COAS THAPA WELCOMES PROPOSAL THAT KING CALL FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002549

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, H
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MCAP MASS NP
SUBJECT: COAS THAPA WELCOMES PROPOSAL THAT KING CALL FOR
INTERNATIONALLY MONITORED CEASE-FIRE

REF: KATHMANDU

Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) In a November 22 meeting, COAS Thapa thought the
Ambassador's suggestion that the King call for an
internationally-monitored cease-fire was a good proposal.
Thapa denied there was any cooling of our military-military
relationship and welcomed a visit by PACOM Commander Admiral
Fallon. The Chief indicated that he was concerned that Nepal
was not receiving U.S. security assistance. The Ambassador
stressed that we needed to see the King reach out to the
political parties to agree on a way forward before we could
provide the M-16s. The recently enacted Leahy Amendment
conditioning future FMF, reflected that concern. COAS Thapa
strongly objected to Senator Leahy's November 18 statement on
Nepal, claiming that his comments about the army "invited
civil war." Thapa also emphasized that Nepal should not
deviate from the two principles of constitutional monarchy
and multi-party democracy. He worried that India was moving
away from those fundamental principles and sought an end to
the monarchy. End Summary.

Ambassador: King Should Call For International Monitored
Cease-Fire
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The Ambassador suggested that the smartest thing the
King could do would be to publicly announce that he wanted
peace and call for a cease-fire hammered out in the presence
of, and monitored by, international observers. If the
Maoists accepted it, Nepal would have a real cease-fire. The
insurgents would not be able to extort, intimidate and
terrorize the populace as they continued to do during the
current unilateral cease-fire, and thus their power and
influence in the countryside would drop immediately. Knowing
their strength would decline, the Maoists might walk away
from the King's call for an internationally monitored
cease-fire. If they did, they would reveal their true
intentions to the international community and force the
political parties to recognize that the Maoists' actions had
been a tactical ploy. COAS Thapa agreed this was a good
concept and strategy. It was "something we need to do." He
added that an extension of the cease-fire could also be
helpful for elections. When Thapa asked that the Ambassador
raise this with the leaders of the government, the Ambassador
informed him that he had discussed it with Vice-Chairmen
Bista and Giri the day before.

Importance of Military-Military Relationship
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3. (C) The Ambassador stressed the strong desire to continue
a normal working relationship with the Nepali military.
Thapa thanked the Ambassador and stated that Nepal would
welcome a visit by Admiral Fallon, Commander US PACOM, noting
that Lt. Gen Brown's visit had been productive. The
Ambassador also raised our concern that it appeared that RNA
personnel were avoiding us - they were reluctant to meet
with us or attend our social events. We had noted a real
drop in contacts and worried about the signal the RNA was
giving. He stressed that we were trying to work for the
betterment of Nepal and felt it necessary for the Parties and
the King to reconcile to address the insurgency. In the
interim, if our military-to-military ties started to
deteriorate, it would hurt our overall relationship. Thapa
denied that there was a policy to restrict contact. He noted
that Nepal was sending its Director for Military Intelligence
to the U.S. He added, however, that his officers needed to
be careful not to make any political statements. Thapa
emphasized that there was no planned cooling of the
relationship, but commented that the U.S.'s cancellation of a
number of joint exercises had not gone unnoticed.

Need Security Assistance
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4. (C/NF) COAS Thapa said Nepal was fighting a "real war,"
and appreciated that the U.S. realized Nepal faced a major
Maoist threat. He lamented that Nepal was not getting the
weapons it needed. He said he had heard that the U.S. had
pressured Korea not to sell Nepal 73mm rockets for
helicopters. When the Ambassador explained that we had not
objected, Thapa corrected himself and said that India had.
The Ambassador told Thapa that we had also informed Israel
that we did not object to its sale of M-16 ammunition. Thapa
said that the Israelis had had to delay the sale, but that
the ammunition was scheduled to arrive at the end of
December. Thapa complained again that INSAS rifles did not
perform well in the heat of battle. The Ambassador responded
that he hoped we would soon see the conditions necessary to
allow us to ship the almost 3,600 M-16s in storage. Nepal
knew what it had to do for this to be possible.

Need For Reconciliation Between Palace and Parties
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5. (C) Describing his November 17-18 trip to New Delhi, the
Ambassador explained that there was a convergence of policy
between the U.S. and India -- we want to see reconciliation
between the Palace and the political parties and we recognize
that the Maoists still represent a real danger to Nepal.
Thapa noted that the UML becoming closer with the Maoists
made the situation more difficult. He argued that the
Parties should take the initiative for dialogue with the
King, but they had not even responded to the King's Dashain
message about talks. The Ambassador countered that since the
King controlled most of the power, the King needed to find a
way to reach out.

Leahy Amendment Underscores That Need
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6. (C) The Ambassador shared with COAS Thapa copies of the
Senate Appropriations Bill containing the conditions for
Nepal to receive Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Senator
Leahy's November 18 statement on Nepal. The Ambassador
explained that, in addition to our ongoing interest in human
rights in Nepal, the new conditions reflected the concern in
the U.S. that there be a reconciliation between the Palace
and the political parties. COAS Thapa objected strenuously
to the Senator's comments that the RNA had to make choices
between the people and the monarchy. He accused the Senator
of trying to get the RNA involved, when it had been trying
hard to remain separate, from the political process. He
stressed Nepal's history of a "trinity: the people, the
military and the monarchy." He added, however, that the RNA
would not go with any group that sided with the terrorists.
He claimed that the Senator's words were "inviting civil
war." The Ambassador pushed back, saying that the Senator's
views reflected a deepening sense of worry in the U.S. The
King was ten months into the current experiment, but there
did not seem to be a way out. Elections could be an option,
but the political parties had legitimate concerns that needed
to be addressed through dialogue with the King.


7. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the U.S. remained
concerned about human rights. Thapa asserted that the RNA
continued to make progress and provided access to
organizations to places of detention. He noted that although
the ICRC still had reservations, they were close to reaching
an agreement to resume visits to barracks. The Ambassador
stressed the importance of the RNA finalizing such an
agreement with ICRC.

India a Factor
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8. (C) Thapa emphasized that Nepal considered India an
important factor. He worried that the GOI might deviate from
supporting the "twin pillars of constitutional monarchy and

multi-party democracy." He said he was already concerned
about India arranging talks between the Parties and the
Maoists. In addition, India had not put enough pressure on
the Parties to talk with the Palace. He lamented that India
had designs to get rid of the monarchy, Sikkimize Nepal and
gain control of its water resources. The Ambassador
responded that the U.S. and India agreed that it was critical
that the King seek a compromise with the political parties.
We shared the concern that the Maoists were looming, waiting
to seize power. The Ambassador continued that the Government
of India clearly understood the negative consequences if
Nepal ended up with a radical regime.

Constituent Assembly a Pandora's Box
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9. (C) Thapa reiterated that there should be no deviation
from the principles of constitutional monarchy and
multi-party democracy. He claimed that holding a constituent
assembly would be like "opening Pandora's box." He added
that there were still rightists who could call for a return
to the partyless democratic system again (panchayat system).
He cautioned that if people tried to change the Constitution,
"civil war and chaos" would result.

Comment
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10. (C) COAS Thapa betrayed deep worry about the need for
lethal security assistance. He eagerly welcomed the
Ambassador's proposal for an internationally-monitored
cease-fire that would give the RNA a continued respite and
more time to get needed assistance. His explanations for the
recent downturn in contacts between the military was weak,
but hopefully he got our message.
MORIARTY