familial-, educational-, recreational-
and other reasons is extremely important and/or desirable to
most Jamaicans, making the potential loss of this privilege a
source of considerable leverage.

- coupling anti-crime initiatives with advocacy for
legislation allowing for asset forfeiture, plea bargaining,
etc.;

- exploring ways of filling the Jamaica Defense Force's (JDF)
officer training void (precipitated by recently announced,
heavy UK and Canadian reductions in long-standing programs
for initial officer training and aviation training of JDF
personnel) to ensure that Venezuela, Cuba, or China do not
exploit the situation; and
- exploring ways to strengthen the judicial system with
technological assistance, basic equipment (such as court
stenography machines); training in the proper disposition of
cases; vetting of personnel in sensitive positions, etc.


6. (C) Because PM Patterson has for so long failed to act
decisively against corrupt subordinates or associates, his
periodic public utterances on the issue are often dismissed
as lip service, and temporary public outrage at each new
scandal is quickly replaced by resigned acceptance of the
reality and inevitability of corruption. In the sunset of
his political life, mindful of his legacy and with no more
elections to contest personally, Patterson could perhaps
afford to act decisively against corruption now in a way he
has never done; however, with what is projected to be a close
general election looming on the horizon, he is unlikely to
take meaningful steps out of concern that a truly impartial
stance against corruption could complicate his party's
chances of winning yet again. JCF/JDF successes against
violent, often politically connected criminal gangs in the
coming months, followed by swift prosecution of suspects
would increase public confidence in the justice system, the
JCF, and the GOJ. The end of the hurricane season should
allow the GOJ to focus on addressing economic problems
without worrying about every tropical storm reported over the
horizon.

Major needs from the Department or other parts of the USG,
including resources, high-level visits, public
diplomacy-related efforts, that would support accomplishing
these objectives


7. (C) Developments in more troubled neighboring countries
rightly absorbing greater attention by senior Department and
Washington officials, but USG actions and opinions carry
great weight with the GOJ and the Jamaican public, even when
they disagree with us. Properly conceived and executed, more
frequent public engagement on Jamaican issues (such as those
described in Sections A and B, above) by senior USG officials
would go a long way here, as was demonstrated in the
trafficking in persons (TIP) arena. Washington- and
Embassy-based discussion of TIP initially met with
considerable resistance from the GOJ, which did not
understand the problem, and which initially viewed our
efforts as unfounded and unjustly punitive. By repeatedly
engaging with officials, private sector contacts, and
particularly the public diplomacy engagement via radio and
television, however, G/TIP and Embassy efforts eventually
resulted in a reluctant acknowledgment of the problem, public
awareness of it, and a promising GOJ campaign to address TIP.


Major impediments, including resource, political, or
structural, to accomplishing these outcomes:


8. (C) Apart from the Department's anticipated FY 2006
resource constraints, possible and probable impediments are
discussed in Paragraphs 9, 10, 12 and 13.

Other countries, organizations or groups with significant
influence on GOJ:


9. (C) As a founding member of Caricom, the GOJ often looks
first to fellow anglophone CARICOM states for political and
moral support, particularly in coordinating its positions in
a UN or OAS context. Despite Caricom's notable lack of
political agility - witness its months-long dithering on
Haiti during the crisis surrounding Aristide's 2004 departure
- due in large measure to the consensus principle on which it
operates, the dream of ever increasing Caribbean integration
is a strong one in Jamaica, and any conceivable future GOJ
would be likely to continue at least to pay lip service to
this ideal.


10. (C) An able politician who came of age politically during
mentor Prime Minister Michael Manley's economically
disastrous 1970's experiment with "democratic socialism"
(both the JLP and PNP grew out of the country's labor
movement, but only PNP members still address each other as
"Comrade"),Patterson's thinking has evolved considerably,
and he well understands globalization, market forces, and the
importance of the U.S. (as a major consumer of Jamaican
goods, and as a source of tourists, foreign investment, and
remittances) to Jamaica's economy, while maintaining a
profound ambivalence about, even a mistrust of, the USG. A
staunch believer in multilateralism as the surest way for
smaller states to ensure their voices (and votes) are heard
by wealthier countries, Patterson in particular has sought to
work with the G-77 countries (which Jamaica currently chairs)
to enhance the UN's role and authority, and to make the UN
more responsive to the types of "development" issues
important to Jamaica. Given the small size and relative
paucity of energy resources in many CARICOM states (Trinidad
being a notable exception),Patterson was the first CARICOM
head of government to conclude a "PetroCaribe" petroleum
agreement with Venezuela. Mindful of USG concerns about GOV
motives without ever specifically acknowledging them,
however, Patterson publicly emphasized that there were "no
strings attached" to his oil accord with Hugo Chavez.

Key areas of democracy promotion supported by GOJ:


11. (SBU) Despite serious disagreement with the USG over
Haiti, the GOJ supports the planned elections in Haiti. As a
member of Caricom, the GOJ is attentive to and supportive of
the protection of democracy in member states, but, outside of
Caricom and UN fora, is often reluctant to speak strongly on
such issues.

Evaluate consequences of pursuing proactive reform agenda:


12. (C) Some senior GOJ officials resent what they perceive
as general USG neglect of the bilateral relationship
interspersed with crisis-generated periods of engagement.
For example, during his valedictory speech to PNP loyalists
at the annual party conference in September 2005, on the eve
of his departure for New York to attend UNGA, Patterson
alluded derisively to telephone calls he received from
numerous, unnamed world leaders (one of whom was the
Secretary) to discuss the hectic final negotiations of UN

SIPDIS
reform issues. Patterson and other senior GOJ officials have
told us publicly and privately that they would welcome
increased USG engagement - particularly within a CARICOM
context.

13 (C) At the same time, however, Patterson and some within
his party might be inclined to suspect or resent a
high-profile, USG-backed "reform agenda" given that the PNP
has been in government since 1989, and in a position to have
done more about Jamaican problems. With elections looming,
the JLP could be expected to attempt to exploit any
indication that the USG viewed the PNP government with
disfavor, particularly on corruption or competency grounds.
Further complicating matters are troubling indications of
serious corruption issues involving some prominent JLP
figures, and their concern over the potential ramifications
of increased USG attention to such matters is something of a
wild card. A "marriage of convenience" with similarly
concerned PNP counterparts to oppose our efforts could not
ruled out. In any event, greater USG engagement in opposing
corruption and strengthening the judiciary would have to be
carefully crafted to avoid the perception that it was
intended to influence the electoral outcome or otherwise
violate Jamaican sovereignty.
TIGHE