Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05KABUL5198
2005-12-21 11:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT HERAT: TROUBLING ISSUES AFFECT HERAT'S DIAG

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005198 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/CT AND SA/A
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT HERAT: TROUBLING ISSUES AFFECT HERAT'S DIAG
PROCESS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005198

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/CT AND SA/A
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT HERAT: TROUBLING ISSUES AFFECT HERAT'S DIAG
PROCESS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Herat Governor Anwari is angered by reported
MOI criticism of DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups)
in his province. It is Kabul, he affirmed at the December 14
weekly DIAG Committee meeting, which is underperforming. The
GOA, moreover, has failed, so far, to force Herat's two major
warlords, Ismael Khan and Amanullah Khan, to comply with
DIAG. Neither, Anwari said, can be brought to heel from
Herat, and the success of DIAG depends on such compliance.
Even more fundamental, the provincial entities tasked with
enforcing DIAG, especially police, lack the necessary tools,
such as boots, coats, food, and fuel, for even basic
operations. While inter-agency bickering in Herat can
probably be overcome with a committed Governor Anwari, such
basics as proper equipment, fuel, and timely pay, are just as
critical for DIAG success. End Summary.


2. (C) There was tension in the air at Herat Governor
Anwari's December 14 DIAG meeting, attended by most of
Herat's senior security leadership, the PRT and RCAG-West
commanders, UNAMA, lead Italian PRT civilian Ambassador Carlo
Ungaro, and PRToff, among others. Herat is one of the DIAG
to four, Phase I provinces, and the Governor has affirmed he
is committed to a successful DIAG in his province during his
tenure.

--------------
Disconnect with Kabul...
--------------


3. (C) The Governor stated he felt the DIAGprocess in Herat
had moved forward with weapons collection as well as could be
expected, given the constraints. He then noted a recent MOI
evaluation which criticized DIAG in Herat for its tardiness.
The key issue, Anwari said, and one Kabul apparently has
chosen to ignore, is the confiscation of weapons held by
Herat's two most prominent warlords, Energy Minister Ismael
Khan (IK) and his rival Amanullah Khan (AK). Only the
central government, Anwari argued, and not the provincial
one, can address the weaponry held by these two
"troublemakers."


4. (C) Anwari angrily rejected the MOI criticism. IK,
Anwari said, had been granted political and social privileges
in Kabul. He should thus be forced by the GOA to make his
commanders comply with DIAG. AK, on the other hand, was a
criminal and should be removed by the GOA from Shindand
District, his personal fiefdom. Moreover, provincial
authorities had no authorization from Kabul to order IK and
AK personnel to comply with DIAG. Unless Kabul takes action
regarding the two warlords, the Governor warned that
additional DIAG meeting would be a waste of time.

--------------
...and within Herat
--------------


5. (C) Governor Anwari fixated on the lack of coordination
within the D&R Commission in Kabul and the mixed signals
being sent to him. Herat, he affirmed, had been selected for
DIAG Phase I because of its strong leadership. Now, others
were saying his leadership was unsatisfactory. Still, Anwari
asked his security team if Herat could do better. How, he
asked, could the process be accelerated? This resulted in
provincial interagency bickering about information sharing
and alleged hoarding of weapons by various police entities.
ANBP accused the police of hoarding a large amount of
"unauthorized" munitions and ordnance (e.g., mortars, RPG's,
artillery shells). Herat Chief of Police Salangi retorted
that the police had never been requested to turn in such
munitions. Regarding already identified weapons caches the
police were to have confiscated, ANBP alleged that the police
had not delivered these weapons under DIAG as it should have.
The Governor did not seem pleased with the quarreling among
his security cabinet in front of the non-Afghan attendees.
(Note: ANBP later affirmed to PRToff that Herat PC
coordination is very good and the Governor, very motivated
and committed. End Note.)

--------------
Lack of Enabling Tools
--------------


6. (C) According to provincial Chief of Information and
Culture Bahara, Kabul DIAG leadership is critical of the
apparent lack of a public information campaign in Herat.
However, Bahara explained, no budget had been allocated for
television, radio, and print media -- which in any case would
have scant impact in much of rural Herat. Still, he felt the
message was getting through as well as anywhere else in the
country despite the dearth of information flow from Kabul.
DIAG West General Aziz pointed out that Imams were being
asked to deliver the DIAG message, a potentially very
effective tool for small weapons holders. (Note: ANBP again
affirmed to PRToff that it enjoys good ties with Herat
Culture and Information officials. Also, there is resistance
among some mullahs to preaching the DIAG message, according
to ANBP. End Note.)


7. (C) Police shortcomings are even more severe. After the
DIAG meeting, Salangi told PRToff that the policemen being
asked to enforce DIAG lack uniforms, coats, boots, and food
-- a similar situation exists with the Border Police as well.
The average police station receives about five liters of
fuel daily total for all vehicles, he maintained. Despite a
German-financed maintenance depot in Herat City, vehicle
maintenance in outlying areas remains a severe problem.
Embedded Regional Training Center (RTC) U.S. mentors
confirmed that their trainees lack even the most basic
equipment.

--------------
Oil on the Waters
--------------


8. (C) PRToff intervened to soften the Governor's threat
that MOI take back its words or else. All recognized, PRToff
said, that there were leadership and coordination problems in
Kabul. In addition, he noted, there is consensus that unless
the IK/AK issue is resolved, DIAG in Herat would have little
impact. Finally, police participation in DIAG was critical
to its success; the police are either part of the problem or
part of the solution. Thus, we should identify their needs
and urge the police receive the tools to do the job. The
Governor seemed placated with the pledge for our continued
support for DIAG in Herat.


9. (C) Herat Comment: A number of the key Herat players in
the DIAG process are alleged to have ties with IK, and this
could well complicate DIAG's forward movement. A more
aggressive approach to the two warlords from Kabul, we feel,
would help negate this. However, Kabul criticism of DIAG in
Herat, without providing the most basic tools for success,
will doom DIAG from the start. Efforts must be made to get
the tools to the enablers, and to sustain them over time.
Despite reported assurances to the contrary, the MOI has
failed, so far, in delivering adequate tools to any of the
police services here.


10. (C) Embassy Comment: The international community (Japan,
UNAMA, ANBP) approached President Karzai last week about
reining in IK; Karzai was non-committal, but offered no
objections to the international community's pressuring IK.
In the absence of a strong central governmental leadership
and backing for this program, starting with the President, it
will be difficult to make significant progress with the
politically sensitive program. End Comment.
NEUMANN