URGENT RESOURCE REQUEST TO SUPPORT AFGHAN BORDER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005185

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, ISN/ECC FOR JCOLLINS
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, AMEND
CJTF-76 FOR POLAD, CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A
TREASURY FOR PARAMESWARAN

SENSITIVE

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS ECON EFIN AF
SUBJECT: URGENT RESOURCE REQUEST TO SUPPORT AFGHAN BORDER
MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE (BMI)

Ref: KABUL 4952

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) We have long recognized the Border Management
Initiative (BMI) as a top USG priority for mission success
in Afghanistan givendue to its links to GoA revenue
generation, security, and counter-narcotics initiatives.
Reftel laid out the basic elements of a BMIn approach that
we now make more concrete. Washington help will be
essential.


2. (SBU) Significant progress in realizing BMI goals needs
to begin with a trial project targeting Herat province
customs revenue generation and Afghan Border Police Sixth
Brigade security activities along the Iranian border. This
border point hosts has the largest flow of commercial
traffic in Afghanistan. We are moving rapidly to design a
new trial plan with the involvement of Ministries of Finance
and Interior. Its success will require the urgent
deployment of additional resources to Afghanistan by
Washington agencies, including as follows:

-- Customs, counter-narcotics and border patrol technical
experts (e.g., immigration) to be deployed to the Herat
customs areas, Afghan Border Police brigades, the MoF, and
the MoI as advisors and mentors. Onward dDeployment of
these resources to other border posts may be necessary
later.

-- Supplemental resources, including specialized equipment
to support customs, counter-narcotics and specified border
patrol activities.

END SUMMARY

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Background
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3. (SBU) Recent fact-finding missions by the Ambassador, the
ARG Chief of Staff and a State Dept. EXBS expert to Herat
province and the Islam Qalah border crossing point pilot
project have revealed the need for significant improvement
in customs organization and Ministry of Finance/Ministry of
Interior cooperation. Under the current customs clearing
system, traders declare goods at Islam Qalah and then clear
those goods and pay associated duties at the customs house
in Herat city, over 100 km inland. While this arrangement
is common -- and even regarded as a "best practice" -- in
more developed countries, under primitive conditions in
Afghanistan it permits tremendous leakage in imported cargo,
much of which either bypasses the customs house via other
transport routes or else is sold into the local market
before reaching the customs house. There is also a general
lack of oversight in the customs yards at both Islam Qalah
and Herat, allowing further leakage in cargo. Moreover, the
customs organization in Herat province is rife with
corruption. Imported goods are regularly undervalued or
improperly declared in exchange for bribes paid to customs
officials, resulting in significant losses in customs
revenue to the central government and significant increases
in illicit revenues to local drug networks, warlords, and
other destabilizing elements.


4. (SBU) The Sixth Brigade of the Afghan Border Police
(ABP),which is tasked with securing the Herat, Farah, and
Baghdis province borders against illegal immigration and the
smuggling of legal and illegal goods (including narcotics
and weapons) must receive adequate resources from the
Ministry of Interior in terms of staffing, salaries,
training, equipment, and sustainment funding for
sustainment. The head of the Sixth Brigade, Col Ayoub,
enabled by excellent mentoring and support from the CFC-A
LNO, has done admirable work in rooting out corruption and
combating cross-border threats, including narcotics
trafficking. The implementation of the USG-approved Police
Rreform Pprogram, which prioritizes border police
development, is addressing these resource shortfalls.
Additionally, when the Border Police worked by themselves,
they generated serious disagreements with the Ministry of
Finance (that controls the Customs Service). This
disagreement has blocked further progress of the unilateral
border plan designed earlier. It is clear from this
experiment that we have identified the problem but must have
a new approach that both generates GoA buy in and builds GoA
capacity to go forward without our running the program.


5. (SBU) To that end we are now focused on generating a new
trial project at Islam Qalah with border police and customs
to be designed in the Border Management Working Group with
agreed timelines, goals, and international participation.
The latter will be essential to referee differences between
GoA agencies and provide a neutral point of evaluation.
Without such oversight,that, the effort will degenerate into
mutual finger pointing among Afghan officials, an easy cover
for those whose illicit revenue is going to be squeezed by
more effective customs collection. Hence there is a need
for personnel resources with the experience to be credible
in this difficult endeavor.


6. (SBU) An additional problem is that the central Afghan
government continues to lack the political will necessary to
reform its customs and border police organizations. We are
undertaking a significant high level political push to
generate support for the new approach. Ambassador recently
met with Minister of Finance Ahady to discuss the issue of
corruption and the lack of will on the part of the MoF and
MoI to resolve the problems. The response was somewhat
positive in that the Minister agreed to revitalize MoF's
participation in the Border Management Working Group. He
also agreed to the new concept of a trial project at Islam
Qalah, including returning customs officers to the post.
However, he also pushed back fairly strongly, asserting that
Border Police are also corrupt, rejecting CFC-A's figures
for projected revenue figures and asking for a master plan
for dealing with corruption and customs control.


7. (SBU) These counter-arguments are not strong: The border
police on the whole may be corrupt, but are relatively clean
at Islam Qalah; the CFC-A's revenue projections LNO's
figures are based on ground-level observation of traffic
and, while the amount is debatable by experts, it is clear
the bottom line that extensive smuggling is costing the GoA
large amounts of revenue is certain. While the U.S. is
certainly committed to helping the GoA root out corruption
and is helping to formulate a master plan, the
responsibility for generating a plan to counter corruption
and institute customs reform rests squarely with the
Ministry of Finance. Nor is it reasonable to wait for a
perfect plan before making progress. It appears that
broader strokes (to include the replacement of senior MoF
officials responsible for customs) will be required to
galvanize GoA reform. A firm MoI commitment to provide the
border police adequate resources will also be required. To
this end the Ambassador will be meeting in the near future
with Acting Minister of Interior Moqbol to rejuvenate MoI's
participating in the Border Management Working Group.

8 (SBU) The Ambassador has also secured the support of
Deputy UNAMA chief Ambassador Alexander for strong UN
political support for the trial plan. This is exactly the
kind of political support envisioned for the new Donors
Coordinating committee that will be set up during the London
Conference. ARG Chief of Staff met on December 19 with
German Ambassador Freck who agreed to support the trial
concept in the Border Management Working Group. The World
Bank also is a key player in the Border Management Working
Group. On December 20 Econ Counselor has discussed the
issue with World Bank Country Director Mazurelle, who
strongly supported the Islam Qalah trial project initiative
and pledged the assistance of two consultants currently
supporting the Bank's Emergency Customs Modernization and
Trade facilitation project.

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Recent Actions
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9. (SBU) Since Reftel, and in addition to the meetings noted
above, Post has taken the following actions to move the
Border Management initiative forward:

-- Conducted fact-finding missions to Herat province and the
Islam Qalah border crossing point;

-- Met with MoI Deputy Minister and the heads of the Border
Police and Customs Police to inform them of USG efforts and
begin building a positive working relationship moving
forward;

-- Met with EC's in-country leadership to de-conflict
construction plans at Shir Khan Bandar border crossing
point;

-- State ISN/EXBS sent its South Asia Program Manager to
Afghanistan, together with a dedicated personal services
contractor who will serve for 6 months to 1 year as the EXBS
liaison officer to Afghanistan to push the trial project
forward. This visit included extensive consultations with
ARG and CFC-A personnel, meetings with all international
donor implementing partners and senior officials at MoI and
MoF, as well as a Herat site-visit1;.


*

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Planned Actions
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7. (SBU) Post plans to take the following actions in the
coming two months:

-- Embassy Country Team will move forward the trial program
at Islam Qalah and attempt to expand it to other customs
posts. Once this trial has demonstrated a feasible
solution, we would move to apply the same solution to
Towrkham, to the remaining three priority crossing points,
and finally to the balance of the 13 crossings locations.
We would then follow with a period of international
monitoring.

-- Meet with International Community (IC) January 12 to
confirm and solidify a comprehensive list of donor resources
and to ensure donor buy-in and coordinated donor action (we
had hoped to meet this week but too many of the key players
have departed for Christmas breaks).

-- Convene a meeting of the Executive Steering Committee
which includes GoA Ministers, U.S. Ambassador, ARG Chief of
Staff, CFC-A CG, and appropriate IC chiefs of mission/party
January 17 to brief the GoA and gain their support for the
IC plan's Islam Qalah trial and attempt to get approval on
the concept of expanding the plan to other customs posts

-- Convene a meeting of the Border Management Working Group
(includes GoA, USG, and IC) February 4. Sub-working-group
level meetings to follow to drill down into specific issues.

-- In response to Reftel request, EXBS will coordinate DHS
expertise and other resources to meet the needs of the
Country Team.

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Required Resources
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8. (SBU) Expanding on Reftel requests, Embassy Country Team
requests the following support on an immediate basis:

-- Customs, border patrol, and counter-narcotics subject-
matter experts to be deployed within key customs areas, ABP
brigades, the MoF, and the MoI as advisors and mentors.
Deployments would begin within the Herat/Islam Qalah customs
structure and the ABP Sixth brigade. When reforms are
sufficiently completed, most personnel would be transferred
to the next BCP/Brigade combination, with some personnel
remaining behind to provide quality assurance and oversight.

-- Supplemental resource requirements will be identified by
subject matter experts by March, 2006 as the Herat/Islam
Qalah trial moves forward. These resource requirements will
likely include specialized equipment to support customs,
border patrol, and counter-narcotics activities, including
items such as fixed gamma scanners for use at ports of entry
to facilitate more thorough and efficient inspection of
inbound cargo.

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Conclusion
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9. (SBU) The Border Management Initiative is a top priority.
Generating increased GoA revenue is critical to the long
term sustainability of the Afghan government and to reducing
the need to have donors to fund normal GoA running expenses.
Truly securing the major border crossing points and
capturing substantial new customs revenue will be a
difficult long term endeavor given the high levels of
corruption, the vast sums of money involved and the weakness
of the GoA. Success is essential to realizing an Afghan
government that can operate independently of international
donor (and particularly USG) support. Post is poised to
realize significant progress in achieving Border Management
Initiative objectives but requires immediate assistance from
Washington agencies as detailed above.

NEUMANN
_______________________________
1Doug, CG has left the note of the need for scanners in the
penultimate para, but felt it did not belong in a para
focused on recent actions.