Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KATHMANDU2548
2005-11-22 11:28:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR REVIEWS POSSIBLE PARTY-MAOIST

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV MASS MCAP NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKT #2548/01 3261128
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221128Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9207
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 8986
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1907
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 8815
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 3950
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3371
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 3675
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1692
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002548 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MASS MCAP NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS POSSIBLE PARTY-MAOIST
AGREEMENT, CHINESE WEAPONS SALES WITH INDIAN AMBASSADOR

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2516

B. BEIJING 18209

C. BEIJING 18123

Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

Welcoming a UML-Maoist Agreement?
----------------------------------

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002548

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MASS MCAP NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS POSSIBLE PARTY-MAOIST
AGREEMENT, CHINESE WEAPONS SALES WITH INDIAN AMBASSADOR

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2516

B. BEIJING 18209

C. BEIJING 18123

Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

Welcoming a UML-Maoist Agreement?
--------------


1. (C) In a November 21 discussion on developments in Nepal,
the Ambassador and Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee discussed
a reported agreement between the political parties and the
Maoists. The Ambassador related that British Ambassador
Keith Bloomfield had approached him at a social function on
November 18 to report that CPN-UML General Secretary MK
Nepal, upon his return from New Delhi over the November 19-20
weekend, would announce an agreement with the Maoists. The
terms of the agreement reportedly were that the Maoists would
put their weapons under international supervision at the time
of constituent assembly elections to be organized by an
interim government. Bloomfield had asked that the USG
endorse such an agreement if announced. (Note: MK Nepal did
not make such an announcement over the weekend, but said that
the Maoists would make an announcement in about a month.
According to UML sources, any agreement between the UML and
the Maoists would need approval by the UML's Central
Committee and Standing Committee; presumably the seven-party
alliance would also need to discuss and approve it. End
Note.)


2. (C) The Ambassador explained to Mukherjee that he had said
to Bloomfield that while the USG would welcome anything
bringing the Maoists back into the political mainstream, "the
devil would be in the details" of any such agreement. He had
noted that the proposal Bloomfield had outlined was the same
program the Maoists had long been pushing; it appeared to
contain nothing preventing the Maoists from resorting to
violence before constituent assembly elections. The
Ambassador had conveyed to Bloomfield that such an agreement
could be highly dangerous to the Parties, who would be
greatly at risk if the Maoists moved back to violence after
signing a pact with the Parties.


3. (S/NF) Mukherjee agreed that we had to push the political
parties to be cautious. He commented that the Parties say
the right things to us, but were under a great deal of
pressure that could force them in strange directions. The
Indian Ambassador stressed that he did not know what the
Indian intelligence agencies were doing regarding arranging
and organizing meetings for Maoists or Party leaders in
India, that was "left to RAW." That said, Mukherjee
stressed, Indian policy pushed for reconciliation between the
King and Parties and recognized the danger of pushing a
flawed agreement between the Parties and the Maoists.

Chinese Arms Sales to Nepal?
--------------


4. (S/NF) The Ambassador also relayed to Mukherjee the
details of his November 18 discussion with Chinese Ambassador
Sun Heping (ref A),who had categorically denied that China
had large commercial weapons sales to Nepal in the works.
The Ambassador compared Sun's assurances to the responses we
had received in Beijing (refs B, C),which had been somewhat
ambiguous about the sales. Noting that China had now
received strong demarches from the U.S. and India, the
Ambassador commented to Mukherjee that it appeared that the
commercial deal might not be going through. Mukherjee agreed
and said he would ask his Defense Attach to investigate
further. The Ambassador remarked that the indication that
the Chinese were not providing large-scale military support
to Nepal dovetailed with an apparent desire on behalf of the
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to see the Maoist three month
cease-fire extended and the government reciprocate. The RNA
might well be getting nervous again about its lack of weapons
and ammunition the Ambassador speculated. Mukherjee stated
that in his last meeting with Chief of Army Staff Thapa,

Thapa had pushed India to release security assistance in the
pipeline; if the RNA was going to receive AK-47s from China,
Thapa would not have been so concerned about getting the
Indian INSAS rifles, Mukherjee concluded. The Indian
Ambassador added that, in his next meeting with COAS Thapa,
he would encourage Thapa to highlight to the King the Army's
dire needs and the desirability of a cease-fire.
MORIARTY